OPTION B: COMPANY LEVEL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CELL:

Organization

The MI cell (C& E), shown at Figure 2, is organized into a headquarters section, an MI unit (CI), an MI unit (interrogation and exploitation), and an MI unit (collection and exploitation). Headquarters section provides C2, administrative services, and logistic support for units of the company.

Roles and Functions

The Collection and Exploitation section provides interrogation and CI support. Functions , include:

• Setting up interrogation centers and executing interrogation operations of enemy prisoners of war.
• Determine enemy multidisciplinary intelligence threat, analyse it and recommend countermeasures, both on the passive defensive side as well as offensive methods.
• Conduct exploitation of turned enemy agents. Conduct polygraph techniques and technical operations.
• Conduct DOCEX
• Conduct debriefing of high level military/political figures,refugees,patrols,military personnel who are released by enemy from capture or who have escaped from captivity,detained civilians and other people who have information of interest.
• Conduct Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO).

DERIVATION FROM ABOVE ..

1.MODULAR FORCE DESIGN : The resources and capabilities at the hands of the Commander with respect to intelligence assets are limited , sometimes scarce .From the above we can introduce the concept of ‘’Modularity’’ in force design. That is to say we can create a deployable, scalable, modular intelligence capability to plug into the requirements interface of any adjacent unit/company/headquarters who lack the necessary intelligence capability or whose resources are very limited. This modular plug-in can be tailored to suit the needs of the Commander of that unit. For example if HUMINT assets are more in demand than the CI or DOCEX elements , the former can be augmented to the plug-in by pulling from the parent units MI Company’s sub-components , with the Company’s capabilities not being reduced in any way. The MI (C&E) is a good example of a plug-in.

2. Tactical HUMINT team formed at company level from CI and I&E platoons of the C&E Company.( Please refer to the Appendix for further details on Tactical HUMINT.)

PROJECTING COMBAT POWER WITH ORGANIC ISR CAPABILITY

Reason for creation of interim team:

Without sending in the interim combat team to gain a situational understanding it is totally impracticable to deploy the striking forces. What we need is a interim combat force with reconnaissance, surveillance and target nomination capabilities—all these facilitated by an organic MI company with organic intelligence assets.

The recce platoon, in addition to reconnaissance and surveillance should also engage in HUMINT activities for thorough situational understanding. The situation in asymmetric warfare is different. Here the recce platoon can conduct HUMINT operations. The reconnaissance platoon should be equipped with CI capability. This heightens its HUMNINT collection ability.

The HUMINT teams (4 teams) are in effect Tactical HUMINT Teams each with 3 HUMINT collectors and one CI agent. Once deployed, the teams report their information to an operational management team (OMT), which collates intelligence data gathered by the tactical teams. The information is then passed on to the brigade INT section for further analysis and integration into the brigade's collection plan.

C2:

The reconnaissance platoon HQ and the HUMINT platoon HQ both should contain one CI NCO.The reconnaissance squads each should have one CI soldier. Thus at the lowest tactical level organic CI capability with the deployment of maximum possible CI soldiers is hereby achieved thus increasing significantly the reconnaissance troops HUMINT collection capability. We can optimally have in the recce patrol 3 six-man squads, each having a CI soldier.

The early entry force, the interim combat team along with HUMINT/CI capability executes both an operational mission and intelligence endeavour.It shapes the battle space before the strike force moves in, makes conditions disadvantageous for the enemy in the initial stage , facilitates the arrival of the strike forces. It also conducts a preliminary intelligence preparation of the battlefield, makes a human terrain study and interacts with local populace using tactical questioning and elicitation to identify threats. In other words it helps in projecting the force into the new area of operations. In the case of asymmetric warfare projecting the force should be the case, not just deterrence. The latter part is force protection—is indeed very important, but if we have to uproot the enemy we need to be proactive, offensive and resort to projecting right into the heart of the enemy’s base.