May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

Battles , Force

Protection &

Intelligence : What is

apparent & What is

lacking actually.

ATTACK THE NETWORK PLAN

May 6th, 2017

TARGETING IN COIN

Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS

Kinetic Targeting is a process by which physical action

is taken to kill/capture insurgents or for that matter any

enemy in the area of operations in order to negate their

activities/operations in the AO.For example HUMINT

reports bring in information about an insurgent

facilitator of IEDs supply.Kinteic Targeting , that is

killing this element severely affects the IED supply

thus limiting the usage of IEDs by the insurgents.Here

it is very important to choose carefully the targets.They

should be critical nodes in the network , destruction

of which will hamper the overall operations of

the network , not just cut off one single line of

operation.Thus targeting C2 nodes , critical lines of

communication and logistics , important couriers and

informers of the enemy , prime facilitators from among

the local populace , HUMINT agents from among the

local populace and anything or anyone close to the

or collocated with the perceived centrer of gravity of

the network will in effect disrupt enemy operations

as well as planning severely.For example we have

identified and located a high profile insurgent and a

drone attack results in his elimination.Thus we have

successfully removed a node in the network.Now if

we study the second and third order effects of this

attack , that is the resultant action on his colleagues

or men under his command and the effect on the local

population(our HUMINT and CI people keeping a tab

on enemy movements, enemy suspects and activities

of local suspected sympathizers , facilitators) we get

further leads for further targeting actions.It couls be ,

for instance , that after removing this critical node there

is a flurry of activity in the local community among

a select group of people , or maybe demoinstrations

are held thus pinpointing the actual sympathizers(these

can now be included in non-kinetic operations) or

the activity of insurgents themselves which become

observable and thus amenable for intelligence action.

Conventional war sees both adversarys attempting to

utilize the entire spectrum of combined arms warfare

to:

1. Annihilate the others forces

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May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

2. Cause severe attrition to erode the overall

enemy strength and projecting capability so as

to penetrate our defences or mount a piercing

attack or in intelligence terms , be deprived of

projecting interim intelligence enabled combat

troops. same time attritting the adversary’s

strength and their ability to project force.

Coming to asymmetric warfare like guerillas ,

insurgents and terrorists here attrition is not a solution

as most of them , going by Maos principle , are

intent on conserving their forces—that is strength ,

capabilities as they are far outnumbered in and they

cannot afford to take in more casualties by foraying

enmasse into enemy territory like conventional forces

or for that matter projecting their force is not an option

for them.They carefully choose their targets and the

location where they will deliver the attack.All this

done by small line squads while the majority of the

insurgents stay safe at the bases.

Here is where we can arrive at a very important

inference.If the insurgent must conserve his forces

which means as his primary objective is to cause

harm to the security forces without exposing himself

unnecessarily , attacking from deep cover , or

ambush , he needs pewrfect information about the

nature , identity and location of his target/s.To this

end intelligence capability ios critical.If he employs

his own intelligence assets , which are very very

limited , his own men who can keep an eye on troops

movements from afar or from a top vantage point—

and that is quite risky some times , the insurgent

leadership then turn to their main resource base , the

local populace.The limited HUMINT agents of the

insurgent group now recruit sympathizers and others

who support their ideology , or those who bear a

grudge against the local administration , police and

the security forces themselves and now these very

innocuous looking people of the local community in

the AO become the eyes and ears of the enemy.As

per Mao’s principle , we can infer the insurgents

should conserve this HUMINT capability in order to

conserve their forces.This further leads to the fact

that they will also protect their informers and sources

and like a professional intelligence organization will

surely conduct secret meetings to indoctrinate them

on security principles , how to handle their captors if

caught by the security forces and other psychological

instructions.

Whatever be the case the local populace is and should

be the main target of the Army intelligence apparatus

—detect , identify and locate the HUMINT elements.

History , Malaya , Philippines , Iraq , etc ..has proved

time and again that a successful insurgency emerges

only with the support of the local population.

Hence comes into the picture –non-kinetic

targeting.Now it is clear that the insurgents will do

everything possible to keep the population on their

side.If not the entire local populace , well all those

who sympathize or believe in its ideology or others.As

for those elements of the population who are some

way or the other disinterested in the insurgency

movement or even averse to it , these people are kept in

leash by the insurgent leadership.Intimidation , fear ,

torture and even killing—these tactics are resorted

to.But generally the elements of the population who

are so labeled as averse to the insurgents ideology

prefer to keep quiet.These people must be identified

by our intelligence personnel.As they are part and

parcel of the community they can offer valuable

intelligence on the elements of the population who

work for the enemy.They are the best ones suitable for

surveillance , static observation of the neighbourhood ,

getting good access and placement to suspects (after

transmittal of the idea that they are pro-insurgency) ,

reporting on strangers in the village , attending

propaganda meetings and hate-seminars , and knowing

the entire terrain very well so as to advise the security

forces during intelligence preparation of the Area of

Operations.

That said , the Army should and must wage a full

scale parallel war with the insurgents in controlling

and influencing the minds of the population in

their favour.This love/hate triangle is in fact the

most important mission objective.You control the

population , you know the local informers and

logistical supporters of the enemy.Also the safe

houses , staging areas and all clandestine meetings

in the area.Going a step further , detaining such

individuals and interrogating them , or more the better

keeping them under tight surveillance using those

friendly elements of the population you can now detect

and identify their enemy HUMINT contacts.Further

May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

surveillance or arrest and detention followed by

interrogation can lead to weapon caches , staging

areas , other enemy personnel concentration points ,

transit camps , bases—in short you get nearer and

nearewr to the insurgent center of gravity.

This parallel war is in effect information

operations.Information operations , such as periodic

or random announcements by the loudspeaker and

other media enabled platoon , PSYOPS platoon ,

coupled with community development programmes

such as road repairs , distribution of food and sweets

to children at regular intervals in primary schools ,

helpinmg in the digging of wells , improving sanitary

conditions , supplying ‘kambals’ in winter , supply

of free educational books and materials , informing

the community of social service programmes and

financial schemes for the poor taken up by the elected

Government , highlightinmg the insurgents atocrities

elsewhere , impressing upon them the insurgents

concept that he has to influence the population in

order to survive , and many other steps/activities

which can easily be undertaken by the Army as

resources for such activities are not expensive , easily

available and can also be supplemented by the local

administration.The main point which should be driven

home is the population must feel more secure and

happy with the presence of the Army and other

security forces and should understand that the only

objective of the movement is violence and target is the

Government , and that they are least bothered about

the local community , but consider it therir safe haven

where they can hide during the day , where they can

get food , shelter and where they can brainwash and

recruit people to serve their ends.

One of the oft-overlooked consequences of just

about are what we call second- and third-

order effects. Once we have targeted someone or

something we must know how this has influenced the

local population , the insurgent network and even other

criminal enterprises in the AO. Second and third order

effects which might emerge are:

· We might lose local cooperation.

· We might gain local cooperation.

· More enemies may result if the kinetic attack results

in vengeance. Going a step further , the removal of

the insurgent/s may effect certain civilians (apparent

by antagonistic actions , disappearance from their

residence apparently to join the insurgents).Which

means we can now zero in on them as suspects.

Another difference exists between conventional

battles and COIN ops.In conventional battles we

detect , identify , get the precise location and then

nominate as a target , be it a high value target or a

high payoff target.Now Counterintelligence activities

ofcourse happen during conventional warfare but not

as offensively as in a limited war against insurgents

in a limited AO.What I mean to say is it can be one

or several of our agents have infiltrated the network

or trhat we have penetrated trhe network by turning

one or few insurgents to work for us.Now in the

same AO it could well be that a company platoon

is engaged in ops against the enemy in the Eastern

part of the AO.Now if this platoon is not aware

of the agents (infiltratrors) in the enemy who might

be selected for targeting by our platoon intelligence

section , then this is a grave error.Or say we could

be using a rouge insurgent unit (turned) who are

up against the insurgents and they could equally

well do the same thing—target our agents.Hence the

number one priority is deconfliction. The targeting

cell generates intelligence requirements which the

HUMINT collection cell satisfies by its collection

operations.Now the two cases cited above or even in

a case where our soldiers are fighting behind enemy

lines (in the case of COIN we can roughly define that as

deep into their territory , say the insurgents dominated

Assam jungles) , the platoon may not be able to

access the HUMINT cell for information or the current

targeting list and then it will autonomously choose and

finish off the target—who can very well be one of

our own agents. So how do our units avoid targeting

our own agents that have been infiltrated within

adversarial organizations? WE NEED TO HAVE A

CENTRAL AUTHORITY , AN INTELLIGENCE

UNIT , WHOSE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY WILL

BE TO DECONFLICT TARGETING CELL AND

HUMINT CELL ASSETS.This is very important as in

most insurgencies , we have to resort to infiltration.We

must remember an agent placed in the network is

worth 50 machine guns.We cannot afford to lose

him due to lack of deconfliction.We then suffer a

May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

counterintelligence defeat in the hands of our very own

units.

There is a great difference between intelligence

driven targeting and targeting based on surveillance

and reconnaissance.Intelligence is crucial.If it is not

present integrally in the targeting process , you can

not remove the targets efficiently.The success rate

will be incredibly low.Intelligence drives the fight.It

is required to detect , identify , locate the target

precisely , gauge beforehand what can be the second

and third order effects , aid in creating target folders

as per category , aid in target reduction – in short

it is CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT.And Mind you ,

counterintelligence should go hand in hand as it

protects this very same intelligence cycle , vetting the

sources , determining if they are genuine , or planted.It

helps in knowing and locating important targets of

the enemy.It is crucial in in telligence planning.It

generates positive intelligence.It is not exactly an

intelligence discipline but it is more than that—it

is an intelligence and force enabler.In COIN it is

indispensable.Its offensive techniques like penetration

or infiltration can literraly destroy the center of gravity

of the enemy.

In any COIN mission , or operation , just launching

an attack (kinetic that is) on the enemy using

military commonsense or standard combat tactics and

techniques/procedures will not be sufficient.Yes here

also you are targeting , but this targeting is the

usual destruction/removal of adversial elements in

the course of combat as per standard doctrine.You

ned to have ‘’targeting ability’’ , not just manage a

team of trigger pullers.And the management of these

‘’trigger pullers’’ , the Company or Bn must have the

‘’intelligence element’’ as its brain.Then only you have

the required targeting ability so critical for success

in COIN.Be it kinetic or personality targeting or non-

kinetic or psychological targeting.

The parallel war –that is the control of the

local population by both the insurgents and

the Army is essentially Information Warfare.That

includes propaganda and PSYOPS.I must drive

home the most important point in COIN—

THE LOCAL COMMUNITY /POPULATION IS

THE BEST ASSET OF THE INSURGENTS

AND OUR GREATEST THREAT IN TERMS

OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.This is the ‘human

terrain’ distinct from the physical terrain (or developed

infrastructure terrain , that is the security forces

configure existing buildings etc so as to provide force

protection and also building attack resistant/delaying

structures ) which is usually scanned /surveilled

and reconnoitered for intelligence preparation of the

battlefield.Ignoring this human terrain , not developing

it and utilizing it to our advantage places all gains from

intelligence preparation of the battlefield considering

the physical terrain , the enemy , the weather and

environment to a minimum.We must consider non-

kinetic targeting with the same importance like kinetic

targeting.We need to maniupulate the minds of the

population.They are the ones who can provide us hard

much needed information.If we lose their support , the

insurgents get their support.

Take a case in point.An army platoon is engaged

in a combat action with a group of insurgents

and things go wrong.The platoon was initially

firmly emplaced in a built up area , protected and

hardened against enemy fires.But a prolonged combat

resulted in rapid depletion of ammunition and now

the soldiers must flee as reinforcements will take

long to reach the area.Fine—they did just that.The

Company Commander had always recognized the

need to influence the human terrain and today this

platoon got saved just because of their Commanders

foresight.How? On escaping they took refuge among

the local population who gave them shelter , hiding

them from the enemy , and also intelligence about

enemy movements ( they are nbow on the lookout for

the platoon) both to the soldiers and team leader and

also to the headquarters by dispatching a couple of

villagers.So they are now the teams cover , intelligence

collectors and also supply points.Thats the benefit

of information operations in COIN. If you can win

the battle for CONTROL , then you’ll make the

battle of attrition much more difficult FOR THE

ENEMY.Period.

Intelligence Support to Targeting

COIN Specific Intelligence Preparation of the Battle

space (IPB) – the systematic,

continuous process of analyzing the threat and

environment in a specific area with the

NETWORK in perspective.

The commander uses IPB to understand the battle

space and the options it presents to friendly

and threat forces.

May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

By applying the IPB process, the commander gains

the information necessary to selectively

apply and maximize his combat power at critical

points in time and space on the battle space.

Irregular Warfare IPB

The principal difference between IPB for a

conventional warfare environment and that of

irregular warfare is the focus on people and the

accompanying high demand for detailed

information (e.g. – census data and demographic

analysis) required to support the commander’s

decision-making process.

Force protection in a COIN environment is dependent

on several factors. These factors can be

studied and detailed by compiling all data,

demographic, human terrain, enemy, environment and

census. The intelligence preparation of the COIN

battlefield is very different than that of

conventional battlefield. Here we are concerned with

specific physical data so as to be aware of

ambush points, egress and ingress

routes,corridors,avenues of approach for the enemy,

areas or

profiles which can serve as cover for our troops if the

enemy launches a surprise attack, areas

which can provide a good cover for the enemy and

which can serve as good concentration zones

for their personnel etc.Hence intelligence preparation

of the battlefield is of prime importance to

avoid mishaps like Dantewada and the Kashmir cases.

In case of jungle warfare this is more

important and severe constraints are imposed due to

very thick foliage, canopy, water areas,

darkness etc.HUMINT is something which might be

the only intelligence discipline which can

work, other assets being degraded in performance/

capability due to the jungle environment.CI

support is to HUMINT of prime importance,

particularly in inhabited areas belonging to the local

community as the insurgents HUMINT source is the

same local population. This will be detailed

later as to how to employ CI techniques in a COIN

environment.

While preparing the intelligence assessment of the

battlefield in a COIN environment we need to

consider the geospatial aspects in its entirety. To

achieve this we must put on paper a mapping of

all explosive hazards attributes and movement

patterns of the people and insurgents. Detailed

tracking information should be mapped out on map

and imagery templates. This tracking information

can be the event and movement patterns of the

community people and insurgents

prior to, during and after an explosive hazard

detonation and the emplacement of explosive

hazards, types, composition, method of

emplacement etc.Thereafter pattern analysis coupled

with terrain analysis can be executed on these

information.

To enable mapping consider the following:

1. All EH detonations, arrest of people with EH devices

over time need to be tracked and

displayed graphically on a map template.

2. The technology used ,whether the EH was buried or

thrown at the security forces ,

whether it is of blast fragmentation type or shaped etc

need to be documented. This will

yield the operational characteristics of the enemy.

Again every EH needs to be

tracked...keeping a time frame in perspective.

3. Every IED explosion or seizure translates to

information about the bomb maker –his

signature. Examine the IED to ascertain the nature of

ingredients, technology used,

tactics etc.Again map out this signature profile for

every IED.

4. Map the IED events density over the area. Locations,

dates and frequency need to be used

as reference points.

5. Considering only the type of EH used if mapping is

done then we can get a good idea of

May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

sources of particular types of IED or any other

interpretation.

6. Keep in mind that one should track all EH events

with respect to adjoining structural,

organizational, religious entities. For example there

can be a local village near frequent

IED explosions that is hostile to our security forces. Or

say a religious unit is nearby

which is pro-insurgent. These entities can be processed

for more intelligence.

7. Map out those areas of the physical terrain that can

act as good ingress and egress

points/routes/corridors to potential sites for EH

emplacement.

8. Recorded information about the flow of enemy

personnel, weapons, etc need to be

considered in its entirety.

9. From all these EH events based mapping identify/

locate areas which may be used for

deployment of Ordnance/EOD /Engineers personnel

and equipment preferably under

cover to assist in rapid response to IED blasts or

attempts for emplacement.

10. Map out all the routes usually taken by the security

forces , especially in friendly areas

and study the corresponding terrain in detail so as to

ascertain any area/s /points worthy

of IED emplacement /vulnerable to IED and post IED

attacks..Identify those movement

patterns of the security forces which are very frequent

and hence liable for IED’ing.

11. Identify those areas where emplacement of an IED

can potentially cause harm to security

forces but not to the local community shelters. Of

particular note are those communities

who are pro-insurgency.

12. Of all the possible emplacement areas on the map

identify those areas that can serve both

as emplacement and also offer terrain advantages for

immediate secondary gunfire attack

by hidden enemy personnel.

13. Map out those areas of the physical terrain which

can multiply the IED explosion severity

by virtue of natural structures and profiles.

14. Locate and map all areas that can offer good

concealment for ammunition and weaponry

caches and IEDs.

15. Map HUMINT.For example an insurgent operative

was arrested in a certain area away

from his place of residence, another defined area.

16. From all the EH points on the map identify those

that are of low damage capacity than

those that inflict mass casualties. The former takes less

time for emplacement and

difficult to prevent compared to the latter. Color code

these two type—thus a geospatial

of such ‘’White-noise’’EH devices and ‘’Mass-

casualty; EH devices help the

Commander to get a better understanding, his

situational awareness is heightened.

COIN targeting necessitates overwhelming

intelligence from ‘’bottom-up’ for successful

kinetic/non-kinetic operations. Hence ground level

units need to be trained and tasked with

intelligence collection. It is near impossible to

dedicate the very few specialized intelligence

assets to all the operating forces in the area of

operations. Here are the key challenges of bottomup

collections:

1. Determining what is important information.

Leaders need to determine PIRs for each

mission.

2. Determining where to start – in terms of information

or geography. Based upon key

terrain (human and/or geographic).

Conventional operations and COIN/Antiterrorist

operations (This can be termed operations

May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

against networked criminal enterprises) are different

in that the intelligence preparation of the

battle space takes into consideration not only threat

elements but also the human terrain—that is

the local population. Unlike kinetic attack priority in

conventional operations (kill/capture) in

COIN operations non-kinetic attack modes are often

the desired outcome – non-kinetic attacks

taking into account civilian community heads,

population psychological operations, insurgent

targets social network, targeting his social contacts

to judge his resultant movements and

tracking him to finally locate his cell members or

leadership, exploitation of targets other

community traits—in effect besides personality

targeting we are also concerned with the fact

(non-kinetic fires) that units must project the second

and third order of effects after they mount

any operation. Operations on a population, with

which the targeted individual interacts, may

have second and third order effects on that targeted

individual (e.g. – he may increase

communications or flee the area—in the former case

SIGINT intercepts can yield a lot of

information about his immediate network , if his

communications are verbal and physical

meetups surveillance will be the preferred tool

whereas in the latter case if he flees the area he

can be tracked to know his sanctuary—he is bound

to contact his team members , move in their

hideouts.).All in all kinetic attack fires can yield

much more intelligence than just by acquiring

battle order intelligence. Only resorting to kinetic

fires of kill/capture can never solve an

insurgency problem., As the soldiers on the ground

are those who are frequently in direct contact

with community members (and hence those of them

who are affiliates/sympathizers/facilitators

of the insurgents) they have the best opportunity to

gain intelligence information by conducting

tactical questioning (patrols, checkpoints, choke

points) or by casual elicitation methods in

normal scenarios.

Later it will be shown that setting up a company level

intelligence cell and enabling tactical

teams with intelligence assets gives a major thrust in

intelligence collection and also

counterintelligence activities.

1. Stress should be given to the fact that tactical

company and platoon level units conduct

operations with a high degree of success and hence

higher levels of command must push

intelligence staff and information down to lowest

points of collection (initial points) , that

is the company/battalion levels.

2. At the same time low density high demand ISR

assets need to be stretched and spread

across the area of operations to gain a better situational

understanding.

With these two initiatives the Command Headquarters

will not lose control over its intelligence

assets and will neither lose the privilege of gaining

situational understanding exclusively. On the

contrary it will be able to gain more accurate

intelligence inputs. Till so far the intelligence needs

of individual ground units or any feedback from them

was generally ignored what with the

Battalion intelligence officer forwarding the

intelligence summary report to higher headquarters

with the overall intelligence picture of the area of

operations falling under the Battalions

jurisdiction.

REQUIREMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE

COLLECTION AT UNIT/PLATOON LEVEL:

It is near impossible to allocate specialized

intelligence assets to every operating force in the

Area of Ops, as such assets are few in number and

the fact that majority of the information

May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

required for targeting flows ‘’bottom-up’ (that is the

lowest level troops) necessitates the creation

of intelligence collection units at troop level either

organic to the tactical combat ground unit or

as a modular unit capable of plugging into any

company or unit as per requirements. This fact

should be taken seriously into Staff consideration for

targeting, particularly in asymmetric type

warfare where the network must be targeted and

where delivery of fire-power is dependent on

very specific intelligence.

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Insurgency has its HUMINT base among the

‘’people’’, hence it becomes very important

to know the human terrain, that is physical

description, name, location, relationships,

biometrics, job, etc. All these information are more

rapidly accessible by the lower levels units

like the company and platoons/sections. Lieutenants

and NCOs can utilize their leadership

appropriately in this regard by detailing their men to

extract information about the human terrain.

The lowest level that is the sepoys/soldiers can be

trained to use tactical questioning to get this

information. The CLIC is ideally suited for this

purpose as a unit. We must incorporate female

soldiers took to handle the feminine component of

the local population—they are averse to be

questioned by male soldiers, and the traditional

conservative approach of rural/semi urban

families prevents access to womenfolk by male

soldiers. We must remember we are operating in

an irregular environment, not in a conventional

warfare setup; hence we require very specific

information. After collection by the lower level

echelons the information is evaluated and

transformed into intelligence products and then

exploited via the targeting process.



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We have both kinetic and non-kinetic fires, selected

as the case may be. Particularly in an

asymmetric environment like COIN operations, we

are more concerned with the population. We

need to create conditions among the population

which will act as enablers for the COIN

operation. Hence targeting is not just concerned with

degrading the enemy’s capabilities. In the

past we have had our special forces go out on

missions with a specific objective in mind, as

against our conventional warfare setup where

targeting is distributed, not personality based and

aimed at the enemy’s command and control nodes,

logistics and weaponry systems. But here in

case of COIN target engagement is like those of our

special forces in the past where conventional

forces act like special forces with ‘’personalities’’ in

the objective window. The targets are

‘’individuals’’ and ‘’populations’’, where we are

concerned with ‘’second-order’’ and ‘’third order’’

effects on the ‘’population’’ of our actions against the

targeted’’ individual’’.(For

example we can conduct certain operations among

the community population which will either

make the targeted individual flee the area or prompt

him to contact his connections amongst the

population or he may resort to communicating with

his men outside the community periphery—

in all these cases we can have a surveillance and

signals \intercept setup on him and track these

movements/communication intercepts).Hence

commanders must understand this very important

concept—We must not limit COIN operations only

to kinetic targeting, we must consider the

second and third order effects of our delivering

effects on an individual; we must take a holistic

view—a system comprising our forces and activities,

the insurgent/s and the population. Even if

we successfully identify and track a individual and

have the capability to kill/capture him at any

time according to our wish ,sometimes it’s better not

to and let him loose and keeping him under

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May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

surveillance , we further carry out non-kinetic

targeting operations (psychological for example

on the community leaders who we have reason to

believe sympathize with the insurgents) on the

community population to ascertain the second and

third order effects to know more about the

targeted individual and his network.

Kinetic and non-kinetic Personality

targeting: Intensive intelligence activity is required in a

COIN environment to single out ‘’personalities’ either

for kinetic or non-kinetic targeting.

Personality targeting is not always killing or capturing

the insurgent. It can be the manipulation

of the target, exploiting him, reaching out to him (also

community leaders and individuals of

influence, power) through meetings, negotiations—in

short exerting influence on him so as to

determine members of the larger network, plans,

foreign influence and anything of

counterintelligence interest. Compare this with

warrant based targeting where the prosecution of

the insurgent by the Law instills a confidence in the

population and lends a semblance of

credibility to the operation in that ‘’look these guys

are following the Law instead of killing

them’’.The idea of kill is never the solution, an

insurgency can never be put to an end by killing

alone. The forces need to positively influence the

population and also carry out psychological

ops and exploit the enemy to its advantage by resorting

to non-kinetic personality targeting. True

we also have to resort to kinetic targeting, either to

remove the target completely from the

insurgent network thus putting an end to his influence

on the network or to remove him

temporarily so as to reach certain counterintelligence

objectives, say leading to apprehension

among the members, forcing them to make contacts

or any other action that can, if placed under

surveillance, lead to important information about the

enemy. Whether it is kinetic personality

targeting or non-kinetic, we need to determine the best

course of engagement after collecting

sufficient intelligence on the targets influence in the

insurgent group and how much that

influence can be removed by which method of

engagement and our influence imposed both on

the target and the group.

Targeting the entire network and targeting the

individual have each a difficulty rating. In the case

of the former the task is of much greater magnitude

than that of the latter where the

counterintelligence operative is facing the least

opposition force—the single individual.

Collecting information on the network as a whole is

difficult but targeting an individual after

accessing him in whatever way possible results in

much detailed information after execution of a

series of influence-based personality attacks.

It is much easier to categorize targets, as then

particular targeting effort can be applied to each

category leading to manageable chunks of

information—a quantum approach to intelligence

collection. Targets can be classified by function in

the group, to what degree that function

influences group decisions and activities and how

much is the accessibility of the individual.

Another category from the local population

perspective can be those insurgent individuals who

are in close liaison with community members.

Categorizing and grouping such individuals is a

must so that operations can be conducted on each

separately without any confliction.

It is very important to consciously use targeting

techniques rather than as a consequence for

which the Commander was not prepared for. This can

have an adverse reaction on the

population. Hence it’s very very important to execute

continuous intelligence collection and

May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

management with clearly defined intelligence

priorities. It should be understood that often

choosing to target an entity may jeopardize the

targeting objective on another. COIN targeting

operations are never linear like in conventional

warfare.

Right from the Command headquarters down to

platoon/section level as well as adjacent

companies/Bn – all of these need to be part and parcel

of the target management process. It can

so happen a target in one Area of operations being

tended to by a Bn also influences the

insurgent operations in another Area of operations. Or

there could be an area far from the

geographical boundary of the disturbed area but under

the Command where insurgency is at its

nascent stage (or insurgents have flee’d from this

disturbed area and are preparing to secure that

area for their operations and projecting the latter into

the disturbed area with that area as base)

and the insurgent HVT and HPT directly or indirectly

affect the insurgents decision making

processes in that new area.

To create such a targeting management system we

must identify all players from a holistic point

of view , not only the enemy but its sympathizers in

the local population , its direct supporters ,

the material flow circuit in terms of money ,

weapons , fooding and the sources of availability of

these , and all hostile and benign aspects of the

enemy. Thus we are not preparing to attack only

the enemy but the ENTIRE NETWORK.

The Command headquarters should lay down SOP for

identifying and nomenclature of Targets

so that uniformity is maintained at every level, vertical

and horizontal throughout the Command.

This will also facilitate the systematic management of

the Target folders database. It could be

that the standard method of nomenclature may not

apply to all targets as some may overlap in

terms of capability, position, multiple lines of

operation or categories. Certain disciplines such as

SIGINT and IMINT will use their own methods of

nomenclature and categorizing, different from

HUMINT methods. Here it should be seen that

although we cannot change their methods of

nomenclature, the manner they feed into the

‘’targeting process’’ should translate to the standard

laid down by the Command headquarters. Still the

standard should attempt to introduce

uniformity as far as practicable across all echelons of

Command.

With the company level intelligence cells, the Bn

intelligence platoons providing intelligence up

the chain and the ‘’top-down’’ standard mentioned

above will foster cross-leveling and

coordination of targeting information provided by

those units/cells.

Categories:

Kill/Capture: The most common category. The

equation that a kill is a kill is not valid in

COIN. Killing one insurgent out of

feelings of vengeance. It’s very important to

have a holistic view of the entire COIN campaign

including the local population and target

centers of influence (for and against the campaign)

with appropriate techniques, finally isolating

the enemy from its support base and then going in

for the kill.

Detaining for prosecution: Strategic

communications, key leader engagement, and civil

affairs

fall in this category. Here we need even more

intelligence so as to obtain a conviction in the

Court of law apart from identifying and

apprehending the convict. Getting him convicted

rather

than killing him won’t raise the issue of vengeance

that much and the local population too will

May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

appreciate this element of legality in the operations

as everyone is opposed to killing. Sometimes

with the process of engaging targets and external

influences, it might be justified to convert a

target with the kill/capture tag to that of warrant

based targeting.

Influence Targeting: Key community leaders, those

elements of the population who are proinsurgency

and lend direct/indirect t support, enemy couriers/

prisoners who may be “turned” by

CI agents to get inside information, those who are

anti-insurgency and those that facilitate the

enemy’s TTPs but project a clean image.

PUSHING DOWN INT

CAPABILITY

May 6th, 2017

TACTICAL MILITARY

INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY

PUSHING INT CAPABILITY TO

BOOT LEVEL

EVOLUTION OF TACTICAL MILITARY

INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE

“No echelon has all the organic intelligence

capabilities it needs to fully support

The commander. Commanders and Military

Intelligence leaders at higher

Echelons should anticipate the intelligence needs of

the lower echelons and

“Push” tailored intelligence support down to them.”

Tactical units engage in combat with intelligence

inputs coming from the MI dep’t from higher

echelons. In today’s asymmetric war scenario

the Company-level units should also have its

own organic intelligence structures with very few

personnel and assets deployed. They can act on

available intelligence from the ground themselves

without having to wait for collected, collated,

analyzed information from Brigade Int section or

other agencies which takes time—add to it the

dissemination delays. In addition to conducting

mission specific analysis and kinetic or non kinetic

attack, the Company-level unit can also disseminate

the intelligence acquired to subordinate units,

parallel units or higher headquarters as these

intelligence inputs may be useful to these parties as

often intelligence about the enemy in one area of

operations can help units in

other operational areas, the enemy may be adopting

similar tactics or other behavioral factors.

It is very important to recognize the lack of an

intelligence structure at Company-level levels. The

Company-level unit should have collection and

analytical capabilities. There have been instances

of lethal attacks on camps and bases itself-a force

protection problem. We just cannot depend entirely

on civil police and other intelligence agencies to

supply us intelligence about the threat which usually

is biased, and influenced by political and regional

faction influences. The soldier on the ground who

is a part of say the Infantry battalion engaging

the insurgents , is face to face with the reality—

the enemy , the local population and other parties

ofinterest.Say during

a reconnaissance patrol his team may come across

a valuable source. After rapidly dismounting and

ensuring he has no weapons, the teams intelligence

component can start source cops like Company-

level or platoon level questioning, debriefing, etc

and if a counterintelligence agent is also present the

more the better for HUMINT collection.

Let us assume a Command (set up for COIN

ops, or Antiterrorist ops in a State) which

has everything in order such as Command

chain, combat machinery, defined communication

channels, civil administration support and police,

civil intelligence agencies support lacks only an

organic intelligence unit and depends on Higher

HQ such as Battalion intelligence section and civil

agencies for intelligence information.

It should be noted here that the necessary

information is requisitioned first in the form of

Request of Information document, which will go

through various processing nodes as characterized

by administrative channels, then finally landing in

the collection manager’s hands from the requested

agencies higher authority to whom the request was

May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

directed. Now the collection manager will access

already present records database and national

databases to explore if the needed information

is already available—if so he further initiates

request for information, gets the information and

passes it on to the commander of the unit. If not

available he prioritizes the requested information

as per the supported commands requirements,

evaluates availability of suitable assets, allocates

the assets tasking as per their capabilities, capacity

and speciality,the

assets are deployed, information collected, again

sent up channels for evaluation of information

quality , credibility (if source-submitted),analyzed,

transformed into intelligence product and then

finally disseminated to the supported commands

commander.

All the above processes takes time, sometimes

very long time, rendering the information useless

as intelligence can at times be highly perishable,

especially combat intelligence. The commander

needs actionable intelligence fast and to enable

this it would be far better if he himself has an

organic modular intelligence unit, ready to take

up assignments, if needed be integrated with the

strike platoons itself for much faster information

gathering and analysis and immediate action by the

platoon commander. Company level/Platoon level

intelligence capability can tremendously increase

the competitive edge of the commander over the

enemy, increase his situational awareness and be

a force enabler.

Doctrine, Personnel, Training and Education,

Leadership, Materiel Development, Organization,

and Soldier Systems needs to be reviewed if

intelligence assets need to be pushed down to the

lowest level. There are dozens of units deployed in

Company-level operations on the battlefield.

If they are intelligence capable the Commander will

get the best up-to-date and regularly updated(in

the fluid war scenario of rapidly changing ground

situations) intelligence inputs thus heightening

his situational understanding immensely and thus

giving him that decisive competitive edge over the

enemy.

The need for projected intelligence capability

is all the more important if the commander

has to deploy to an unfamiliar area ,inhabited

by an asymmetric threat which unlike a

conventional enemy has no defined order

of battle,organization,discernible patterns ,does not

employ standard military tactics and where ops

may be simultaneous , non-linear and distributed.

In such a situation the commander needs to

project his force by sending in interim combat

enabled (for self defense) reconnaissance teams

who have intelligence gathering ability as well

as counterintelligence asset , not the usual

reconnaissance and surveillance patrols who are

composed only of scouts and which do not answer

the ‘’why’’ of things observed.

Today we are facing an enemy which

is very unlike conventional adversaries who

can be identified using intelligence as to

their leadership,TOE,order ofbattle,strength,dispositions or

anything which is determined by

set doctrinal military tactics, techniques

and procedures.Todays enemy in low intensity

warfare is asymmetric in nature, taking refuge

among the urban or rural community who act as

enablers of the insurgent movement wither wholly

or partially depending on the degree of acceptance

of insurgent ideology and insurgent leaderships

always try to influence the local communities to the

maximum as they are well aware of the benefits

of sanctuary among the latter. The enemy recruits,

rests and reinforces/resupply itself from amongst

the population. Here intelligence directly focused on

the enemy is difficult in practice; the enemy

is elusive, deceptive and resorts to unconventional

attack modes and very adaptable but the enemy’s

source of sustenance and very survival depends

a great deal on the local populations support. The

company and platoon sized units need immediate

on scene intelligence support to deal with such a

population enabled asymmetric enemy. As such

even the smallest fighting unit must be capable

of intense collection and analysis of information to

get actionable intelligence instead of waiting for

intelligence from higher headquarters which may

entail time thus letting go

of opportunities in combat. It is always not realistic

to depend on higher echelon staff for intelligence.

We must have an inbuilt intelligence capability in the

smallest unit on the ground.

The main criteria here is to shorten

considerably the time between deciding

on intelligence priorities ,detecting the

May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

enemy’s OB,Strength,disposition,capabilities and

T&OE ,delivering the attack sequence and

assessing the Battle damage and re-strike options.

COIN targeting necessitates overwhelming

intelligence from ‘’bottom-up’ for successful kinetic/

non-kinetic operations. Hence ground level units

need to be trained and tasked with intelligence

collection. It is near impossible to dedicate the

very few specialized intelligence assets to all the

operating forces in the area of operations. Here are

the key challenges of bottomup collections:

(1) Determining what is important information.

Leaders need to determine PIRs for each

mission.

(2) Determining where to start – in terms of

information or geography. Based upon key terrain

(human and/or geographic).

Conventional operations and COIN/Antiterrorist

operations (This can be termed operations against

networked criminal enterprises) are different in

that the intelligence preparation of the battle

space takes into consideration not only threat

elements but also the human terrain—that is the

local population. Unlike kinetic attack priority in

conventional operations (kill/capture) in

COIN operations non-kinetic attack modes are often

the desired outcome – non-kinetic attacks taking

into account civilian community heads, population

psychological operations, insurgent targets social

network, targeting his social contacts to judge his

resultant movements and tracking him to finally

locate his cell members or leadership, exploitation

of targets other community traits—in effect besides

personality targeting we are also concerned with

the fact (non-kinetic fires) that units must project

the second and third order of effects after they

mount any operation. Operations on a population,

with which the targeted individual interacts, may

have second and third order effects on that targeted

individual (e.g. – he may increase communications

or flee the area—in the former case SIGINT

intercepts can yield a lotofinformation about his

immediate network , if his communications are

verbal and physical meetups surveillance will be the

preferred tool whereas in the latter case if he flees

the area he can be tracked to know his sanctuary

—he is bound to contact his team members ,

move in their hideouts.).All in all kinetic attack

fires can yield much more intelligence than just by

acquiring battle order intelligence. Only resorting

to kinetic fires of kill/capture can never solve an

insurgency problem., As the soldiers on the ground

are those who are frequently in direct contact with

community members (and hence those of them who

are affiliates/sympathizers/facilitators

of the insurgents) they have the best opportunity to

gain intelligence information by conducting tactical

questioning (patrols, checkpoints, choke points) or

by casual elicitation methods in normal scenarios.

Later it will be shown that setting up a company

level intelligence cell and enabling tactical teams

with intelligence assets gives a major thrust in

intelligence collection and also counterintelligence

activities.

There needs to be a change in focus of effort

between command levels.

1)Stress should be given to the fact that tactical

company and platoon level units conduct operations

with a high degree of success and hence higher

levels of command must push intelligence staff

and information down to lowest points of collection

(initial points) , that is the company/battalion levels.

2)At the same time low density high demand ISR

assets need to be stretched and spread across

the area of operations to gain a better situational

understanding.

With these two initiatives the Command

Headquarters will not lose control over its

intelligence assets and will neither lose the privilege

of gaining situational understanding exclusively. On

the contrary it will be able to gain more accurate

intelligence inputs. Till so far the intelligence needs

of individual ground units or any feedback from them

was generally ignored what with the

Battalion intelligence officer forwarding the

intelligence summary report to higher headquarters

with the overall intelligence picture of the area of

operations falling under the Battalions jurisdiction.

REQUIREMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE

COLLECTION AT UNIT/PLATOON LEVEL:

It is near impossible to allocate specialized

intelligence assets to every operating force in the

Area of Ops as such assets are few in number and

the fact that majority of the information

required for targeting flows ‘’bottom-up’ (that is the

lowest level troops) necessitates the creation

May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

of intelligence collection units at troop level either

organic to the tactical combat ground unit or as a

modular unit capable of plugging into any

company or unit as per requirements. This fact

should be taken seriously into Staff consideration for

targeting, particularly in asymmetric type warfare

where the network must be targeted and where

delivery of fire-power is dependent on very specific

intelligence.

Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) drive the military

intelligence collection process.

While military intelligence officers help in developing

intelligence requirements, it is the commander who

is responsible for designating an intelligence

requirement as a priority. The intelligence staff

regularly updates the commander on its progress

toward answering each PIR.speaking, that a

military intelligence officer (STAFF INT

OFFICER) and his staff are tasked with answering.

Additional intelligence requirements aimed at filling

gaps in commanders’ understanding of the

operating environment and requests for information

may come from higher echelons, lower echelons,

and lateral organizations, or from the

intelligence staff itself, but it is the PIRs that an

STAFF INT OFFICER has been tasked with

that are most important.

While emphasis shifts in various doctrinal

publications, PIRs are generally supposed to2:

1. Ask a single question.

2. Be ranked in importance.

3. Be specific: Focus on a specific event, fact or

activity.

4. Be tied to a single decision or planning task the

commander has to make.

5. Provide a last time by which information is of

value (LTIOV).

6. Be answerable using available assets and

capabilities.

Usually, a commander only designates three to five

intelligence requirements as PIRs at any

one time.

The PIR model makes use of intelligence-led and

problem-oriented policing models that gained

traction in combating crime in the United States after

11 September 2001 by refining them for practical

use within the military dynamic. The recce

unit along with the embedded HUMINT / CI

element conducts area reconnaissance and

community operations involving atmospherics, thus

establishing a PIR framework before resorting to

tactical questioning, elicitation and interrogation

by using the PIRs to force conversations,

gain community perspective and prepare

engagement summaries for analysis...The

engagement summaries are analyzed, community

feedbacks are compiled thus highlighting the

causes that aid insurgency, enabling the unit in turn

to recommend the targets that are the driving

causes of the insurgency.

We can have an integral organic intelligence

capability at the Battalion level:

The Bn Intelligence section will consist of

the Bn intelligence officer, a JCO , 2 havildars and 6

infantry soldiers. The Bn Intelligence section will

interface between the companies and the

Bde.The companies pass on intelligence

information for processing to the Bn Intelligence

section who in turn passes them on to the Bde and

also as per ground requirements from the

companies and Bn staff .The Bn intelligence section

will develop sources and contacts from among the

local population and liaise with the civil police

and intelligence agencies. The question of

deconfliction arises at this stage as the line

companies and platoons have their sorces ,

contacts and liaisons as well as the civil

agencies. It is the responsibility of the Bn

intelligence section to deconflict its sources

with all these sources, contacts and liaisons.

The Bn intelligence section

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will use its HUMINT and other capabilities to detect

weapons/explosives caches, collect incriminating

evidentiary information for prosecution by the civil

agencies and increase the situational overall

situational understanding of the Bn and Bde

commanders and staff. Delineation of

sources between the Bn , the line companies , the

platoons and the HUMINT units is very important

by clearly defining the responsibilities of each with

respect to the sources. We can have contacts like

community leaders of influence , local politicians

and councilors , surface and witting contacts as

well as those contacts who are very useful , can

supply information of rich intelligence value but

need protection which will be the responsibility of

the HUMINT units. The overt contacts like the

community leaders etc can be the responsibility of

the Bn intelligence section while the surface

contacts and liaison can be given to the line units

and platoons. The same line units and

platoons can forward to HUMINT units any

source of HUMINT interest which they come

across community operations , patrolling or

tactical operations.

Just like the Staff composition at Division level we

can create similar structure at the Divn Bn level.

There will be an Ops Staff officer and an

Intelligence Staff officer. Compared to the Ops

Staff officer the Int Staff officer, by virtue of his direct

contact with the Div Staff Officer is better aware of

all Div intelligence requirements, prioritized or

otherwise and which requirements are tasked to

subordinate units. His duties include analyzing

collected information by Bn Int Section and

effect the transfer of intelligence laterally and

vertically, laterally to adjacent units , higher

headquarters , line companies and even to

the line platoon base camps.

The Ops Staff officer will see to the tasking of Div

intelligence requirements to all subordinate

units.

To further push down the intelligence capability to

the line companies level and platoon level ,we can

assign 2 NCOs at each line company and one

soldier to take over as intelligence representative

and co-located at the platoon level. During

patrolling , reconnaissance by the Company

soldiers , platoon soldiers , all collected

information will be filtered , categorized and

forwarded to the Bn Intelligence section for analysis

and dissemination laterally and to higher

headquarters. The intelligence soldiers at Company

and Platoon levels can also requisition intelligence

and imagery information from higher

headquarters.

Secondary Collectors:

HUMINT collection is not limited only to HUMINT

personnel. These can be termed primary

collectors.HUMINT can also be and is collected

(sometimes unknowingly and never reported) by

secondary collectors like military police , troops

and civil affairs personnel.

Take a scenario. A soldier comes across a man who

offers information which the soldier feels could be

of use to the HUMINT people. He does not bring

the source in focus by detaining him or questioning

him before others. He stays friendly , eliciting as

much as possible after the source finishes his

narration. He does all this discreetly. He manages

to record the details of the source and when he is

back from the check post to his camp he discreetly

meets the Bn Int section officer and fills him up

with all the information he has gathered.Therafter

one and only one soldier in the Bn Int section

passes on the information to the HUMINT

operative with the contact details of the source.In

a second scenario the soldier may come across

something , say a weapons cache , which he

recognizes , and this exploitable intelligence he

again passes on to the Bn Int section discreetly.

In both cases he won’t tell his colleagues or anyone.

Thus we find line soldiers and other

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secondary collectors, if they keep their eyes and

ears open, can create a good surface contacts

base , thus reducing the workload on primary

HUMINT collectors by gathering exploitable

intelligence , the primary collectors can now focus

on more important issues like prioritized

intelligence requirements of the Commander. If all

or many of the line soldiers or other secondary

collectors work in this fashion the surface contacts

base grows phenomenally, thus creating a

secondary source base. Thus we achieve

synchronization between primary and secondary

collectors. The fact that the soldier does not tell

any of his colleagues or even the chain of

command renders the information to be

exploited and away from any technical or influence

detractors by limiting the sphere of

knowledge. Further it is possible that any primary

source may have links with the individual dealing

with the secondary collector or any other link and

this can be of value to the primary HUMINT

collectors. Hence the bottom-line should be

personal contact and liaison with the local

community for every patrolling member.

Mission Responsibilities of commanders (with

regard to soldiers who are not intelligence

personnel, but come across information on tactical

questioning—secondary collectors)

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Patrols, roadblocks, checkpoints, convoys—all

these come into contact with enemy personnel

(captured), civilians, civil suspects/ detainees

and criminal elements who can be subjected to

tactical questioning. Hence the mission is to train

the involved personnel in tactical questioning and

integrate it in the planning and

preparation/execution of the said

activities. Pursuant to this prepare for debriefing

after all personnel of patrols etc report to the unit

intelligence officer.

Prepare reports , verbally (debriefing) or written on

any observations or information

extracted after tactical questioning including being

able to recognize any information of so much

importance(combat intelligence) that it must be

reported immediately without delay.

During such activities like patrolling, convoy etc all

EPW/Detainee and seized documents must be

subjected to exploitation carefully as these are

prime sources of intelligence.

All the above should be predicated by the Unit

intelligence officers tasking of prioritized

intelligence requirements but collection outside

these should not be ignored if such information is

delivered by the source concerned. They might

be of tactical value to the Commander or HUMINT

officers.

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Squad/section/patrol/ CP/roadblocks, and convoy

leaders are tasked by the platoon leader

based on intelligence requirements as laid down by

higher headquarters.

Instruct and see to it that it is followed to the book

that all personnel returning from patrolling,

manning checkpoints, convoys etc report

everything and get subjected to full debriefing.

Highlight before them the high importance of

submitting information of immediate tactical value

without ANY delay. Make it very clear this is

mandatory. To this effect he should

apprise everyone of the procedures laid down by the

battalion intelligence staff in this

regard.

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Squad/section/patrol/ CP/roadblocks, and convoy

leaders are tasked by the platoon leader

based on intelligence requirements as laid down by

higher headquarters.

All intelligence inputs by the personnel involved in

patrolling and tasked with collection are reviewed

and forwarded to the Bn intelligence staff and Bde

staff. While doing this highlight that

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information that is linked to the current operations

or the AO environment.

Make it mandatory for everyone to be debriefed in

keeping with the procedures laid down by higher

headquarters intelligence staff.

Ensure that everyone understands that it is

mandatory to report information IMMEDIATELY

of critical value.

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Task the company, section, squad commanders on

intelligence requirements and guide them through

the Staff headquarters.

Push down intelligence information to these

command levels so as to enable them to get a

better situational understanding and know what is

expected of them. Thus they will be able to frame

tactical questions better.

See to it that all patrols etc are debriefed and no one

is left out.

Establish procedures for immediate reporting of

information of critical tactical value.

The fighting forces engaged directly with the enemy,

companies and the platoons therein come

into regular contact with the local communities, local

administration, village heads and panchayats, and

the enemy itself. The battalion mayhave its own

intelligence section and if it does the section is

very understaffed with one intelligence officer

and an aide. The troops depend wholly on

brigade intelligence inputs and intelligence

feeds from other agencies. These inputs

come as a result for requests for information from

the ground and the process of requesting, tasking

the request to brigade intelligence

personnel, gathering the intelligence using

collection platforms and pulling intelligence from

adjacent headquarters, units and from national

agencies and finally pushing it down to the

combat team all takes time resulting in untimely

intelligence

feeds. Add to this the total lack of first hand contact

of Brigade level intelligence section with the

human and enemy terrain of the area of operations

(human terrain is the local population) which is

enjoyed by the troops on the ground fully. This

lack of contact leads to low level of situational

understanding of the higher headquarters and

whatever intelligence they gather is based on

standard TTPs and intelligence sharing with other

agencies.

Yes certain cases involve infiltration by HUMINT/CI

assets but as this is fraught with dangers and

requires highly talented agents adept in

deception and which is lacking in our intelligence

headquarters intelligence acquisition using

infiltration is scarce e are now left with the human

terrain, the local populace and higher headquarters

intelligence personnel will not commit to regular

interaction with them like the soldiers on the ground

do during patrols or securing an area after an

operation or mopping up operations or during a

cordon/search operation. Higher commands are

not fully meeting their intelligence requirements of

the companies and platoons in a timely manner;

nor at the level of detail necessary for company

commanders to successfully operate in

the asymmetric

defined battlespace.The company and platoon

commanders must be able to portray the threat

and disposition accurately nominate targets-both

for kinetic and nonkinetic attacks and conduct

successfully battle damage assessments so that

the option of restrike does not get overlooked for

example. For this is required a company level

intelligence cell and pushing down further an

intelligence enabled platoon. The infantry

company requires and organic capability to

collect, process, and disseminate

intelligence to increase their operational

effectiveness in full spectrum conflict. Infantry units

require company level intelligence cells

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(CLIC) specifically organized, trained, and equipped

to address this capability gap.

Each company (and in many cases several

platoons) are assigned their own Area of Ops

where the company level intelligence team or

platoon level intelligence cell conduct intelligence

collection activities and proper

synchronization of ISR and integrating with the

targeting process is invariably attained as all round

collection involving the soldiers who are now the

sensors leads to a far better situational

understanding.

Primary tasks: Threat situation and disposition,

Target nomination, BDA,Combat/security

operations, surveillance, target acquisition, and

reconnaissance.

The troops fighting on the ground are fed

intelligence from Brigade level intelligence

HQ.There are certain limitations which must be

taken cognizant as well as the offered solutions (

points 1,6 , highlight the need for company

level intelligence structure)

Your intelligence system has some limitations you

must understand. These include-

1. Dissemination of information is highly dependent

on communications systems and

architecture and these are usually limited and under

constraints in different fighting environments.

Often requests for information from ground units

are not disseminated in time. Accurate, timely

and specific actionable intelligence is necessary

to drive operations with that distinctive

competitive edge and this is usually lacking.

2. Single-source collection is susceptible to

adversary control and deception.Muliple sources

need to be deployed and multidisciplinary

intelligence collection platforms

should be employed.

3. Counterinsurgency operations may be affected if

the enemy resorts to non-usage of

communications/no communications equipment (to

avoid getting intercepted or DF’d)

thus affecting adversely COMINT and ELINT based

intelligence collection. Thus our intelligence

collection effort gets degraded by theenemy.

4. Weather degradation of traffic ability and the

negative effects of high winds on antenna arrays

and aviation collection and jamming

systems.

5. Inability of ground-based systems to operate on

the move. Positioning and integration of

mutually supporting ground and airborne systems is

critical to continuous support.

6. Lack of sufficient organic intelligence assets to

satisfy all your intelligence

requirements.

Current asymmetric intelligence collection is the

primary means to combat insurgency successfully

by gaining a thorough situational

understanding and developing first hand combat

intelligence. This tactical environment needs our

fighting troops to be trained in tactical intelligence

collection to deal with an asymmetric enemy.

When a battalion is deployed, and usually stability

and support operations are at battalion level we

usually see that the battalion itself rarely

executes its operation as a single unit. It devolves

into sub-divisions which take up strategic areas in

the overall area of operations. Detached

posts/stations are set up in these strategic areas

and these posts /sections create and maintain unit

intelligence cells engaged in tactical intelligence

collection on the enemy. Each garrison unit

engages in low level source operations using

standard intelligence collection methods, and

getting a feel of

communication routes.locational economics,

topography and geography, human terrain

intelligence and the political forces operating in the

community together with any other criminal

enterprises working hand in hand with the

insurgent elements.

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After an area of operations is identified inhabited by

an asymmetric enemy in a complex terrain with

weak transportation and logistical

infrastructure. We need to deploy an interim combat

team complete with HUMINT/, CI/. SIGINT assets

which will act as an early combat team, mounted

infantry organization with the capability to rapidly

assess the environment, physical terrain,

community, cultural and political and conduct an

intelligence preparation of the battlefield by

assessing the enemy’s strength, capabilities,

disposition, TOE thus enabling the striking force to

project itself before deployment. The primary intent

here is to develop a situational understanding of

an unknown area inhabited by an enemy against

the backdrop of distributed, asymmetric, nonlinear

simultaneous operations. Here the problem is to

determine the OB of an enemy that doesn’t have

a conventional standing force nor is easily

identifiable. We don’t see any typical military

structure, units, rear and forward areas or logistical

networks characteristic of conventional enemy

forces. It is a big question how to deploy ISR

assets for collecting intelligence or conducting

reconnaissance or for that matter determining the

center of gravity of the enemy.

Without sending in the interim combat team to gain

a situational understanding it is totally

impracticable to deploy the striking forces. What we

need is a interim combat force with

reconnaissance, surveillance and target nomination

capabilities—all these facilitated by an organic MI

company with organic intelligence assets.

The recce platoon, in addition to reconnaissance

and surveillance should also engage in HUMINT

activities for thorough situational

understanding. The situation in asymmetric warfare

is different. Here the recce platoon can conduct

HUMINT operations. The reconnaissance

platoon should be equipped with CI capability. This

heightens its HUMNINT collection ability.

The HUMINT teams (4 teams) are in effect Tactical

HUMINT Teams each with 3 HUMINT collectors

and one CI agent. Once deployed, the teams

report their information to an operational

management team (OMT), which collates

intelligence data gathered by the tactical teams. The

information is then passed on to the brigade INT

section for further analysis and integration into

the brigade's collection plan.

FORCE PROTECTION

May 6th, 2017

FORCE PROTECTION--

AVOIDING URI TYPE ATTACK

Intelligence has two objectives:

First, it provides accurate, timely, and

relevant knowledge about the enemy (or potential

enemy) and the surrounding environment.

The second intelligence objective is that

it assists in protecting friendly forces

through counterintelligence. Counterintelligence

includes both active and passive measures

intended to deny the enemy valuable

information about the friendly situation.

Counterintelligence also includes activities

related to countering hostile espionage,

subversion, and terrorism. Counterintelligence

directly supports force protection operations by

helping the commander deny intelligence to the

enemy and plan appropriate security measures.

Stated differently it acts as an early warning

system by attempting to provide accurate and

timely informationabout the adversary’s

intention, and the surrounding environment. It

also provides a counterintelligence tool to deny

the adversary valuable information and also to

combat terrorism, subversion and espionage.

Thus intelligence is protective, exploitative and

positive in that it supplies us with positive

intelligence about the adversary and protects

our own infrastructure. Intelligence thus renders

our actions either offensive or defensive.

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“Intelligence supports the commander’s force protection

needs by estimating an enemy’s intelligence, terrorism,

espionage, sabotage, and subversion capabilities as

well as recommending countermeasures against those

capabilities’’

Today’s war scenario is of the 4th Generation type.

Asymmetry has factored in most battle or tactical

operations to a great deal. In fact most of the conflicts

around the Globe are asymmetrical in nature , with

the players in the combat environment being terrorists,

insurgents with very limited firepower , elusive and most

of the time operating while mobile , very less identifiable

with no conventional forces insignia , very limited

personnel strength , distributed and sporadic operational

tactics, undefined infrastructure logistical capabilities on

one hand and a national power or allies with a formidable

military, attack and defense platforms and a central

military organization with subordinate headquarters and

units spread at unique identifiable geographic locations.

Hence not to be subdued by this disparity between

themselves and govt. forces the asymmetric adversary

resorts to sudden, sporadic, hit and run type attacks on

the forces bases , installations , camps , ordnance depots,

communication systems, personnel and information

systems with the sole objective to degrade the forces

combat capability and kinetic termination of its key

leaders at top echelons or middle and ground level tactical

units. A kill is a kill. A kinetic hit is a kinetic hit. Whether

it’s a bazooka attack destroying an armored personnel

carriers drive system immobilizing it or whether it’s a

timed explosion resulting in the destruction of a combat

helicopter in the hangar , the end result is the same….we

have lost combat capability. In this fashion attacks on

our installations,camps,bases,personnel and information

systems/communications are designed to degrade our

capabilities, exhaust our ordnance on nonexistent targets

or dummy targets / proxy targets (deceptive measures of

the adversary) –this realm of Threat to our forces itself

while in transit or before deployment or in personnel

stations and bases and the Govt. forces actions to thwart

these threats with intelligence feeds predicating the plans/

COAs design is called Force Protection.

CI supports Command Force Protection efforts

by:

·Identifying the potential threat forces and

multidisciplinary threat intelligence

·Identifying threat capabilities and intent together with

the most likely course of action and the most dangerous

course of action (keeping all the possible COAs parallel

for review)

·Using deception to mislead the enemy about our

capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions.

CI & SECURITY REQUIREMENTS:

·Protecting classified information

·Protecting critical resources

·Protecting weapons and weaponry systems

·Safeguarding visitors to the installation

·Protecting dignitaries

·Protecting Senior government officials or military senior

stafdf visiting the installation or areas outside the

installation but falling within military jurisdiction

·Sustain mission objectives

·Protect information systems

Within the installation thee may be specific person/

s,resources,assets,activity,operation or information that

if targeted by the enemy can adversely affect the

installation operations , mission objectives or any risk

dimension—in other words it has ‘’Target value’’ to

the adversary. During security planning such entities

should be identified (in most cases using red-teaming or

counterintelligence support to vulnerability assessment)

and secured against enemy actions. Include with this the

need to ascertain what adverse effects the local threat can

have over the installation as a whole and what missions

or contingency plans can be designed to support the

installation, and what results is the minimum security

requirements in the light of the threat perceived due to

the existence of local threat forces.

Local threat assessment usually provides a threat

picture specific to a single installation or grouping

of installations based on the threat factors mentioned

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above. This means that each installation may have

specific security requirements tailored to its individual

assessment.

Resource economy-probably the most important factor in

inefficient Force protection

Due to erroneous planning, or improperly defining

intelligence requirements or even due to enemy

deceptive/denial measures it could very well be that

the Commander deploys his resources, combat power

and other combat-related assets in the wrong place and

time thus exhausting/wasting them and hence resource

economy is of prime consideration during any mission

and to this end the value of intelligence cannot be

overstated. These false responses can be limited and

brought down to a minimum by specific, timely and

accurate intelligence. Intelligence helps the commander

to prioritize his security options. The commander

can direct his efforts towards the most important

requirements, such as handling the most serious security

risks first, mitigate the threat/s which is of lesser severity

and accept the inevitable danger and be prepared for risks

which are of least severity. Thus the countermeasures

will be more appropriately directed against the enemy

without any wastage of resources, manpower or lessening

in combat effectiveness. All this proper threat driven

intelligence and counterintelligence operations, the term

‘’threat-driven’’ assuming greater significance as it then

goads the commander to know the unknown aggressively.

It should be emphasized that other security agencies

should be consulted and information shared with them,

both horizontally and vertically to get a complete picture

of the threat.

CI/HUMINT Support to Force Protection: Whether

conducting liaison, a Threat/ Vulnerability Assessment

(TVA), or a HUMINT collection operation, the focal

point for most CI/HUMINT operations is providing

support to Force Protection. There are three critical pieces

to this support mission on which we focus:

a. Know the Threat: The development of a MDCI

Estimate is critical prior to any deployment. Once

contingency areas are identified, the HUMINT

Single Source Cell within the Control HQ begins

developing and maintaining these products. As the

Battalion operational plan develops, HUMINT operation

management teams aid HUMINT Single Source in

gathering information on the AO. The turf is broken

down and CI/HUMINT teams work to become subject

matter experts on the customs, culture, government,

and geography of their given areas. Once in the

contingency area, conducting liaison is always the first

step. Without the initial preparation to gain knowledge

of the area, the team would be incapable of "hitting

the ground running" and making the initial liaison

contacts required to quickly assess the threat to the

force. W e look to identify and maintain contact with

local police, intelligence, and security agencies; Private

Volunteer Organizations (PVO) and Non-Governmental

Organizations (NGO); and allied counterparts. Through

this liaison the development of CI Force Protection

Source Operations (CFSO) occurs. CFSO operations

provide Indications and Warnings (I&W) of potential

threats to our Forces.

b. Know your Vulnerabilities: Once the threat has been

established, the CI/HUMINT teams move their focus

toward conducting Threat/Vulnerability Assessments

(TVA) on critical army assets and potential enemy

targets. The identification of friendly critical assets is

derived from determining what the Army Commander

considers as his centers of gravity and those assets

that compose and support it. Some traditional critical

assets include C

nodes, logistics sites, aviation and

ADA assets, and counterfire radars. The TVA analyzes

all the aspects of physical security, personnel security,

information security, and communications security. The

TVA measures the current threat capabilities against

emplaced security measures and operating procedures

to identify vulnerabilities. Again, without the previous

research in identifying the threat and in conducting

liaison, the team would be incapable of making a valid

identification of vulnerabilities.

c. Provide Countermeasures: Providing valid

countermeasures is often a difficult task to strike the

right balance of security with the given assets and

environment. Too restrictive of security measures rapidly

degrades operational sustainment and builds distrust

in the people we are trying to protect as we continue

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to throw barriers between us and them. Too lax of

security measures provides the enemy with his target

of opportunity and forces the Army to pay for a costly

mistake in the loss of lives, material, and status in the

world's eye. Providing predictive intelligence coupled

with valid countermeasures is the apex of CI/HUMINT

support to force protection. One tool that we can use with

good success in providing predictive intelligence is the

24-hour time-event chart. The 24-hour time-event chart

graphically depicts incident reporting on a 24-hour clock

chart. Over the span of a couple days, the chart displays

the enemy's operational patterns. From this pattern, the

analyst can determine enemy sleep cycles, movement,

and attack times, aiding the analyst in predicting enemy

activities over the next 24 hours. Countermeasures can

then be applied to avoid enemy contact on unfavorable

grounds and increase defense measures during most

likely times of enemy attacks.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN CI AND HUMINT:

CI Does Not Equal HUMINT

CI and HUMINT , although sharing most of the time

similar collection techniques , are not the same thing in

the sense that CI is not a subset of HUMINT.HUMINT is

an intelligence discipline whereas CI is a multidiscipline

function supporting HUMINT.We should not confuse

the information collection methods and operational

intention. This incorrect doctrinal terminology error will

lead to a weakening of both/

HUMINT is solely concerned with collection , not

the purpose of collection of the information or the

requirements which predicate this collection. Y e s

the HUMINT collector is aware that the purpose

of his collection efforts are geared to collecting

information from designated human sources using

specific collection techniques. In this sense he is

conducting a ‘’pure’’ collection effort, not concerned

with what this information will be used for and what

necessitated the collection in the first place.HUMINT

collection includes “operations conducted using

HUMINT collection techniques regardless of the ultimate

use of that information.” HUMINT activities include a

great variety of operations, analysis, and liaison duties.

CI on the other hand uses human sources too as source

of information but goes few steps further in that CI

is aware of the intent of collection and aggressively

uses specific techniques to either neutralize or exploit

the enemy intelligence activities using the gathered

information. Most of the techniques in his repository

are similar to that of the HUMINT agent; It is

this use of HUMINT skills, particularly investigation

and source operations that has created the confusion.

CI is a multidiscipline function with the purpose

to detect,identify,deter,exploit.neutralize the enemy’s

collection efforts—itseeks to counter enemy intelligence

geared towards terrorist,subversive,espionage,sabotage

or insurgent attacks on our forces and installations

and lend support to HUMINT in its activities, protect

the intelligence cycle and ensure force protection

—a very important factor. Thus we find CI to

be composed of several attributes,aggressive,never

relenting and protecting the other intelligence disciplines

activities(for example , determining whether a source

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is a source who wants to wittingly give information

\or is an enemy plant).HUMINT contributes to an

all-source visualization of the battlefield , increases

the situational awareness of the commander.HUMINT

i s intelligence derived from persons,documents,a pure

intelligence activity whereas CI is somewhat like the

hand in darkness..exploring,detecting,getting a hold.

Moving ahead with all help that is available in an

unknown enemy specific darkness , the enemy lurking in

the shadows , whose actions once discerned by the hand

will lead to the latter’s firm clasp on his neck.

Hence we must not tend to associate CI solely

with HUMINT collection nor define HUMINT in

terms of CI.Commanders should understand this.It

should not be the prerogative of only intelligence

personnel.Commanders,staff officers of operations

etc functions should understand this intelligence

issue clearly so as to synchronize ops well with

intelligence.ISR effort should not be degraded by

weaknesses in both HUMINT and CI as a result of this

confusion.CI and HUMINT are highly complimentary.

Very true but of opposing mindsets.

Conclusion

HUMINT collection and CI are and will continue

to become increasingly important as we enter the

21st century. Both efforts are vital to mission

success across the entire spectrum of operations. The

understanding of the doctrinal distinction between

HUMINT collection and CI is fundamental. This

distinction drives the doctrinal description of both

efforts and our understanding of how they are

mutuallysupportive and intertwined in stability

operations and support operations.Whatever be the

divisions in function or overall structure, HUMINT and

CI are indispensable to thwart enemy intelligence

activities, to conduct force protection in a optimum

manner, to keep our forcescombat-ready to deliver

precision strikes and to always keep the decision

advantage in our favor with the element of surprise by

the enemy being put at the minimum. Both disciplines

are time intensive and inter-human interactions over

prolonged periods have turned the tradecraft into a very

specialized skill involving human perception, behavior,

psychology and other traits. Unlike other disciplines

like SIGINT,IMINT,MASINT,GEOINT HUMINT and

CI have in common human sources , the human element

and hence is susceptible to error , deception by the

enemy , fraught with risks and psychological stress

including human vices predicated by money and other

factors which are usually the byproduct of

information-transactions (quid-pro-quo).But it is

exactly these problems which prompts intelligence

professionals to come up with newer tactics so as to

minimize these negative factors and the resulting

exploration and research in the field of HUMINT and

CI leads to refined methodologies , TTPs which have

been found to be effective in many cases.

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Improving Army CI Doctrine

The first step in improving the Army’s ability to collect

force protection intelligence is building appropriate

doctrine that clarifies the role of Army Intelligence and

CI personnel. Make its information operations doctrine

more complete by publishing comprehensive CI doctrine.

This doctrine should explain the primary CI missions of

collections, investigations, operations, and analysis and

production.

Doctrine guides the employment of military forces, and

shapes how military professionals “think about the use

of the military instrument of national power”. Army

doctrine details a basic understanding of the tactics ,

techniques and procedures to be employed to support

combat requirements. Air Force doctrine provides

commanders and their staffs a basic understanding of

how various Air Force organizations can be used to meet

or support combat requirements.

INDIA historically lacked comprehensive CI

doctrine.This lack of doctrine has resulted in confusion,

and hampered the ability of Force commanders to use CI

to improve force protection efforts.Force protection

efforts must be threat

driven.Vulnerabilities should be identified , the

corresponding threats identified and then protective

measures are put in place.To this end MI and CI play

a very important role.This should be the basis for the

creation of a comprehensive CI doctrine. .

“CI is the systematic acquisition of information

concerning espionage, sabotage, insurgency, and related

foreign activities conducted for or on behalf of foreign

nations, entities, organizations, or persons and that are

directed against or threaten our military interests.” T o

this end a variety of HUMINT sources , like walk ins ,

casual sources , defectors , official sources , liaison

contacts , recruited sources are employed by CI elements.

CI collections and investigations lead to a repository

of information on threats.Thereafter by cueing other

intelligence disciplines and using all source analysis a

complete picture of the threat is obtained.Thus we reach

our main objective— the precise warning of hostile attack

and we also identify the probable targets of the attack and

the time of attack.In a nutshell CI usage of HUMINT is

the first line of defence.

Army force protection requires a separate force

protection doctrine. Not only intelligence personnel

will benefit from the doctrine directly but also tactical

commanders who must have a basic knowledge about

force protection so as to understand what requirements

ought to be defined and handed over to the intelligence

and counterintelligence personnel to adequately protect

the force.

The commanders battlefield operating system at

his d isposal are fire support a nd maneuv er and

here is where intelligence and counterintelligence

act as force multipliers –the Intelligence and CI

BOS must be successfully integrated in the

Commanders BOS so that his PIRs are

successfully answered giving

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him ideally a perfect situational awareness about

the b attlespace so as to cond uct operations successfully.

The commander focuses on the intelligence system by

clearly designating his priority intelligence require-

ments (PIR), targeting requirements and priorities.

Intelligence is a continuous process which keeps

IEW operations tied to the commander's critical

decisions and concept of operations. CI collection,

analysis, and dissemination, like other intelligence,

have to meet the commander's time requirements

to be of any use other than historical.

They can then better understand the limitations

and capabilities of the CI support elements. Force

protection doctrine requires intelligence and counter-

intelligence personnel to obtain and analyze information

on:

·Enemy units

·Terrorist groups

·Insurgent groups

·Enemy special forces

·Criminal enterprises

·Cybercriminals

·Radical elements

·That part of the local populace which supports the

enemys ideals

·Environmental/chemical/health/radiological/biological

hazards

·Weaponry systems

of the enemy

units,terrorists,insurgents and crimninal enterprises

Force protection doctrine should compel the creation

of Service capabilities to collect, receive, evaluate,

analyze, and disseminate all information on terrorist

activities,strength,capabilities,organization,intent,past

history, current activities in the area in question or areas

of interest and indicators of imminent attack.

W e can categorize the threats based on intent. This

can be incorporated in the force protection doctrine.

Hence we can allocate HUMINT resources in an

appropriate manner without any duplication or wastage.

Type 1 can be criminal activity geared towards army

bases ,Type 2 can be penetrative reconnaissance and

sabotage operations, terrorist and insurgent attacks , and

Type 3 can be major land , amphibious , air and missile

attacks.

TYPE1, 2 and 3 threats can be adequately determined

by the employment of counterintelligence assets which

use HUMINT sources to collect force e protection

information and conduct investigations , security

surveys ,threat and vulnerability assessments. Casual

sources, official sources, liaison contacts and recruited

sources comprise the source database of the CI

repository. All source intelligence is also used for all

the threats, particularly TYPE4.These include HUMINT,

SIGINT.MASINT, IMINT, ELINT AND OSINT.Fusion

of all information from multidisciplinary intelligence

platforms with data from national level intelligence

agencies result in far better situational understanding of

the Commander. ISR synchronization is a must if we have

to have a robust advance warning system to avoid the

element of surprise.

We can make certain observations after studying force

protection failures from around the globe:

ØHUMINT was not given priority in force protection

efforts , neither the HUMINT support was precise,

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effective and tailored to the Commanders needs. Instead

standard operating procedures detailing standard and

routine defensive methods and access control were

implemented.HUMINTs capability in predicting on how ,

where and when a terrorist attack might take place was

ignored.HUMINT can predict the specific target ,time

and nature of attacks.

ØLack of organic intelligence capability at tactical level..

“They did not have a dedicated, organic, and focused

[force protection] intelligence analytical capability.”Plus

there is a weakness in both collection and analysis of

force e protection intelligence. If intelligence capability

can be pushed down to company/platoon level with the

soldiers being augmented with 2-3 HUMINT and 1-2 CI

operatives (or the soldiers themselves being trained in

the basics like tactical questioning and interrogation)

then instead of sending request for information to

higher headquarters the tactical capability to investigate ,

gather information and analyze it would have been

achieved. The ‘’always top-down’’’ intelligence flow

could have been avoided and a four way flow

implemented with interaction between the tactical units

and higher headquarters, adjacent company headquarters

and intelligence elements.Hence there is a desperate need

for military units operating in high-threat environments

to possess organic intelligence collection, analysis, and

investigative capabilities.

ØMilitary intelligence lacked the necessary impetus to

devote time, effort and resources for long-term and mid-

term terrorist threat intelligence collection and analysis

– such as trends, intentions and capabilities of terrorists.

National intelligence agencies were larger in operational

and administrative size and were given priority rather

than the MI in collecting intelligence but national level

agencies cater to a wide range of requests for information

apart from terrorist threat to forces whereas MI can

exclusively set up collection taskings for force protection

intelligence given adequate weight age , administrative

and financial aid and clearance by the Government. This

was absent.

ØThe installation in question fell prey to terrorist attacks

because the intelligence arrangement at Command level

in higher headquarters or at the installation headquarters

itself was focused on outward attacks like tactical

missions, or defensive postures dictated by air threat

and totally ignored the need for HUMINT/CI based

intelligence collection for ground defense of the

installation, personnel, information and communication

facilities.

To execute a CI operation successfully liaison is needed

with other civil agencies and with the intelligence

agencies of the 3 services.To effectively build up a

liaison time is required,it cannot be achieved overnight.In

case of COIN operations liaison is much needed

with the local administrations intelligence branch and

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with the police as they are the ones who know the

local area,population,criminal elements and insurgency

profile in terms of attack history, police records of

personalities and elements who have been apprehended

and surrendered..the latter can be put to use by the

counterinsurgents as pseudo-insurgents to penetrate the

adversary’s setup. Liaison relationships are an investment

in the future, and the return on this investment is

directly proportional to the time and effort expended on

developing and maintaining the relationship.

We can transfer say 2-3% personnel from the MI to the

CI unit as CI units are generally understaffed compared

to the standard HUMINT units , and the liaison units.

Even transferring 3% personnel can significantly raise

the strength of all the units overall. Thus with this transfer

the Commands HUMINT assets get a boost and now

coupled with CI augmentation the HUMINT teams can

handle all three types of threats , Basic , Levels 1&2.

Simply transferring will not suffice, proper training in

counterintelligence need to be given. But this wont be a

problem as the MI soldier already has basic intelligence

training and acumen. Yes they need to be granted

clearance to access compartmentalized intelligence

information and hence prior to transfer the soldiers need

to undergo a counterintelligence investigation process as

to their suitability.

The CI effort focuses on the overall hostile intelligence

collection, sabotage, terrorist, and subversive threat. The

CI effort is also sufficiently flexible to adapt to the

geographical environment, attitudes of the indigenous

population, mission of the supported command, and

changing emphasis by hostile intelligence, sabotage,

terrorist, and subversive organizations.

What Are We Protecting?

In protecting an installation and its information

systems, operations and general security from enemy

multidisciplinary intelligence threat we must identify the

vulnerable and critical areas to be given more weightage

during security review. Not all assets and activities

warrant the same level of protection. T o this end a

careful and thorough vulnerability analysis needs to be

conducted resorting to red teaming methodology.

It should be noted at this juncture that it is always the

attempts of the enemy intelligence service to subvert

our knowledgeable personnel. In a military production

unit , say ordnance factory , the senior engineers and

quality control scientists have access to sensitive designs

and information related to weaponry systems. Similarly

classified and top secret documents/information are in

the hands of cleared senior personnel. These people are

often the target of aggressive enemy counterintelligence

agents.

The five basic categories include the following:

1.People

2.Military personnel

3.Activities/Operations

4.Intelligence collection/analysis

5.Sensitive movement of operations/personnel

6.Conduct of sensitive training

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7.Communications/networking

8.RDT&E and sensitive technology

9.Production of sensitive technology

10.Protection of nuclear/chemical/biological materials

11.Protection of weapons, explosives, and equipment

12.Information

13.Classified

14.Sensitive Compartmented Information

15.Top Secret

16.Secret

17.Confidential

18.Unclassified

19.System designs

20.System capabilities/vulnerabilities

21.Sensitive methods

22.Facilities

23.Headquarters

24.Field offices/administrative buildings

25.Training facilities

26.Storage facilities

27.Production facilities

28.R&D laboratories

29.Power plants

30.Parking facilities

31.Aircraft hangars

32.Residences

33.Equipment/Materials

34.Transportation equipment/vehicles

35.Maintenance equipment

36.Operational equipment

37.Communications equipment

38.Security equipment

39.Weapons

40.Automated information systems equipment

Now that the CI agent is knowledgeable about these

assets and activities that need protection, he can execute

a vulnerability and criticality analysis and recommend

suitable protective measures as well as countermeasures

to the Commander. He can recommend which critical

units need protection first and what resources to allocate

and how and where to implement general security and

countermeasures.

UNIT PROTECTION:

We will define unit not be size or specific function but

by any military group capable of offensive, defensive or

stability operations.

Unit protection is the process through which combatant

and noncombatant personnel, physical assets and

information are protected from adversarial threats

including adversarial multidisciplinary intelligence

threats.Multi layered, active/passive, lethal/non-

May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

lethal offensive and defensive measures are adopted for

this purpose. Protection is composed of a variety of active

and passive measures (for example, weapons, pre-

emption, and warning) in the air, land, sea, and space

domains. The goal of unit protection is preventing attacks

on the three unit resources , manpower, physical assets

and information so that the capability of the unit to

maintain its fighting potential without any degradation by

the enemy is constantly maintained.

The Army must:

ØDetect the threat

ØAsses the threat capability to degrade the units combat

capabilities

ØDecide on protective measures , whether offensive or

defensive

ØAct to implement these protective measures

ØRecover in very less time from any damage inflicted by

the adversary so that technical countermeasures and

tactical procedures may be employed so as to bring

back the unit to full operational status in the least

time possible.

In order for unit protection to be 100% effective we need

to ensure that the following are taken into prioritized

consideration by the unit commander:

vPersistent surveillance

vActionable intelligence

vPrecise target recognition

vInterrogation

vCommanders situational awareness

vAccurate identification of unit security related

intelligence gaps The above factors are contained in

the Detect-Assess-Decide system.”(DAD).

In addition unit Command and Control must be properly

defined as C2 aids the Commander to take proper

decisions in the light of what needs to be done exactly

to protect the unit and ensure that this is carried out

efficiently.

Protection: Protection is a function which should be given

a holistic treatment. Protection should not separately

focus on weapons deployment , pre-emption and

warning. All three must be integrated. No one is

a separate entity. Protection must be proactive. In

fact unit protection should never always be passive

but must also include active measures.Intellighence ,

counterintelligence and an admixture of military and

cross government capabilities should be employed to

the full. Installation/camp protection should look beyond

the perimeters. Just employing passive measures(check

posts, access control, perimeter security , guard

functions , lighting) and OPSEC isn’t sufficient.

Surveillance teams , counterintelligence operatives

should foray outside into adjoining areas , even areas of

interest located far from the unit , and the communities

in these areas so as to gain information/intelligence and

counter enemy reconnaissance/HUMINT/subversive /

sabotage/terrorist activities. Counterintelligence should

be employed to screen contract workers and

suppliers. A counterintelligence review should be

conducted periodically on unit personnel. Red teaming

should be

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taken up by the commander and his staff to ascertain unit

vulnerabilities and critical areas.

Add to Detect , Assess and Decide the functions

Act and Recover and we have the foundation for

a complete protection system on which to base our

decisions regarding collection of intelligence , fortifying

and strengthening/hardening our bases, decide on the

optimum courses of actions , employ forces optimally

to act on these decisions and in case of an attack which

could not be prevented , recover in the shortest possible

time without the base collapsing totally during/after the

attack using redundancy measures/backups and thorough

protection of critical assets. W e should also remember

protection has yet another dimension. The enemy might

know the protective measures we have employed using

intelligence and might attempt to block /prevent/deter

our post-attack or pre-emptiveactions , hence protection

must take these into account also.

Protection means ‘’time-critical tactical operations’’ ..not

just tactical operations. Protection should be a 360

degrees hemispherical capability , meaning protection

from land , air and sea based attacks.

For protection intelligence is critical as everything needs

to be known about the enemy , environment and self. The

last factor is determined by counterintelligence reviews ,

technical experts and red teaming.All intelligence

platforms and ops must be thoroughly integrated

to handle attacks fro m land , air, information ,

electronic,CBRNE,and intelligence domains of the

enemy. This integrated approach heightens the

commander’s situational awareness considerably , thus

acting as a force e anddecision-superiority enabler thus

leading to optimum effective course of action/s by the

Commander with a decisive finish.

Thus it is clear from the above that protection must be

proactive , intelligence-led and an integrated approach.

Objectives of unit protection are:

Install a warning system

Intelligence preparation of all areas adjoining the

base ,camp , the route along which the troops movement

takes place –in fact it must be made mandatory for

units intelligence section to keep an updated file on the

intelligence preparation of the entire area surrounding

the base/troop movement route whether or not there is

a perception of threat.IPB should include , among other

things

·Protection must be proactive , lethal and nonlethal both.

·Intelligence is the primary tool in protection

·Increase active/passive protection measures

·Rapid seizure of initiatives

·Rapid transition to decisive operations

·Rapid decision making capacity as tactical operations

in unit protection are ‘’time- critical’’.Damage to our

forces in combat on the battlefdield or in case of an

assymetrical combat , in hilly/urban/jungle terrain but

away from base is different than that of an attack on

an unsuspecting troop movement or installation/base

itself where an attack means catching us off guard ,

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unprepared and things move so fast due to the element

of surprise our forces do not have enough time to

recover , regroup and counterattack in time to thwart

the enemy.The enemy may have critical assets in mind

when they attack the installation/camp/base.Thus tactical

operations are ‘’time-critical’’.Hence to successfully

thwart an attack ,should our defences fail …we must be

prepared to execute time critical axctions without falling

prey to the shock due to the surprise element.This is more

so say in the case of an attack on an unsuspecting convoy

or troop column.

·Reducing vulnerability to minimum

·Identifying critical assets , protecting them priority of all

unit protection systems

·Understanding that most operations will be in

a non-linear unconventional operational environment

and hence all intelligence , counterintelligence ,

surveillance , reconnaissance , target determination

and nomination, combat oiperations,passive and active

protection measures , red teaming , and recovery options

should be seen from this perspective.

·Should understand that a complete 360 degree

hemispherical protection system must be installed

which must be a thoroughly integrated intelligence

and operations function keeping the factors DAD in

perspective and the factors which come next , viz..Act ,

Finish and Recover

The following types of threats should be expected in any

future conflict-

·Attacks –air based/heliborne—on logistical systems.

·Critical assets will be targeted with precision munitions.

·Staging areas , critical choke points may be

targeted using missiles with medium-range to ballistic

capabilities.

·Random attacks so as to be unpredictable , IED

attacks , terrorist and insurgent attacks and Special

Forces attacks may be conducted with twin objectives

or any of them..Viz..Effect destruction/undermine our

fighting capability and to force the commander to waste

resources , ammunition, and unnecessarily divert forces

to protect facilities and personnel which in fact are not

threatened.

We must remember we are now facing a fourth

generation enemy , who will attempt to put in

use every means including confusion and deception

to overcome the asymmetry/mismatch by increasing

uncertainty and making us more susceptible to the

element of surprise. The enemy will resort to continuous ,

random, and non-decisive engagements. The enemy

will randomly and continuously threaten and interdict

lines of cooperation’s and communications. They

will use camouflage and deception to to reduce

weapon engagement rangers and degrade our forces

advantages in ‘’stand-off’’engagements. There are two

objectives herein—first to confuse us so much that we

cannot execute the targeting process correctly , target

determnination.identification.nomination becomes very

difficult against an elusive enemy employing random

attack methods , and secondly frequent loss of contact

May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

with this elusive enemy has more negative consequences

than that which would have occurred with a conventional

more predictable echeloned enemy.

HUMINT and CI are two disciplines which help in

detecting enemy capabilities, intent and countering

enemy intelligence collection activities. In a typical

Army Intelligence structure, the intelligence assets are

located at Div and Bde levels , with the Bde having a

HQ company and Intelligence Bn , each Bn catering to

a specific collection/counterint discipline. For example

there can be a Ops Bn , a reconnaissance Bn , a tactical

exploitation Bn,a forward collection Bn ,or a strategic

SIGINT Bn.There is also a Div MI Bn and a theater

intelligence Bde.

Military intelligence brigades coordinate, manage, and

direct intelligence and surveillance; they conduct

collection management, all-source intelligence analysis,

production; and they disseminate information in support

of national, joint, interagency, multi-national, regional

combatant command, and Army service component

requirements.

Unit protection must integrate the protective attributes

of different Army Corps. The capabilities in brief of the

Corps are as follows:

·The Air Defense artillery provides protection by

acting as a warning system , intercepting threats

directed from air in the form of missiles and aerial

attacks (heliborne..etc) and also provide locational grid

information for otrher supporting forces to target.

·Military Police provides security by executing proactive

intelligence led policing.

·Engineer Corps protect our force by contributing to

its mobility and countermobility thus heightening its

survivability.provides the capabilities of survivability,

mobility, and countermobility to the force.

·Military intelligence provides security to our force by

adequate synchronized utilization/deployment of ISR

assets and counterintelligence capability

·Signals protects our command and control nodes

directing/controlling communiucation,computers,and

intelligence operations. Siugnals intelligence directly

supports HUMINT operations to validate information

,increase the situational understanding of the CO

Commander.

·Field Artillery provides security to the force by

contributing to the direct/indirect firepower,predicting

impact points.

Ordnance Corp contributes to recovery by deploying its

ordnance disposal systems.

Unit Protection Functions

It’s very true that conventional military threats exist

and are given priority in intelligence activities but

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the existence and threat capabilities of asymmetric ,

nonconventional threats cannot be undermined. Add to

these new emerging threats of this category. At the

tactical level it is very important to address this type of

threat by determining its identity, leadership, capabilities,

tracking its location and gauging its intent. We need to

detect the enemy entire range of hostile activity including

intelligence collection and counterintelligence activities,

use this information to assess its capabilities and intent to

arrive at the common operation picture COP which brings

to light the

relationship between the

terrain,enemy,mission,troops,time and the civil

environment thus enabling the commander to enter the

enemy’s decision cycle, gauge its intent more accurately,

deliver warning to force s in the area and develop

suitable courses of action. After the asses step is

over the commander moves on to the decide function

wherein an action is decided upon or any existing

action is altered or monitiored.Therafter the act function

takes over where the course of action decided upon

is implemented by tasking the tactical fighting unit to

deliver kinetic.nonkinetic attack on nominated targets or

passive protection measures..all with the intent to protect

the force. Protecting the force should not entirely be

passive in nature, the soldiers need to go out and attack

nominated targets so as to deter attacks or fail plans to

attack our installations.

ACTIVE MEASURES FOR UNIT PROTECTION:

Active measures will provide at stand-off distances, the

capabilities to-

W e designate a stand-off area outside the installation/

protected area and take active measures to deny

unidentified vehicular or personnel movement in that

area

·Just like we have a C2 system with respect to any

mission, similarly we need to have a C2 mission with

respect to active or passive defensive measures and these

need to be integrated with the C2 itself. Such active/

passive measures can be remotely controlled

lethal/nonlethal measures.

·As for passive measure steps should be taken to

deny unidentified/suspect personnel/vehicles movement

inside a restricted area/protected area .Areas within

buildings,facilities,structures,airfields,ammunition

depot,etc can be effectively protected by employing

unmanned remotely controlled nonlethal systems at

standoff distances. Measures should be taken with

priority to deter personnel and vehicles from entering

a protected military installation again using remotely

activated lethal/nonlethal systems. Physical barriers, both

active and passive can be employed for this purpose.

·There can be instances of enemy fire directed at

critical assets of the installation and hence we need

to include modular protection packages, automatic or

soldier response teams built up specifically for this

purpose. The protection system should be integrated

again with the C2 system. It is very important to point out

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here that all the passive/active measures success depends

on a great deal on intelligence/counterintelligence/liaison

apart from the remotely/manned protection system

deployment. For example we need intelligence to

apprehend any infiltrations in our camp in the form of

security or non security civilian contractors. Or we can

effectively liaise with the civil police/intelligence

agencies to build up a mapping of probable anti-

installation criminal forces operating in the area who

could attempt to launch sporadic fires or explosive

attacks, such attacks being in keeping with the criminal

group’s affiliation with the enemy. Counterintelligence

can help in visualizing our vulnerable areas within the

installation and then proceed to identify the critical nodes

which if damaged can stop the installation operations

altogether. This vulnerability assessment coupled with

the threat assessment and supported by sound OPSEC

practices can give adequate unit protection.

From the force protection perspective CI and HUMINT

functions:

Recommending countermeasures after assessment of

threat capabilities, operations, expected courses of

actions, most likely COA and most dangerous COA.

·Threat intent

·Identify Threat leadership. Key commanders. Key

lieutenants and area commanders

·Identify threat C2 nodes

·Identify threat logistic routes

·Identify threat social reach, network, and contacts

·Identify threat affiliates in other criminal networks,

enterprises

·Identify threat sympathizers in own area of control

·Identify political/administrative figures that support

threat ideology

·Threat attack /defense operations location parameters.

·Gauge potential attack/defense methods of threat.

·Recommend C2 setup to thwart threat attack.

·Estimate with reasonable accuracy the expected time of

attack.

·Possible locations of Threat listening post/observation

posts

·Determine possible escape routes of threat forces after

an attack or defense scenario

·Possible enemy IED techniques, infiltration routes,

emplacement

·Gauge IED detonation methods/means

·Gauge IED timings

·Possible routes for IED ex-filtration

·Staging areas

·Safe houses

·Weapons and ammunitions storage locations

·Production facilities for IED and other ammunitions/

explosives.

·Find out what supplementary operations threat may

resort to

·Recommending countermeasures to threat IED

·Recommending countermeasures to threat ISR/EW

·Determining threat indirect fire parameters, key indirect

fire

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May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

WARNING

Once actionable intelligence is

obtained warning or predictions is disseminated

in a timely,unambiguous,specific and accurate

manner.Warning is an acknowledgement of the existence

ofd a threat and subsequent disseminatin.

Warning is of two types:

(a)Defensive warn

(b)Enemy warn

In defensive warn after receiving actionable intelligence

about the adversary’s possible attack the installations

security is beefed up by incorporating protective

measures. The warning may be digital/aural/physical or

virtual.

In enemy warn the enemy is communicated the fact

through non-lethal measures such as interrogation or

challenging an enemy unit/capability that in case of

persistent or continued enemy action our course of action/

s can take on an increasingly lethal nature with the intent

to prevent the enemy from taking further hostile actions

and also inflict heavy damages. Thus enemy warn is a

method to deter the enemy from carrying out its intent if

it hasn’t done so yet or to stop the enemy in its tracks..

It is very important that warning should be unambiguous,

accurate and timely/specific,. In addition to this it should

be actionable. Warning can be graduated , meaning the

level of warning may assume increasing proportions

in keeping with the feedback about the enemy which

may indicate that it has ceased its operations/.activities

temporarily but is conducting discreet operations/

increased intelligence activity masked in the cloak

of acceptance of our warning and cessation of open

hostilities.

WARNING SYSTEM:

The warning system must have the following features:

·It should allow for redundancies in our act capability

systems.

·It should allow for passive proactive means so as to

protect our installations, its critical assets, command and

control nodes, thus overall reducing the vulnerability of

the installation/.protected area.

·It should provide a system of integrating fires to handle

threats and precluding enemy attack on our installation ,

its C2 and critical assets.

·Provide warning of threat intelligence activities.

·Provide warning of existing threat C2 nodes

·Provide warning of threat capabilities, disposition,

strength, order of battle

·Provide warning of threat logistic routes.

·Provide warning of threat sympathizers.,

·Provide warning of threats possible attack COAs

·Provide warning of the defense capability of the threat

·Provide warning of threats peculiar /preferred TTPs/

modus operandi

·Provide warning of threats history

·Provide warning of threat movements

·Provide warning of threat leadership

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May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

·Provide warning of threat detachments, cells dispersed

in and out of the area of operations.

·Provide warning of Threat attack /defense operations

location parameters.

·Provide warning of potential attack/defense methods of

threat.

·Provide warning of the expected time of attack.

·Provide warning of possible locations of Threat listening

post/observation posts

·Provide warning of possible escape routes of threat

forces after an attack or defense scenario

·Provide warning of possible enemy IED techniques,

infiltration routes, emplacement

·Provide warning of IED detonation methods/means

·Provide warning of IED timings

·Provide warning of possible routes for IED ex-filtration

·Provide warning of Staging areas

·Provide warning of Safe houses

·Provide warning of weapons and ammunitions storage

locations

·Provide warning g of the Production facilities for IED

and other ammunitions/explosives.

·Provide warning of supplementary operations threat may

resort to

·Provide warning of threat indirect fire parameters, key

indirect fire

Future Modular Force leaders must be trained to

aggressively manage information and instill trust in the

output of decision support tools that automated systems

provide. Other major implications include adoption of

a lifetime of education paradigm and the creation of

knowledge centers configured to support professional

leader education. Leader development questions include,

but are not limited to-

(1)How do we develop leaders ready to deal

with the complexity of the contemporary operating

environment, threats, and interagency implications?

(2)How can we develop more adaptive leaders, versatile

in UP operations?

(3)How do we provide collaborative, distributed

training problem solving and decision aids that empower

battle command to support commanders, as well as staffs

to advising commanders during planning, preparation,

rehearsal, and execution of UP exercises and operations?

(4)How are leaders enabled to know the terrain

and weather and appreciate their tactical implications for

tactical concealment, employment of weapons, mobility,

and seeking positions of advantage?

(5)How are leaders empowered to understand the

operational environment as well as, or better than, the

threat in order to execute UP detect, assess, and decide

functions?

May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

(6)How will units enable leaders to know the

enemy, friendly unit locations, and their capabilities?

(7)How will units adapt to emerging UP situations more

quickly than an adversary?

UP is not force protection, although the application

of protection capabilities will positively affect force

protection. By integrating the protection capabilities

outlined in this CCP, a commander, and consequently, the

force will be offered superior protection abilities.

TOCs DIVNET & INT-ENABLED

NCOs

May 6th, 2017

TACTICAL OPS CENTERS AND

NETWORKING.

The Division must maintain an intranet capability wherein

all intelligence and operations data,historical , current and

projected are maintained in the database.For example,all

sensors,humint-sigint-elint-comint-techint-masint deployed

in the Brigade area of the Division should be able to

channel the information collected to the specific tactical

operations center Desk NCO.Each Brigade will have seperate

TOCs installed for each/group of (as the case may be

depending on manpower availability to staff TOCs)company/

companies of every batallion.The humint team will send

reports to the HUMINT Desk NCO.Similarly with the other

intelligence collection disciplines/sensors.Now after analysis

by the analysis element in the TOC the intelligence

information is passed on to the LAN server.Say we have

as the TOTAL NORTH EAST battlespace comprising of the

disturbed States.Every State is broken down territory/area

wise into specific area of ops.Each area of ops is subjected

to intelligence collection by the Bn Intelligence organic

units,wherein the information as said above is passed on to

speciic intelligence sensor based TOC.or it could be one TOC

may cater to all sensor types with each Desk NCO allocated

to each sensor information receipt channel.Each subset area

of operations within the boundaries of each State has as its

intelligence and ops database input nodes at the TOCs of the

Brigade (each Bn)/Bn group.A group of such TOC nodes are

conected to one LAN node.In this manner an entire network

of LAN nodes are dispersed in each State.The complete LAN

is connected with the total AO WAN system..Now the total

battlespace which comprises of all the affected NE States has

as its information repository domain the WAN Servers.Each

WAN NODE will cater to each State intelligence ops as well as

all tactical combat ops(linked to all the TOCs of the State

AO.).. This entire system in its totality should be viewed as

concentric circles.The outermost ring is the deployed sensors

(or as I aim to achieve , organic company level-platoon level

intelligence sections--that is boot level sensors);The next

ring will be the individual TOCs and the DESK NCOs receipt/

dissemination terminals.The inner ring will be the LAN chain

of all the States; each LAN being comprised of all the

sub-LANs of that State to which feeds come from all the

State TOCs.All feeds from this inner LAN ring will be into

the next inner ring - the WAN Network Main Server.In

this manner we have overcome the probs of decentralized

command and control of intelligence and tactical

operations in a nonliner distributed wide battlespace (it

is not possible for every tactical unit to push upwards

all intelligence and combat operation to higher

headquarters in a very wide (State) area of operations ,

there is an inundation of information at Bde level

intelligence section--it cannot manage easily even with

intelligence detachments sporead out without the

installation of Bn-level TACTICAL OPS CENTERS (and

Company level organic intelligence cells created out of

a team of non-int occupational speciality

personnel--like the infantry soldiers,MP,patrols--

trained in basic tactical question-

ing,elicitation,observation and surveillance skills.The TOCs

bring in an element of control and ease of information

push to much lower levels than higher HQs for the tactical

units deployed.In each sub-sector of each AO within each

sub-region of each State the tactical units find it easy to

push information to the locally installed TOC.The group of

TOCs in the State can exchange information laterally among

themselves and get a clear picture of all activities and

trends.This helps to give the Bde Commander a clear

common operating picture COP--which means the exact

ground situation without being inundated with unnecessary

or conflicting or excessive intelligence information.(In my

CFET web portal I have detailed the battle-staff functions of

each TOC wherein cases like deconfliction , technical control

of int/counterint TTPs,updating and management of source

network and source registries,requirement,collection assets

management and collection management,administrative

control,ops management,dissemination--all being handled

by NCOs and a JCO with one battle Captain).This TOC

network through the Overall LAN system of each State

can effectively push/pull information from the main WAN

Network.Thus we find that an effective command and control

of the entire NE intelligence and tactical combat operations

is ensured due to the availability of intelligence and combat

information at the boot level (Company level int capability

and lower) ,TOC level , State level (LAN System) and the

entire Battlespace (NE) Level THROUGH THE MAIN WAN

NETWORK(Each Bde Level).All Bde's will have their own

network system on similar grounds in their AO with the main

linkages to the DIV MAIN INT/OPS DATABASE SERVER.This

is what I will call the Div Ops and Intelligence Net (the main

WAN System).

During deployment for combat the Bn intelligence section

int officer can enter this Div NET AND CAN ACCESS THE

division ops and intelligence activities if necessary.He can

thus maintain a current intelligence situation report/map

within the Bn TOC reflecting the current enemy situation.At

every level trends,pattern recognition , analytical (link

diagramming,forecasting trends,association mapping,time

series analysis,PERT/CPM applied to operations etc)software

can be used to manipulate and research information on the

servers.Such information may be pushed down on request

to operational/tactical levels.

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May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

Roles and Functions of Battle Staff

Noncommissioned Officers in the

Intelligence Warfighting Domain

Battle staff noncommissioned officers (NCOs)

focus on assisting their respective

staff officers and senior NCOs. The

entire staff contributes to making and

executing timely decisions. Commanders and

staffs continually look for opportunities to

streamline cumbersome or time-consuming

procedures. The following paragraphs,

organized by warfighting function (WFF),

suggest activities and functions common to all

members of a particular staff section. Principal

staff officers along with their senior NCOs

determine what specific functions are performed

within their sections based upon the skill sets of

available personnel.

Commanders and Staff concentrate on

achieving a streamlined picture of the ensuing

battle , in fact at any moment of time the Staff

and the Commander should be able to grasp the

immediate current situation

as simply as possible without the presentation

getting inundated with information overflow.This

common operating picture viewed explicitly

and concretely enables the Commander to take

swift decisions in an otherwise fast evolving

uncertain battle environment.It

is not possible for the Staff to accomplish this

by themselves and the standard office personnel

who assist them (in the Tactical Ops

Center)..what is required that the battle staff

from among the JCOs,Senior NCO and NCOs

assist the Staff Officers in the respective

warfighting functions , viz: intelligence and

CI;maneuver;sustainment;command,control,communication

and computers C4;plans;fires;protection;engineer

and provost marshall functions.The main

objective is to acquire the best situational

understanding about the common operating

picture within the tactical operations

center/command post. . The

TOC/CP has two primary functions:

1.To track Soldiers and equipment during the battle,

to assist the leader in the command and control of the

unit.• 2.To serve as a data center that processes

enemy and friendly information

Intelligence (Intel) Function

Intelligence

readiness,tasks,synchronization,counterintelligence,other

intelligence support and support to force protection

, coin , and other security programs—these war

fighting functional domains if properly executed,

supervised and controlled ,help the Commander to

a great extent in visualizing the battlefield from the

correct perspective and shape the battle in his favor

by deciding promptly on course of actions. It is here

where the most must be extracted from the Battle

Staff NCOs who are assisting the Battle Staff Officers.

Intel readiness -- Throughout the AO the Battle staff

NCOs should coordinate with horizontally dispersed units

and intel staff and lower and upper echelon

staff,establishing and maintaining the proper

relationships/procedures.

• There should be a proper command intelligence training

plan and the Battle staff NCOs should see to it that threat

force considerations,intelligence,counterintelligence

and force protection are properly integrated in this

training plan.This will ensure good intelligence readiness.

• Prepare the command intel-training plan and

integrate intel, counterintelligence,

and enemy/threat considerations into other

training plans.

Intel tasks:

• Recommend priority intelligence requirements (PIR).

•Execute and manage the intelligence preparation of the

battlefield in line with changing intelligence requirements

due to the rapid tempo of battle,co-ordinate with the

IPB efforts of the rest of the staff and other unit staff.

Create situation reports,intelligence estimates,update

enemy/threat/terrain/weather factors so that the

commanders situational perspective is heightened thus

leading to a clear common operating picture COP.

Provide support to indications and warning with

respect to operations.

Provide support to Force Protection

Provide intelligence support to battle damage assessment.

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May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

TACTICAL OPERATION

CENTER

May 6th, 2017

The Commander needs to see , shape , shield ,

strike and move within the Battlefield most efficiently

while retaining that competitive edge over the

enemy.Battlefield conditions are extremely fluid and the

current type of prevailing Battlespace--distributed and

non-linear-- compounds intelligence collection highly.

I would like to view the Battlespace not as a whole ,

operationally or strategically but rather as a tactical-

nodal-network..numerous tactical battles being fought at

various points distributed throughout the battlefield..in

fact so numerous that its a very very hard task for

limited intelligence collection assets to cover the entire

battlefield with the result (what has been happening

till now) intelligence/information feeds up the channel

to higher HQs are only from the major battles ,

the routine tactical battles going ignored.Unlike our

american counterpart , the boot level indian soldier is

not equipped with hand-held data entry system which

can also access pertinent intelligence required by him

from the central intelligence database at rear-HQ/Higher

HQs.Hence if in any tactical combat operation the

soldiers gain valuable intelligence , say after exploitation

of captured enemy personnel or documents they cant

''push'' it above.Again the limited information flow

upwards by intelligence collection assets is ''limited'' as

only major battles and some tactical engagements are

covered.With the result that the higher HQs does not

get a complete situational understanding and also limited

responses in the form of targeting instructions or need for

further intelligence is pushed down to the operational and

Bn levels..with most of the urgent actionable intelligence

required by the soldier on the ground being unobtainable.

We need to make the average soldier on the ground int-

savvy.It is not difficult , as he needent be trained in

all intelligence functions but rather be acquainted with

tactical questioning,screening and document exploitation

plus surveillance/reconnaissance skills.

Regarding the last two he need only understand how

R&S is conducted , and all the factors that go

into it--predeployment,insertion and the two activities

itself(collection)--he needent be proificient in R&S,the

intelligence asset (the CI man[or one member of the R&S

team trained in TQ,DOCEX] with the R&S team) can

look for intelligence/CI information while the R&S team

does its own bit.

Battle Staff man the TOC/CP;besides the officers/JCOs

there are the Senior NCOs and NCOs.These people can

be trained to assist in intelligence duties; if the TOC/

CP suffers casualties and if we have a pool of int-savvy

soldiers which can be drawn from the combat troops,well

the TOC/CP is again operational.In another chapter

I will elaborate Battle Staff (NCOs and Senior NCOs)

functions w.r.t the intelligence warfighting function.

The CP officers role is to configure operations in such

a manner so that he can ‘’see’’ the battle space in the

most simple, direct manner , without any ambiguity

or inundating information and maintain a wide view

of operations. Military decision making and planning

processes occur at all levels of Command and similarly

at the CP/TOC too. Battle staff officers should be

able to analyze higher headquarters mission orders ,

adjacent headquarters feeds/requirements and lower units

requirements and ‘’pushed-up’’ intelligence feeds –

ensuring seamless operations. They should be able to

assess the tactical situation , the enemy’s intent and the

long and short term friendly courses of actions. They

use MDMP to properly steer TOC/CP operations in

conformation with the Commanders intent and priority

intelligence requirements and develop estimates and

plans within the various war fighting functional areas.

These are sort of ‘’managerial roles’’ which can only

be accomplished successfully with a trained battle staff

NCOs and Sr NCOs in the CP/TOC team. . The TOC/

CP battle staff officers should not routinely post the

Operations map, work digital command and control

(C2) systems, or answer Telephones. These roles should

be fulfilled by battle staff NCOs.These Battle staff

NCOs must have access to all war plans at the CP/

TOC ,must understand fully what are the critical and

priority intelligence requirements of the Commander as

laid down before the Battle staff officers , must be

able to receive and analyze intelligence feeds from the

ongoing tactical operations in the AO overseen by the CP/

TOC,maintain and understand ops schedules , execution

May 6th, 2017 Published by: keshavmazumdar

matrices and overall common operating picture. He is the

frontline information manager. The battle staff NCO and

battle captain must work together and understand each

Other’s roles and responsibilities.

_____________________________________

Commanders and Staff concentrate on achieving a

streamlined picture of the ensuing battle , in fact at any

moment of time the Staff and the Commander should be

able to grasp the immediate current situation as simply as

possible without the presentation getting inundated with

information overflow.This common operating picture

viewed explicitly and concretely enables the Commander

to take swift decisions in an otherwise fast evolving

uncertain battle environment.It is not possible for the

Staff to accomplish this by themselves and the standard

office personnel who assist them (in the Tactical Ops

Center)..what is required that the battle staff from among

the JCOs,Senior NCO and NCOs assist the Staff Officers

in the respective warfighting functions , viz: intelligence

and

CI;maneuver;sustainment;command,control,communication

and computers C4;plans;fires;protection;engineer and

provost marshall functions.The main objective is to

acquire the best situational understanding about the

common operating picture within the tactical operations

center/command post. . The TOC/CP has two primary

functions: • To track Soldiers and equipment during the

battle to assist the leader in the command and control of

the unit. • To serve as a data center that processes enemy

and friendly information.

The role of the battle staff is a critical component

to achieve mission success in a counterinsurgency

environment. Battle staff noncommissioned officers

(NCOs) perform a multitude of vitally important roles

and functions in the tactical operations centers and

command posts. They are the principal managers of

battle tracking, which supports the timely analysis and

processing of plans and orders, and they continually

adapt these plans and orders to counter the threat.

KESHAV MAZUMDAR

ANTITERRORISM OFFICER

KOLKATA.WB.

mi.intelligence@gmail.com

http://bit.ly/armyxxii

NOTE FROM AUTHOR

May 6th, 2017

This is the first part of a series of ebooks I have prepared in the

aftermath of Dantewada attacks.My objective is to present our

shortcomings where intelligence as a prime enabler of military

operations and force protection is often ignored in its entirety-

that is to say we do not realize its full potential from different

perspectives , such as pushing intelligence capability to the

hands of tactical units--the infantry unit itself having its own

organic int cell rather than depending for actionable int from

higher HQs ..sometimes flung far away from the actual area of

ops.Same goes for force protection where counterintelligence

assumes a very very important role.We need to secure our

bases,personnel ,C2 before we decide to go offensive.That is to

say we go forward full ahead with 100% combat capability.The

enemy will do its best to attack us when we are inside our

camps , bases to destroy our combat adge.Be it morale ,

C2,lweaponry systems, personnel , our ops plans , and even

our intelligence plans-moves--the enemy will try to effect a

destruction and even if we lose one unit of our capability ,

say a soldier we fall short of a 100% combart capability. In

this booklet I have touched on these shortcomings and I have

introduced TOCs and the Div NET.

All these will bev elaborated in other booklets of the series.

Keshav Mazumdar Antiterrorism Officer

CPO CRC CMAS ASC ATO

Fellow New Westminster College Canada

Reach Me Here

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