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Intelligence has two objectives:

First, it provides accurate, timely, and relevant knowledge about the enemy (or potential enemy) and the surrounding environment.

The second intelligence objective is that it assists in protecting friendly forces through counterintelligence. Counterintelligence includes both active and passive measures intended to deny the enemy valuable information about the friendly situation. Counterintelligence also includes activities related to countering hostile espionage, subversion, and terrorism. Counterintelligence directly supports force protection operations by helping the commander deny intelligence to the enemy and plan appropriate security measures.

Stated differently it acts as an early warning system by attempting to provide accurate and timely information about the adversary’s intention, and the surrounding environment. It also provides a counterintelligence tool to deny the adversary valuable information and also to combat terrorism, subversion and espionage. Thus intelligence is protective, exploitative and positive in that it supplies us with positive intelligence about the adversary and protects our own infrastructure. Intelligence thus renders our actions either offensive or defensive.

“Intelligence supports the commander’s force protection needs by estimating an enemy’s intelligence, terrorism, espionage, sabotage, and subversion capabilities as well as recommending countermeasures against those capabilities’’

Today’s war scenario is of the 4th Generation type. Asymmetry has factored in most battle or tactical operations to a great deal. In fact most of the conflicts around the Globe are asymmetrical in nature , with the players in the combat environment being terrorists, insurgents with very limited firepower , elusive and most of the time operating while mobile , very less identifiable with no conventional forces insignia , very limited personnel strength , distributed and sporadic operational tactics, undefined infrastructure logistical capabilities on one hand and a national power or allies with a formidable military, attack and defense platforms and a central military organization with subordinate headquarters and units spread at unique identifiable geographic locations. Hence not to be subdued by this disparity between themselves and govt. forces the asymmetric adversary

resorts to sudden, sporadic, hit and run type attacks on the forces bases , installations , camps , ordnance depots, communication systems, personnel and information systems with the sole objective to degrade the forces combat capability and kinetic termination of its key leaders at top echelons or middle and ground level tactical units. A kill is a kill. A kinetic hit is a kinetic hit. Whether it’s a bazooka attack destroying an armored personnel carriers drive system immobilizing it or whether it’s a timed explosion resulting in the destruction of a combat helicopter in the hangar , the end result is the same….we have lost combat capability. In this fashion attacks on our installations,camps,bases,personnel and information systems/communications are designed to degrade our capabilities, exhaust our ordnance on nonexistent targets or dummy targets / proxy targets (deceptive measures of the adversary) –this realm of Threat to our forces itself while in transit or before deployment or in personnel stations and bases and the Govt. forces actions to thwart these threats with intelligence feeds predicating the plans/COAs design is called Force Protection.

CI supports Command Force Protection efforts by:

∙Identifying the potential threat forces and multidisciplinary threat intelligence

∙Identifying threat capabilities and intent together with the most likely course of action and the most dangerous course of action (keeping all the possible COAs parallel for review)

∙Using deception to mislead the enemy about our capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions.

CI & SECURITY REQUIREMENTS:

∙Protecting classified information

∙Protecting critical resources

∙Protecting weapons and weaponry systems

∙Safeguarding visitors to the installation

∙Protecting dignitaries

∙Protecting Senior government officials or military senior stafdf visiting the installation or areas outside the installation but falling within military jurisdiction

∙Sustain mission objectives

∙Protect information systems

Within the installation thee may be specific person/s,resources,assets,activity,operation or information that if targeted by the enemy can adversely affect the installation operations , mission objectives or any risk dimension—in other words it has ‘’Target value’’ to the adversary. During security planning such entities should be identified (in most cases using red-teaming or counterintelligence support to vulnerability assessment) and secured against enemy actions. Include with this the need to ascertain what adverse effects the local threat can have over the installation as a whole and what missions or contingency plans can be designed to support the installation, and what results is the minimum security requirements in the light of the threat perceived due to the existence of local threat forces.

Local threat assessment usually provides a threat picture specific to a single installation or grouping of installations based on the threat factors mentioned above. This means that each installation may have specific security requirements tailored to its individual assessment.

Resource economy-probably the most important factor in inefficient Force protection

Due to erroneous planning, or improperly defining intelligence requirements or even due to enemy deceptive/denial measures it could very well be that the Commander deploys his resources, combat power and other combat-related assets in the wrong place and time thus exhausting/wasting them and hence resource economy is of prime consideration during any mission and to this end the value of intelligence cannot be overstated. These false responses can be limited and brought down to a minimum by specific, timely and accurate intelligence. Intelligence helps the commander to prioritize his security options. The commander can direct his efforts towards the most important requirements, such as handling the most serious security risks first, mitigate the threat/s which is of lesser severity and accept the inevitable danger and be prepared for risks which are of least severity. Thus the countermeasures will be more appropriately directed against the enemy without any wastage of resources, manpower or lessening in combat effectiveness. All this proper threat driven intelligence and counterintelligence operations, the term ‘’threat-driven’’ assuming greater significance as it then goads the commander to know the unknown aggressively. It should be emphasized that other security agencies should be consulted and information shared with them, both horizontally and vertically to get a complete picture of the threat.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN CI AND HUMINT:

CI Does Not Equal HUMINT

CI and HUMINT , although sharing most of the time similar collection techniques , are not the same thing in the sense that CI is not a subset of HUMINT.HUMINT is an intelligence discipline whereas CI is a multidiscipline function supporting HUMINT.We should not confuse the information collection methods and operational intention. This incorrect doctrinal terminology error will lead to a weakening of both/

HUMINT is solely concerned with collection , not the purpose of collection of the information or the requirements which predicate this collection. Yes the HUMINT collector is aware that the purpose of his collection efforts are geared to collecting information from designated human sources using specific collection techniques. In this sense he is conducting a ‘’pure’’ collection effort, not concerned with what this information will be used for and what necessitated the collection in the first place. HUMINT collection includes “operations conducted using HUMINT collection techniques regardless of the ultimate use of that information.” HUMINT activities include a great variety of operations, analysis, and liaison duties.

CI on the other hand uses human sources too as source of information but goes few steps further in that CI is aware of the intent of collection and aggressively uses specific techniques to either neutralize or exploit the enemy intelligence activities using the gathered information. Most of the techniques in his repository are similar to that of the HUMINT agent; It is this use of HUMINT skills, particularly investigation and source operations that has created the confusion. CI is a multidiscipline function with the purpose to detect,identify,deter,exploit.neutralize the enemy’s collection efforts—it seeks to counter enemy intelligence geared towards terrorist,subversive,espionage,sabotage or insurgent attacks on our forces and installations and lend support to HUMINT in its activities, protect the intelligence cycle and ensure force protection—a very important factor. Thus we find CI to be composed of several attributes,aggressive,never relenting and protecting the other intelligence disciplines activities(for example , determining whether a source is a source who wants to wittingly give information or is an enemy plant).HUMINT contributes to an all-source visualization of the battlefield , increases the situational awareness of the commander.HUMINT is intelligence derived from persons,documents,a pure intelligence activity whereas CI is somewhat like the hand in darkness..exploring,detecting,getting a hold. Moving ahead with all help that is available in an unknown enemy specific darkness , the enemy lurking in the shadows , whose actions once discerned by the hand will lead to the latter’s firm clasp on his neck.

Hence we must not tend to associate CI solely with HUMINT collection nor define HUMINT in terms of CI.Commanders should understand this.It should not be the prerogative of only intelligence personnel.Commanders,staff officers of operations etc functions should understand this intelligence issue clearly so as to synchronize ops well with intelligence.ISR effort should not be degraded by weaknesses in both HUMINT and CI as a result of this confusion.CI and HUMINT are highly complimentary. Very true but of opposing mindsets.

Conclusion

HUMINT collection and CI are and will continue to become increasingly important as we enter the 21st century. Both efforts are vital to mission success across the entire spectrum of operations. The understanding of the doctrinal distinction between HUMINT collection and CI is fundamental. This distinction drives the doctrinal description of both efforts and our understanding of how they are mutually supportive and intertwined in stability operations and support operations.

Whatever be the divisions in function or overall structure, HUMINT and CI are indispensable to thwart enemy intelligence activities, to conduct force protection in a optimum manner, to keep our forces combat-ready to deliver precision strikes and to always keep the decision advantage in our favor with the element of surprise by the enemy being put at the minimum. Both disciplines are time intensive and inter-human interactions over prolonged periods have turned the tradecraft into a very specialized skill involving human perception, behavior, psychology and other traits. Unlike other disciplines like SIGINT,IMINT,MASINT,GEOINT HUMINT and CI have in common human sources , the human element and hence is susceptible to error , deception by the enemy , fraught with risks and psychological stress including human vices predicated by money and other factors which are usually the byproduct of information-transactions (quid-pro-quo).But it is exactly these problems which prompts intelligence professionals to come up with newer tactics so as to minimize these negative factors and the resulting exploration and research in the field of HUMINT and CI leads to refined methodologies , TTPs which have been found to be effective in many cases.

Improving Army CI Doctrine

The first step in improving the Army’s ability to collect force protection intelligence is building appropriate doctrine that clarifies the role of Army Intelligence and CI personnel. Make its information operations doctrine more complete by publishing comprehensive CI doctrine. This doctrine should explain the primary CI missions of collections, investigations, operations, and analysis and production.

Doctrine guides the employment of military forces, and shapes how military professionals “think about the use of the military instrument of national power”. Army doctrine details a basic understanding of the tactics , techniques and procedures to be employed to support combat requirements. Air Force doctrine provides commanders and their staffs a basic understanding of how various Air Force organizations can be used to meet or support combat requirements.

INDIA historically lacked comprehensive CI doctrine.This lack of doctrine has resulted in confusion, and hampered the ability of Force commanders to use CI to improve force protection efforts.

Force protection efforts must be threat driven.Vulnerabilities should be identified , the corresponding threats identified and then protective measures are put in place.To this end MI and CI play a very important role.This should be the basis for the creation of a comprehensive CI doctrine. .

“CI is the systematic acquisition of information concerning espionage, sabotage, insurgency, and related foreign activities conducted for or on behalf of foreign nations, entities, organizations, or persons and that are directed against or threaten our military interests.” To this end a variety of HUMINT sources , like walk ins , casual sources , defectors , official sources , liaison contacts , recruited sources are employed by CI elements. CI collections and investigations lead to a repository of information on threats.Thereafter by cueing other intelligence disciplines and using all source analysis a complete picture of the threat is obtained.Thus we reach our main objective— the precise warning of hostile attack and we also identify the probable targets of the attack and the time of attack.In a nutshell CI usage of HUMINT is the first line of defence.

Army force protection requires a separate force protection doctrine. Not only intelligence personnel will benefit from the doctrine directly but also tactical commanders who must have a basic knowledge about force protection so as to understand what requirements ought to be defined and handed over to the intelligence and counterintelligence personnel to adequately protect the force.

The commanders battlefield operating system at his disposal are fire support and maneuver and here is where intelligence and counterintelligence act as force multipliers –the Intelligence and CI BOS must be successfully integrated in the Commanders BOS so that his PIRs are successfully answered giving him ideally a perfect situational awareness about the battlespace so as to conduct operations successfully. The commander focuses on the intelligence system by clearly designating his priority intelligence requirements (PIR), targeting requirements and priorities. Intelligence is a continuous process which keeps IEW operations tied to the commander's critical decisions and concept of operations. CI collection, analysis, and dissemination, like other intelligence, have to meet the commander's time requirements to be of any use other than historical.

They can then better understand the limitations and capabilities of the CI support elements. Force protection doctrine requires intelligence and counterintelligence personnel to obtain and analyze information on:

∙Enemy units

∙Terrorist groups

∙Insurgent groups

∙Enemy special forces

∙Criminal enterprises

∙Cybercriminals

∙Radical elements

∙That part of the local populace which supports the enemys ideals

∙Environmental/chemical/health/radiological/biological hazards

∙Weaponry systems of the enemy units,terrorists,insurgents and crimninal enterprises

Force protection doctrine should compel the creation of Service capabilities to collect, receive, evaluate, analyze, and disseminate all information on terrorist activities,strength,capabilities,organization,intent,past history, current activities in the area in question or areas of interest and indicators of imminent attack.

We can categorize the threats based on intent. This can be incorporated in the force protection doctrine. Hence we can allocate HUMINT resources in an appropriate manner without any duplication or wastage. Type 1 can be criminal activity geared towards army bases ,Type 2 can be penetrative reconnaissance and sabotage operations, terrorist and insurgent attacks , and Type 3 can be major land , amphibious , air and missile attacks.

TYPE1, 2 and 3 threats can be adequately determined by the employment of counterintelligence assets which use HUMINT sources to collect force e protection information and conduct investigations , security surveys ,threat and vulnerability assessments. Casual sources, official sources, liaison contacts and recruited sources comprise the source database of the CI repository. All source intelligence is also used for all the threats, particularly TYPE4.These include HUMINT, SIGINT.MASINT, IMINT, ELINT AND OSINT.Fusion of all information from multidisciplinary intelligence platforms with data from national level intelligence agencies result in far better situational understanding of the Commander. ISR synchronization is a must if we have to have a robust advance warning system to avoid the element of surprise.

We can make certain observations after studying force protection failures from around the globe:

HUMINT was not given priority in force protection efforts , neither the HUMINT support was precise, effective and tailored to the Commanders needs. Instead standard operating procedures detailing standard and routine defensive methods and access control were implemented.HUMINTs capability in predicting on how , where and when a terrorist attack might take place was ignored.HUMINT can predict the specific target ,time and nature of attacks.

Lack of organic intelligence capability at tactical level.. “They did not have adedicated, organic, and focused [force protection] intelligence analytical capability.”Plus there is a weakness in both collection and analysis of force e protection intelligence. If intelligence capability can be pushed down to company/platoon level with the soldiers being augmented with 2-3 HUMINT and 1-2 CI operatives (or the soldiers themselves being trained in the basics like tactical questioning and interrogation) then instead of sending request for information to higher headquarters the tactical capability to investigate , gather information and analyze it would have been achieved. The ‘’always top-down’’’ intelligence flow could have been avoided and a four way flow implemented with interaction between the tactical units and higher headquarters, adjacent company headquarters and intelligence elements.Hence there is a desperate need for military units operating in high-threat environments to possess organic intelligence collection, analysis, and investigative capabilities.

Military intelligence lacked the necessary impetus to devote time, effort and resources for long-term and mid-term terrorist threat intelligence collection and analysis – such as trends, intentions and capabilities of terrorists. National intelligence agencies were larger in operational and administrative size and were given priority rather than the MI in collecting intelligence but national level agencies cater to a wide range of requests for information apart from terrorist threat to forces whereas MI can exclusively set up collection taskings for force protection intelligence given adequate weight age , administrative and financial aid and clearance by the Government. This was absent.

The installation in question fell prey to terrorist attacks because the intelligence arrangement at Command level in higher headquarters or at the installation headquarters itself was focused on outward attacks like tactical missions, or defensive postures dictated by air

threat and totally ignored the need for HUMINT/CI based intelligence collection for ground defense of the installation, personnel, information and communication facilities.

To execute a CI operation successfully liaison is needed with other civil agencies and with the intelligence agencies of the 3 services.To effectively build up a liaison time is required,it cannot be achieved overnight.In case of COIN operations liaison is much needed with the local administrations intelligence branch and with the police as they are the ones who know the local area,population,criminal elements and insurgency profile in terms of attack history, police records of personalities and elements who have been apprehended and surrendered..the latter can be put to use by the counterinsurgents as pseudo-insurgents to penetrate the adversary’s setup. Liaison relationships are an investment in the future, and the return on this investment is directly proportional to the time and effort expended on developing and maintaining the relationship.

We can transfer say 2-3% personnel from the MI to the CI unit as CI units are generally understaffed compared to the standard HUMINT units , and the liaison units. Even transferring 3% personnel can significantly raise the strength of all the units overall. Thus with this transfer the Commands HUMINT assets get a boost and now coupled with CI augmentation the HUMINT teams can handle all three types of threats , Basic , Levels 1&2.

Simply transferring will not suffice, proper training in counterintelligence need to be given. But this wont be a problem as the MI soldier already has basic intelligence training and acumen. Yes they need to be granted clearance to access compartmentalized intelligence information and hence prior to transfer the soldiers need to undergo a counterintelligence investigation process as to their suitability.

The CI effort focuses on the overall hostile intelligence collection, sabotage, terrorist, and subversive threat. The CI effort is also sufficiently flexible to adapt to the geographical environment, attitudes of the indigenous population, mission of the supported command, and changing emphasis by hostile intelligence, sabotage, terrorist, and subversive organizations.

What Are We Protecting?

In protecting an installation and its information systems, operations and general security from enemy multidisciplinary intelligence threat we must identify the vulnerable and critical areas to be given more weightage during security review. Not all assets and activities warrant the same level of protection. To this end a careful and thorough vulnerability analysis needs to be conducted resorting to red teaming methodology.

It should be noted at this juncture that it is always the attempts of the enemy intelligence service to subvert our knowledgeable personnel. In a military production unit , say ordnance factory , the senior engineers and quality control scientists have access to sensitive designs and information related to weaponry systems. Similarly classified and top secret documents/information are in the hands of cleared senior personnel. These people are often the target of aggressive enemy counterintelligence agents.

The five basic categories include the following:

1.People

2.Military personnel

3.Activities/Operations

4.Intelligence collection/analysis

5.Sensitive movement of operations/personnel

6.Conduct of sensitive training

7.Communications/networking

8.RDT&E and sensitive technology

9.Production of sensitive technology

10.Protection of nuclear/chemical/biological materials

11.Protection of weapons, explosives, and equipment

12.Information

13.Classified

14.Sensitive Compartmented Information

15.Top Secret

16.Secret

17.Confidential

18.Unclassified

19.System designs

20.System capabilities/vulnerabilities

21.Sensitive methods

22.Facilities

23.Headquarters

24.Field offices/administrative buildings

25.Training facilities

26.Storage facilities

27.Production facilities

28.R&D laboratories

29.Power plants

30.Parking facilities

31.Aircraft hangars

32.Residences

33.Equipment/Materials

34.Transportation equipment/vehicles

35.Maintenance equipment

36.Operational equipment

37.Communications equipment

38.Security equipment

39.Weapons

40.Automated information systems equipment

Now that the CI agent is knowledgeable about these assets and activities that need protection, he can execute a vulnerability and criticality analysis and recommend suitable protective measures as well as countermeasures to the Commander. He can recommend which critical units need protection first and what resources to allocate and how and where to implement general security and countermeasures.

UNIT PROTECTION:

We will define unit not be size or specific function but by any military group capable of offensive, defensive or stability operations.

Unit protection is the process through which combatant and noncombatant personnel, physical assets and information are protected from adversarial threats including adversarial multidisciplinary intelligence threats.Multi layered, active/passive, lethal/non-lethal offensive and defensive measures are adopted for this purpose. Protection is composed of a variety of active

and passive measures (for example, weapons, pre-emption, and warning) in the air, land, sea, and space domains. The goal of unit protection is preventing attacks on the three unit resources , manpower, physical assets and information so that the capability of the unit to maintain its fighting potential without any degradation by the enemy is constantly maintained.

The Army must:

Detect the threat

Asses the threat capability to degrade the units combat capabilities

Decide on protective measures , whether offensive or defensive

Act to implement these protective measures

Recover in very less time from any damage inflicted by the adversary so that

technical countermeasures and tactical procedures may be employed so as to bring back the unit to full operational status in the least time possible.

In order for unit protection to be 100% effective we need to ensure that the following are taken into prioritized consideration by the unit commander:

Persistent surveillance

Actionable intelligence

Precise target recognition

Interrogation

Commanders situational awareness

Accurate identification of unit security related intelligence gaps The above factors are contained in the Detect-Assess-Decide system.”(DAD).

In addition unit Command and Control must be properly defined as C2 aids the Commander to take proper decisions in the light of what needs to be done exactly to protect the unit and ensure that this is carried out efficiently.

Protection: Protection is a function which should be given a holistic treatment. Protection should not separately focus on weapons deployment , pre-emption and warning. All three must be integrated. No one is a separate entity. Protection must be proactive. In fact unit protection should never always be passive but must also include active measures.Intellighence , counterintelligence and an admixture of military and cross government capabilities should be employed to the full. Installation/camp protection should look beyond the perimeters. Just employing passive measures(check posts, access control, perimeter security , guard functions , lighting) and OPSEC isn’t sufficient. Surveillance teams , counterintelligence operatives should foray outside into adjoining areas , even areas of interest located far from the unit , and the communities in these areas so as to gain information/intelligence and counter enemy reconnaissance/HUMINT/subversive /sabotage/terrorist activities. Counterintelligence should be

employed to screen contract workers and suppliers. A counterintelligence review should be conducted periodically on unit personnel. Red teaming should be taken up by the commander and his staff to ascertain unit vulnerabilities and critical areas.

Add to Detect , Assess and Decide the functions Act and Recover and we have the foundation for a complete protection system on which to base our decisions regarding collection of intelligence , fortifying and strengthening/hardening our bases, decide on the optimum courses of actions , employ forces optimally to act on these decisions and in case of an attack which could not be prevented , recover in the shortest possible time without the base collapsing totally during/after the attack using redundancy measures/backups and thorough protection of critical assets. We should also remember protection has yet another dimension. The enemy might know the protective measures we have employed using intelligence and might attempt to block /prevent/deter our post-attack or pre-emptive actions , hence protection must take these into account also.

Protection means ‘’time-critical tactical operations’’ ..not just tactical operations. Protection should be a 360 degrees hemispherical capability , meaning protection from land , air and sea based attacks.

For protection intelligence is critical as everything needs to be known about the enemy , environment and self. The last factor is determined by counterintelligence reviews , technical experts and red teaming.All intelligence platforms and ops must be thoroughly integrated to handle attacks fro m land , air, information , electronic,CBRNE,and intelligence domains of the enemy. This integrated approach heightens the commander’s situational awareness considerably , thus acting as a force e and decision-superiority enabler thus leading to optimum effective course of action/s by the Commander with a decisive finish.

Thus it is clear from the above that protection must be proactive , intelligence-led and an integrated approach.

Objectives of unit protection are:

Install a warning system

Intelligence preparation of all areas adjoining the base ,camp , the route along which the troops movement takes place –in fact it must be made mandatory for units intelligence section to keep an updated file on the intelligence preparation of the entire area surrounding the base/troop movement route whether or not there is a perception of threat.IPB should include , among other things

∙Protection must be proactive , lethal and nonlethal both.

∙Intelligence is the primary tool in protection

∙Increase active/passive protection measures

∙Rapid seizure of initiatives

∙Rapid transition to decisive operations

∙Rapid decision making capacity as tactical operations in unit protection are ‘’time- critical’’.Damage to our forces in combat on the battlefdield or in case of an assymetrical combat , in hilly/urban/jungle terrain but away from base is different than that of an attack on an unsuspecting troop movement or installation/base itself where an attack means catching us off guard , unprepared and things move so fast due to the element of surprise our forces do not have enough time to recover , regroup and counterattack in time to thwart the enemy.The enemy may have critical assets in mind when they attack the installation/camp/base.Thus tactical operations are ‘’time-critical’’.Hence to successfully thwart an attack ,should our defences fail …we must be prepared to execute time critical axctions without falling prey to the shock due to the surprise element.This is more so say in the case of an attack on an unsuspecting convoy or troop column.

∙Reducing vulnerability to minimum

∙Identifying critical assets , protecting them priority of all unit protection systems

∙Understanding that most operations will be in a non-linear unconventional operational environment and hence all intelligence , counterintelligence , surveillance , reconnaissance , target determination and nomination, combat oiperations,passive and active protection measures , red teaming , and recovery options should be seen from this perspective.

∙Should understand that a complete 360 degree hemispherical protection system must be installed which must be a thoroughly integrated intelligence and operations function keeping the factors DAD in perspective and the factors which come next , viz..Act , Finish and Recover

The following types of threats should be expected in any future conflict-

∙Attacks –air based/heliborne—on logistical systems.

∙Critical assets will be targeted with precision munitions.

∙Staging areas , critical choke points may be targeted using missiles with medium-rangeto ballistic capabilities.

∙Random attacks so as to be unpredictable , IED attacks , terrorist and insurgent attacks and Special Forces attacks may be conducted with twin objectives or any of them..Viz..Effect destruction/undermine our fighting capability and to force the commander to waste resources , ammunition, and unnecessarily divert forces to protect facilities and personnel which in fact are not threatened.

We must remember we are now facing a fourth generation enemy , who will attempt to put in use every means including confusion and deception to overcome the asymmetry/mismatch by increasing uncertainty and making us more susceptible to the element of surprise. The enemy will resort to continuous , random, and non-decisive engagements. The enemy will randomly and continuously threaten and interdict lines of cooperation’s and communications. They will use camouflage and deception to to reduce weapon engagement rangers and degrade our forces advantages in ‘’stand-off’’ engagements. There are two objectives herein—first to confuse us so much that we cannot execute the targeting process correctly , target determnination.identification.nomination becomes very difficult against an elusive enemy employing random attack methods , and secondly frequent loss of contact with this elusive enemy has more negative consequences than that which would have occurred with a conventional more predictable echeloned enemy.

HUMINT and CI are two disciplines which help in detecting enemy capabilities, intent and countering enemy intelligence collection activities. In a typical Army Intelligence structure, the intelligence assets are located at Div and Bde levels , with the Bde having a HQ company and Intelligence Bn , each Bn catering to a specific collection/counterint discipline. For example there can be a Ops Bn , a reconnaissance Bn , a tactical exploitation Bn,a forward collection Bn ,or a strategic SIGINT Bn.There is also a Div MI Bn and a theater intelligence Bde.

Military intelligence brigades coordinate, manage, and direct intelligence and surveillance; they conduct collection management, all-source intelligence analysis, production; and they disseminate information in support of national, joint, interagency, multi-national, regional combatant command, and Army service component requirements.

Unit protection must integrate the protective attributes of different Army Corps. The capabilities in brief of the Corps are as follows:

∙The Air Defense artillery provides protection by acting as a warning system , intercepting threats directed from air in the form of missiles and aerial attacks (heliborne..etc) and also provide locational grid information for otrher supporting forces to target.

∙Military Police provides security by executing proactive intelligence led policing.

∙Engineer Corps protect our force by contributing to its mobility and countermobility thus heightening its survivability.provides the capabilities of survivability, mobility, and countermobility to the force.

∙Military intelligence provides security to our force by adequate synchronized utilization/deployment of ISR assets and counterintelligence capability

∙Signals protects our command and control nodes directing/controlling communiucation,computers,and intelligence operations. Siugnals intelligence directly supports HUMINT operations to validate information,increase the situational understanding oif the Commander.

∙Field Artillery provides security to the force by contributing to the direct/indirect firepower,predicting impact points.

∙Ordnance Corp contributes to recovery by deploying its ordnance disposal systems.

Unit Protection Functions

It’s very true that conventional military threats exist and are given priority in intelligence activities but the existence and threat capabilities of asymmetric , nonconventional threats cannot be undermined. Add to these new emerging threats of this category. At the tactical level it is very important to address this type of threat by determining its identity, leadership, capabilities, tracking its location and gauging its intent. We need to detect the enemy entire range of hostile activity including intelligence collection and counterintelligence activities, use this information to assess its capabilities and intent to arrive at the common operation picture COP which brings to light the

relationship between the terrain,enemy,mission,troops,time and the civil environment thus enabling the commander to enter the enemy’s decision cycle, gauge its intent more accurately, deliver warning to force s in the area and develop suitable courses of action. After the asses step is over the commander moves on to the decide function wherein an action is decided upon or any existing action is altered or monitiored.Therafter the act function takes over where the course of action decided upon is implemented by tasking the tactical fighting unit to deliver kinetic.nonkinetic attack on nominated targets or passive protection measures..all with the intent to protect the force. Protecting the force should not entirely be passive in nature, the soldiers need to go out and attack nominated targets so as to deter attacks or fail plans to attack our installations.

ACTIVE MEASURES FOR UNIT PROTECTION:

Active measures will provide at stand-off distances, the capabilities to-

∙We designate a stand-off area outside the installation/protected area and take active measures to deny unidentified vehicular or personnel movement in that area

∙Just like we have a C2 system with respect to any mission, similarly we need to have a C2 mission with respect to active or passive defensive measures and these need to be integrated with the C2 itself. Such active/passive measures can be remotely controlled lethal/non-lethal measures.

∙As for passive measure steps should be taken to deny unidentified/suspect personnel/vehicles movement inside a restricted area/protected area .Areas within buildings,facilities,structures,airfields,ammunition depot,etc can be effectively protected by employing unmanned remotely controlled nonlethal systems at standoff distances. Measures should be taken with priority to deter personnel and vehicles from entering a protected military installation again using remotely activated lethal/nonlethal systems. Physical barriers, both active and passive can be employed for this purpose.

∙There can be instances of enemy fire directed at critical assets of the installation and hence we need to include modular protection packages, automatic or soldier response teams built up specifically for this purpose. The protection system should be integrated again with the C2 system. It is very important to point out here that all the passive/active measures success depends on a great deal on intelligence/counterintelligence/liaison apart from the remotely/manned protection system deployment. For example we need intelligence to apprehend any infiltrations in our camp in the form of security or non security civilian contractors. Or we can

effectively liaise with the civil police/intelligence agencies to build up a mapping of probable anti-installation criminal forces operating in the area who could attempt to launch sporadic fires or explosive attacks, such attacks being in keeping with the criminal group’s affiliation with the enemy. Counterintelligence can help in visualizing our vulnerable areas within the installation and then proceed to identify the critical nodes which if damaged can stop the installation operations altogether. This vulnerability assessment coupled with the threat assessment and supported by sound OPSEC practices can give adequate unit protection.

From the force protection perspective CI and HUMINT functions:

Recommending countermeasures after assessment of threat capabilities, operations, expected courses of actions, most likely COA and most dangerous COA.

∙Threat intent

∙Identify Threat leadership. Key commanders. Key lieutenants and area commanders

∙Identify threat C2 nodes

∙Identify threat logistic routes

∙Identify threat social reach, network, and contacts

∙Identify threat affiliates in other criminal networks, enterprises

∙Identify threat sympathizers in own area of control

∙Identify political/administrative figures that support threat ideology

∙Threat attack /defense operations location parameters.

∙Gauge potential attack/defense methods of threat.

∙Recommend C2 setup to thwart threat attack.

∙Estimate with reasonable accuracy the expected time of attack.

∙Possible locations of Threat listening post/observation posts

∙Determine possible escape routes of threat forces after an attack or defense scenario

∙Possible enemy IED techniques, infiltration routes, emplacement

∙Gauge IED detonation methods/means

∙Gauge IED timings

∙Possible routes for IED ex-filtration

∙Staging areas

∙Safe houses

∙Weapons and ammunitions storage locations

∙Production facilities for IED and other ammunitions/explosives.

∙Find out what supplementary operations threat may resort to

∙Recommending countermeasures to threat IED

∙Recommending countermeasures to threat ISR/EW

∙Determining threat indirect fire parameters, key indirect fire

WARNING

Warning. Once actionable intelligence is obtained warning or predictions is disseminated in a timely,unambiguous,specific and accurate manner.Warning is an acknowledgement of the existence ofd a threat and subsequent disseminatin.

Warning is of two types:

(a)Defensive warn

(b)Enemy warn

In defensive warn after receiving actionable intelligence about the adversary’s possible attack the installations security is beefed up by incorporating protective measures. The warning may be digital/aural/physical or virtual.

In enemy warn the enemy is communicated the fact through non-lethal measures such as interrogation or challenging an enemy unit/capability that in case of persistent or continued enemy action our course of action/s can take on an increasingly lethal nature with the intent to prevent the enemy from taking further hostile actions and also inflict heavy damages. Thus enemy warn is a method to deter the enemy from carrying out its intent if it hasn’t done so yet or to stop the enemy in its tracks..

It is very important that warning should be unambiguous, accurate and timely/specific,. In addition to this it should be actionable. Warning can be graduated , meaning the level of warning may assume increasing proportions in keeping with the feedback about the enemy which may indicate that it has ceased its operations/.activities temporarily but is conducting discreet operations/increased intelligence activity masked in the cloak of acceptance of our warning and cessation of open hostilities.

WARNING SYSTEM:

The warning system must have the following features:

∙It should allow for redundancies in our act capability systems.

∙It should allow for passive proactive means so as to protect our installations, its critical assets, command and control nodes, thus overall reducing the vulnerability of the installation/.protected area.

∙It should provide a system of integrating fires to handle threats and precluding enemy attack on our installation , its C2 and critical assets.

∙Provide warning of threat intelligence activities.

∙Provide warning of existing threat C2 nodes

∙Provide warning of threat capabilities, disposition, strength, order of battle

∙Provide warning of threat logistic routes.

∙Provide warning of threat sympathizers.,

∙Provide warning of threats possible attack COAs

∙Provide warning of the defense capability of the threat

∙Provide warning of threats peculiar /preferred TTPs/modus operandi

∙Provide warning of threats history

∙Provide warning of threat movements

∙Provide warning of threat leadership

∙Provide warning of threat detachments, cells dispersed in and out of the area of operations.

∙Provide warning of Threat attack /defense operations location parameters.

∙Provide warning of potential attack/defense methods of threat.

∙Provide warning of the expected time of attack.

∙Provide warning of possible locations of Threat listening post/observation posts

∙Provide warning of possible escape routes of threat forces after an attack or defense scenario

∙Provide warning of possible enemy IED techniques, infiltration routes, emplacement

∙Provide warning of IED detonation methods/means

∙Provide warning of IED timings

∙Provide warning of possible routes for IED ex-filtration

∙Provide warning of Staging areas

∙Provide warning of Safe houses

∙Provide warning of weapons and ammunitions storage locations

∙Provide warning g of the Production facilities for IED and other ammunitions/explosives.

∙Provide warning of supplementary operations threat may resort to

∙Provide warning of threat indirect fire parameters, key indirect fire

Future Modular Force leaders must be trained to aggressively manage information and instill trust in the output of decision support tools that automated systems provide. Other major implications include adoption of a lifetime of education paradigm and the creation of knowledge centers configured to support professional leader education. Leader development questions include, but are not limited to-

(1)How do we develop leaders ready to deal with the complexity of the contemporary operating environment, threats, and interagency implications?

(2)How can we develop more adaptive leaders, versatile in UP operations?

(3)How do we provide collaborative, distributed training problem solving and decision aids that empower battle command to support commanders, as well as staffs to advising commanders during planning, preparation, rehearsal, and execution of UP exercises and operations?

(4)How are leaders enabled to know the terrain and weather and appreciate their tactical implications for tactical concealment, employment of weapons, mobility, and seeking positions of advantage?

(5)How are leaders empowered to understand the operational environment as well as, or better than, the threat in order to execute UP detect, assess, and decide functions?

(6)How will units enable leaders to know the enemy, friendly unit locations, and their capabilities?

(7)How will units adapt to emerging UP situations more quickly than an adversary?