Statement:The Battalions organic tactical int unit  intelligence officer plans supplemental intelligence missions so as to adequately exploit the human terrain as infantry soldiers in a COIN environment are the closest to the local population than intelligence assets deployed by higher HQ Int Section.

Elaboration: The Bn Commander may have access to intelligence from higher HQ assets but frequently the available intelligence lacks the necessary information to plan tactical operations , these intelligence gaps are crucial , and it is imperative the Commander takes initiative to execute supplemental intelligence missions. For this the requirement of organic int platoons is a must. The intelligence officer’s duty is to precisely state intelligence requirements after assessing the local environment, threat-populace-other factors, these requirements stem from lack of certain information when planning operations/missions. It is very important that there must be someone who will help the commander to adjust the way he requests intelligence and here the intelligence officer comes into play, aided by the Bn int section. It is extremely critical that the commander has access to the necessary intelligence once it is apparent that, despite intelligence feeds from higher HQ Int assets the feeds lack the information necessary for mission planning. Supplemental intelligence mission should follow after a supplementary analysis. This can be achieved by integrating trained inf soldiers within teams, task organizing them with commanders prioritized int requirements clearly stated. Once a supplementary analysis is carried out after int gaps are evident, it is not difficult to plan local int missions by organic int platoons or patrol/combat R&S teams embedded with one of two inf-turned int personnel.

Operationalizing intelligence

Military operations are not all alike even if standard tactics , techniques and procedures are employed or the operation is template on a previous similar operation. The reason is intelligence requirements vary. Each operation success banks heavily on correct intelligence , the risk must be kept to a minimum with success rate high. Intelligence must be available in a format relevant to the military operation. Relevant that is.Operationalized.This is extremely important to understand. The intelligence officer and his staff should understand the military operation in detail and the ops officer  of the military unit must understand the intelligence sections argument , predictions, assets limitations and capabilities. What I want to drive home here is say there is a time constraint which prohibits intelligence collection, such as a pre dawn strike or an assault in 24 hours—no time for collection activities. Here required information is not available for planning the operation. Now the intelligence officer will elaborate indicators already known or anything about the particular scenario and going on these lines he will list out key questions that still need to be answered. As he is putting forth all this to the ops officer the latter will reciprocate by making the int officer understand the mission tasking and available options , thus prompting the intelligence officer to take the cue and refine and refocus intelligence collection and analysis in the very short time available. Had there been no this int-ops dynamic , the intelligence officer would have been confused how to allocate and direct his resources/assets in the very short time available for collecting actionable intelligence. This is what is operationalizing intelligence. The primary gain is situational awareness for the commander which will aid mission planning and minimize risk. Risk and options become more apparent and tactical performance is positively ensured by allowing quick and sure responses to rapidly changing conditions in short frames of time. This sort of derived intelligence from int-ops dynamic is operational intelligence.

When commanders are concerned about time constraints, they frequently may not task their collectors and analysts for additional intelligence on the human terrain. There may result inadequacies in the analysis about COIN specific human terrain and battlefield factors due to the difficulty in acquiring required intelligence. Commanders can deploy created organic int teams or augmented combat/recce platoons to collect information as they conduct their own missions. We cannot tolerate inefficient planning for combat missions due to intelligence gaps. That is what is missing apart from handed down intelligence products from higher HQ int section. Now that is indeed difficult for int higher HQ as personnel limited and cannot cover the entire tactical commanders requirements-boot level that is. For this purpose the tactical organic int capability must be created so that battalion commanders can get their own int platoons crafted out of inf soldiers who can exploit the human terrain , atmospherics , conduct tactical questioning , docex and CEE..all can be easily learnt without prior int knowledge..the result being addressing int gaps not apparent to higher int HQ and boot level collection ops leading to the most imp element—situational awareness of the commander.

We usually find most analysis of collections of information will be isolated from the operational environment in which the data originated(tactical level in fact), and the analysts will therefore be unable to apply the appropriate perspective to the intelligence assessment and correlate data to operational activities at tactical levels. The analysis will therefore offer little insight or contextual understanding of the way a particular piece of intelligence should be considered or whether its use may have unintended effects. 

By enhancing the role of intelligence operations, unit personnel can find subtle, ambiguous or fleeting observables that indicate seemingly hidden enemy activities or behaviors. Soldiers must not only collect this information but also quickly record and report mission results, which will prompt additional analysis and result in a better understanding of the situational atmospherics.

The organic  field collectors are able to immerse themselves within an area and have daily contact with numerous sources. With their analytical skills, they develop a capacity for judgment, and they may be in the best position to comprehend indicators or warnings that likely would not set off the same alarms within the larger intel apparatus. Under many circumstances, their comprehension is beyond the scope of a distant analyst from higher int HQ who is more focused on a very broad area of operations rather than SOF tactical battles or non kinetic operations on human terrain (locals), who may frequently discard what he deems as irrelevant information. In short, the local collectors can become their own camp-based intelligence community.

An enhancement to operational intelligence would be the conduct of more counterthreat and counteraction activities to collect intelligence clandestinely or to gain intelligence insights for missions. Insurgencies and guerrilla movements facilitated through illicit border-crossing activities   rely on mobility, elusiveness and availability of a safe-haven. The trade and transport of drugs, arms and humans rely on the same factors. All these illicit acts require significant active and passive civilian material support, which is deeply rooted in the human sociological framework. And mind you its these ground troops who encounter most human suspects during the illicit transfer. And these troopers can augment their daily ops by inducting an int platoon drawn from other troopers and basically trained in tactical question and mobile on the spot interrogation at forward areas to extract info of int value in very short span of time and then MP escort them to rear to CI cages. On the spot tactical questioning and interrogation works very well on fresh confused scared suspects and gives them no time to overcome the initial shock of arrest and cook alibi/stories enroute the long way as would be the case when standard TTPs dictate escorting suspects to rear for interrogation with lip service at the time of arrest.

When correctly managed, operational intelligence will be more proactive and pre-emptive and less a reactive, "off the shelf" product that has not been framed for the TACTICAL battle but for a broad AO operational int requirements and created by higher HQ.Point is higher HQ has no way to ascertain and address individual tactical commanders int gaps...this must be NOTED. They just can’t deploy int assets for every commander and very good shortage of int personnel compounds the difficulty. You tell me how many int operatives we have for NE area of operations? Minimal.

(Ill Continue In The Next Mail..)