EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The Doklam area of operations can be subjected to a military intelligence battle plan wherein the primary objective of enhancing the situational awareness of the commander at  the concerned echelon is attained. A proper mix of intelligence collection assets is divined to obtain the necessary information in keeping with intelligence gaps and prioritized intelligence requirements as laid down by the commanders at Bde and Div levels. I would like to point out at this juncture that intelligence gaps are much more evident to company/battalion commanders than to higher headquarters. True intelligence is disseminated to lower tactical levels, intelligence that is collected from human assets, from overhead surveillance platforms and from reconnaissance and surveillance platoons but it is only the soldier on the ground who is the closest to the local populace, the terrain and sometimes the enemy that makes him aware of the need to answer certain immediate questions--answers to intelligence gaps and these gaps are not evident to higher headquarters. Say for example there is a possibility of extracting information from a local who has suspected connection with the enemy sympathizers , and here it is the line infantryman who doubts this as he is in the best position to be in close proximity to the local populace but the soldier has no previous training in immediate tactical extraction of intelligence , which i term tactical questioning and this coupled with basic surveillance-reconnaissance-document and captured equipment exploitation can be very easily taught to the infantryman thus rendering him as a secondary collector for HIS battalion int officer, an indispensable organic int asset who can contribute in his own little way to the battalion commanders immediate intelligence needs or answers to intelligence gaps. Ill clarify the term intelligence gaps more here : Aptly it is the gap between received intelligence from higher headquarters and the intelligence requirements in toto of the battalion commander. It is the existence of such unanswered intelligence gaps that contribute to most operational/tactical failures.
All this being said , Doklam area of operations is amenable to tactical intelligence collection by organic intelligence platoons of the deployed infantry units. A very positive feature of tactical intelligence capability is the number of intelligence assets available in the length and breadth of the area of operations. With organic intelligence platoons in every battalion this is made possible. But this is important, very important secondary collection operations. Still intelligence collection at higher headquarters level must be more streamlined. The architecture must he altered to rein in intelligence assets from different perspectives of task organization. Plus a seamless communication protocol is required where information flow from soldier on the ground to the Bde int server or the other main cloud server and vice versa , adjacent headquarters intelligence exchange , flow between commands --tactical , operational rear headquarters (be it operational or even line tactical units and headquarters like deep entry tactical humint reconnaissance teams and corresponding forward and rear temporary headquarters setups).Communication is crucial as it ensures proper command and control of intelligence assets and more importantly conveying to them (or actuating sensors) changing intelligence requirements due to battle tempo or passive changes in enemy intentions. I have created tactical operations centers TOC's with all this in mind , staffed not by intelligence military occupational specialty personnel but by line infantrymen of the rank of Sr NCOs , JCOs and a battle Captain. Networked all these Bn TOCs with the Bde Int Server , the Cloud server (where apart from storage and retrieval of information and push-pull with the combat soldier on the ground , it has a microprocessor based system with software to reposition and actuate sensors in accordance with incoming changes in intelligence or any other change as perceived by tactical units , intelligence personnel or other assets).