PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
FOR
FIRST INT UNIT
DESIGNED ON AMERICAN TTPS
KESHAV MAZUMDAR
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
FOR
FIRST INT UNIT
DESIGNED ON AMERICAN TTPS
KESHAV MAZUMDAR
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
PROPOSED MODEL UNIT
ALPHA Coy FIRST INT PLATOON
KESHAV MAZUMDAR
Associate Degree Military Science USA , Dip Criminology UK
ATO FNWC CRC CAS CMAS ASC
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
The design of COP Architecture
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
THE UNIT
Provide TOC for Battle Tracking in COIN and Conventional ops manned by NCOs and Senior NCOs/JCOs.Concept is to train them so that they can handle effectively the various War fighting functions.
Provide UNIT1 and UNIT2 support. Provide CI capability to
Provide particularly int support by getting proficient in TQ,Screening,DOCEX.
To enable SECONDARY INT COLLECTION
TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT:
COMMAND AND CONTROL:
COMMAND:
HQ ( S1 S2 S3 S4)
HQ SERVICE COMPANY
STAFF OFFICER S2 CONTROL (FULL INTEGRATION WITH S3 OPS) Planning Captain
ISR TASKING INTELLIGENCE OFFICER INTRACOMPANY LNO
CONTROL:
TECHNICAL CONTROL UNIT
MISSION ORDER RECEIPT AND ANALYSIS UNIT
INT ANALYSIS UNIT
REQUIREMENTS,COLLECTION,ASSEST MANAGEMENT UNIT
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
HUMINT AND CI OPS MANAGEMENT SECTION
OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT TEAM OMT (HUMINT/CI)
TEAMS:
OPERATIONAL
SUPPORT:
PROVIDE INT SUPPORT TO:
LRS UNIT COIN
BN COMPANY
FORCE PROTECTION
AREA SECURITY
MILITARY SECURITY
AUGMENTING CHECKPOINTS
COIN
IPB
INT ENABLED RSTA TEAM REPORTS TO RSTA HQ BUT CI ELEMENT REPORTS TO
SUPPORT TO COIN
SECURING FOB?POPN AROUND?COMBAT OUTPOST?CHECK BOOK
There will be a cell for analysis and control (incl technical control)of : 1.Collection TTPs ,
to ascertain optimum
whether to assign mission to exclusively HUMINT or CI team or TACHUMINT team, whether at all to go for field intel collection or resort to open source int collection and to determine usability,efficacy of existing teams.
This cell will be termed CONTROL UNIT
CONTROL UNIT WILL HAVE A HQ, AND TWO SECTIONS.ALL SOURCE INT SECTION(ASIS) AND TECHNICAL CONTROL/PROCESSING SECTION(TCPS).
The two sections will have two SECTION HQ respectively.
The one under ASIS will: look after the:
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
Target Nomination Team
and Dissemination Team.
The TCPS HQ will look after:
HUMINT AND CI TEAM(Multidisciplinary)
IMINT TEAM
SIGINT TEAM
CONTROL HQ will look after all communications and administrative matters logistics and maintenance.
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PROPOSED ORGANIC INTELLIGENCE UNITS TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS
Inf Bn Int Section
BN INT SECTION
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CLIC
(Coy level int cells)
Tactical Questioning
Mobile interrogation team
Task organized Humint/CI team
Document exploitation
Captured equipment exploitation
Screening ops
Preparing Personalities Black list , Grey list and White list
Preparing list of organizations and installations of CI interest.
Prioritizing targets of CI interest in order of top
Reconnaissance & Surveillance ops
Sniper scout ops
Light armoured reconnaissance ops
Radio Cell ops
Support to lateral units (General Support , i.e.Orders from parent Bn) Support to lateral units (Direct Support , under Command of supported unit) Support to Force Protection
Support to military security
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
Support to HUMINT ops of higher HQ Support to IPB
(Summary:
Provide TOC for Battle Tracking in COIN and Conventional ops manned by NCOs and Senior NCOs/JCOs.Concept is to train them so that they can handle
effectively the various Warfighting functions.
Provide UNIT1 and UNIT2 support.
Provide CI support to FP.
Provide particularly int support by getting proficient in TQ,Screening,DOCEX. To enable SECONDARY INT COLLECTION CAPABILITY-
MP,Check Points Inf Soldiers,R&S Teams,Patrols.)
At the Bn level we will have:
Int assets (organic) made out of selected soldiers from line Companies , Battalions.These units prevade the entire area of ops , closest to the ground , and aware of int gaps not apparent to higher HQ as they view the AO from a coarser resolution while its finer resolution for line company commanders.
Line troops are generally Going on patrol duty
Establish observation and listening posts Conducting or escorting convoys Movingthroughout the operational area
We cannot have higher HQ deploy the very limited int assets throughout the AO.This is where the line soldiers come in.They are ''all'' information collectors and organic int cells from every company/battalion drastically increase the ground int staff strength over the operational area thus leading to credible actionable intelligence collection.They can conduct the int ops outlined in A1 above given adequate training.
Bn Int HQ
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Ops Int HHSC Comm
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Coy Level Int Section
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CLIC IR Platoon Scout Sniper Platoon Light Armoured Recon Bn Int Pltn Radio Unit
PILOT UNIT ( J&K/Assam Rifles Tripura Sector21 ):Bn has fielded 6
company level int platoons.Each company has one int and recon platoon , one CI operative and one linguist.
Command and Control: Succession of command will be :
platoon havildar>platoon commander (JCO/Sr NCO)>Coy Int officer (JCO) at Rear Int HQ.
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
Intelligence specific command post will be at the Rear Int HQ (Colocated with Bn Int Section)
and a forward CP (Tactical ops center2).There will be a Tactical Ops Center colocated with rear Int HQ.
All soldiers reporting from CLIP will be made via TOC1 to rear int HQ which in turn will brief the Bn S2.The TOC1 will filter out/segregate ,
collate HUMINT/CI/R&S/HET reports , conduct brief analysis,and in turn feed them to TOC2 colocated with rear Int HQ.
Int coordination line and special security.
Bn Int Section
RearInt HQ
Rear Command Post
Tactical Ops Center2
Forward Command Post
Tactical Ops Center1
Tactical Ops Center Staff:
Team Officer CAPT
Coy Desk NCO Equivalent
Coy Liaison NCO
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CONTROL OFFICER |
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(Tactical team (Organic cell)below , members report to officers vertically/laterally,not shown here)
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(Tactical Qn Assistant1)TQA1 (Tactical Qn Assistant2)TQA2
DOCEX NCO
CEE NCO
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
Team Sr NCO
OSINT NCO
UNIT SETUP DRAFT
STEPS IN IMPLEMENTING PROJECT XXII
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE
1.INITIATION PHASE
2.SELECTION AND TRAINING
3.FORMATION OF BATTALLION INT HQ
4.FORMATION OF MI BATTALLION (MI Coy, CI Coy , COLLECTION AND EXPLOITATION Coy, INTERROGATION AND EXPLOITATION Coy)**
5.FORMATION OF MI Bde**
6.Formation of Tactical Operation Centers TOC manned by Battle Staff NCOs and one Battle Captain.
7.Networking these TOCs in a single Area of Operation , horizontally with adjacent unit HQs and vertically with Higher HQs.
8.Connecting this network with the WAN Network of all the Bde's deployed in the wide Area of Ops which finally connects with the DIV NET , thus the objective of attaining the Common Operating Picture COP is met with Commanders at all echelons , from the DIVISION level down to the Company Commander and the Platoon Int Forward HQ sharing the same picture - - real time visualization of operations. Moreover parallel/lateral exchange of information between adjacent and far flung units is made possible. Also in COIN ops second and third order effect of kinetic/non kinetic attacks in Areas of Interest and those beyond AI can be gauged and strategies/tactics changed.
**These will be added to site later on. Material on these are available for reading in my manuals page in all indian languages here. As for TOC/DIV NET you may please go here.and here for a model map.
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Support:(Modular packages to plug in either Direct Support or General Support to Host UNIT; Each package can constitute
∙Company Intelligence Support Teams
∙Modular UNIT : Pulled from Platoons to support COIN
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
∙Support to Reconnaissance and Surveillance - Fighting for Information or Passive
∙Mode , either with int capability
∙Support to HUMINT
∙Support to CI
∙Training other
∙Secondary Collectors.
∙Support to Cordon and Search Operations.
1.INITIATION PHASE
2.SELECTION AND TRAINING
TOTAL TIME - 11 MONTHS
PHASE 1.
Screening and selection of 7 riflemen. Out of
which 4 enlisted soldiers , 2 Senior NCO , 1JCO. Training in
Observation skills , reconnaissance. Screening, Cordon and Search ops
with basic intelligence trained
PHASE 2.
Training in tactical questioning in preferably model village. Total time allotted 2 months. PHASE 3.
Training in CEE DOCX.Tagging.OSINT. Report Writing. 1 month. PHASE 4.
Basic training in IPB.SALUTE FORMAT. How to manage
PHASE 5.
Debriefing unit patrols. Phase A/B/C/D Reports, Total time allotted 1 month. PHASE 6.
Educational classes: Intelligence , HUMINT,
CI,Force Protection, Collection Management, Requirements Management,
Knowledge of Commanders intelligence requirements and what predicates
their
PHASE 7.
Communication , Dissemination. Time Allotted 1 month PHASE 8.
Tactical Operations Centers , its networking , battle staff comprised of
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
PHASE 9.
Studying C2 relationships , how they change during conduct of battle.How to create forward bases and reporting channels between deployed teams and forawrd base and base HQ Int Staff Officer.
Your intelligence system has some limitations you must understand. These include- 1.Dissemination of information is highly dependent on communications systems and architecture and these are usually limited and under constraints in different fighting environments. Often requests for information from ground units are not disseminated in time. Accurate, timely and specific actionable intelligence is necessary to drive operations with that distinctive competitive edge and this is usually lacking.
3.Counterinsurgency operations may be affected if the enemy resorts to
4.Weather degradation of traffic ability and the negative effects of high winds on antenna arrays and aviation collection and jamming systems.
5.Inability of
6.Lack of sufficient organic intelligence assets to satisfy all your intelligence requirements.
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
All these point to the necessity of empowering the soldier on the ground with certain capabilities so as to convert him into an effective sensor. Totally depending on intelligence personnel and other intelligence collection platforms for actionable intelligence is impracticable given todays asymmetric enemy operating with newer and newer asymmetric tactics and in an environment where the human terrain that offers sanctuary plus counterintelligence and intelligence support to the enemy, line of sight problems for aerial and Sigint sources, highly distributed and non linear characteristics of the battlespace,the high workload on very limited (in strength)HUMINT/CI personnel and the prevailing demographics.
(The above points are strictly my observations and no one else).
The ‘Every Soldier is a Sensor’ (ES2) concept ensures that Soldiers are trained to actively observe for details for the commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR) while in an AO. It also ensures they can provide concise, accurate reports. Leaders will know how to collect, process, and disseminate information in their unit to generate timely intelligence. They should establish a regular feedback and assessment mechanism for improvement in implementing ES2. Every Soldier develops a special level of exposure to events occurring in the AO and can collect information by observing and interacting with the environment. Intelligence collection and development is everyone’s responsibility. Leaders and Soldiers should fight for knowledge in order to gain and maintain greater situational understanding.
RESOURCES
As Soldiers develop the special level of exposure
to the events occurring in their operating environment, they should
keep in mind certain potential indicators as shown in Figure
∙Performing traditional offensive or defensive missions.
∙Patrolling in a stability and reconstruction or civil support operation.
∙Manning a checkpoint or a roadblock.
∙Occupying an observation post.
∙Passing through areas in convoys.
∙Observing and reporting elements of the environment.
∙Observing and reporting activities of the populace in the area of operations.
Figure 1. Potential indicators. |
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SIGHT Look for– |
SOUND Listen for– |
TOUCH Feel |
SMELL Smell |
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for– |
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• Enemy personnel, vehicles, and |
• Running engines or |
• Warm coals |
• Vehicle exhaust |
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aircraft • Sudden or unusual |
track sounds • Voices • |
and other |
• Burning |
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movement • New local inhabitants • |
Metallic sounds • |
materials in a |
petroleum |
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Smoke or dust • Unusual movement of Gunfire, by weapon type fire • Fresh |
products • Food |
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For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
farm or wild animals • Unusual
uncleared routes, areas, or paths • Signs that the enemy has occupied the area • Evidence of changing trends in threats • Recently cut foliage • Muzzle flashes, lights, fires, or reflections • Unusual amount (too much or too little) of trash.Signs of fresh faeces , urine.Cigarette stubs.
• Unusual calm or |
tracks • Age of |
cooking • Aged |
silence • Dismounted |
food or trash |
food in trash • |
movement • Aircraft |
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OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Armed Elements Locations of factional forces, mine fields, and potential threats. Homes and Buildings Condition of roofs, doors, windows, lights, power lines, water, sanitation, roads, bridges, crops, and livestock. Infrastructure Functioning stores, service stations, and so on. People Numbers, gender, age, residence or DPRE status, apparent health, clothing, daily activities, and leadership. Contrast Has anything changed? For example, are there new locks on buildings? Are windows boarded up or previously boarded up windows now open, indicating a change in how a building is expected to be used? Have buildings been defaced with graffiti?
Commanders get information from many sources, but you are his best source. You can in turn collect information from the following sources:
∙Enemy prisoners of war (EPWs)/detainees are an immediate source of information. Turn captured Soldiers over to your leader quickly. Also, tell him anything you learn from them.
∙Captured enemy documents (CEDs) may contain valuable information about present or future enemy operations. Give such documents to your leader quickly.
∙Captured enemy equipment (CEEs) eliminates an immediate threat. Give such equipment to your leader quickly.
∙Enemy activity (the things the enemy is doing) often indicates what the enemy plans to do. Report everything you see the enemy do. Some things that may not seem important to you may be important to your commander.
∙Tactical questioning, observation, and interaction with displaced persons, refugees, or evacuees (DPRE), during the conduct of missions, can yield important information.
∙Local civilians, however often have the most information about the enemy, terrain, and weather in a particular area. Report any information gained from civilians. However, you cannot be sure
which side the civilians are trying to help, so be careful when acting on information obtained
from them. If possible, try to confirm the information by some other means.
FORMS OF QUESTIONING
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
Questioning may be achieved by tactical or direct methods. The following paragraphs detail both methods:
Tactical
Direct
Various AOs will have different social and regional considerations that can affect communications and the conduct of operations (i.e., social behaviors, customs, and courtesies). You must also be aware of the following safety and cultural considerations:
∙Know the threat level and force protection (FP) measures in your AO.
∙Know local customs and courtesies.
∙Avoid using body language that locals might find rude.
∙Approach people in normal surroundings to avoid suspicion.
∙Behave in a friendly and polite manner.
∙Remove sunglasses when speaking to those people with whom you are trying to create a favorable impression.
∙Know as much as possible about the local culture, including a few phrases in the local language.
∙If security conditions permit, position your weapon in the least intimidating position as possible.
REPORT LEVELS
All information collected by patrols, or via other contact with the local population, is reported through your chain of command to the unit Int officer (he will be an officer of the inf Bn). He is responsible for transmitting the information through intelligence channels to the supported military intelligence elements, according to unit intelligence tasks and the OPORD for the current mission. Therefore, if everyone is involved in the collection of combat information, then everyone must be aware of the priority intelligence requirements (PIR). All Soldiers who have contact with the local population and
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
routinely travel within the area must know the CCIR, and their responsibility to observe and report. The four levels of mission reports follow:
LEVEL 1
Information of critical tactical value is reported immediately to the unit int section, while you are still out on patrol. These reports are sent via channels prescribed in the unit SOP. The size, activity, location, uniform, time, equipment (SALUTE) format is an example of Level I reporting.
LEVEL 2
Immediately upon return to base, the patrol will conduct an
LEVEL 3
After receiving the initial patrol report, the unit int section will debrief your patrol for further details and address PIR and CCIR not already covered in the patrol report.
LEVEL 4
Note: Any patrols or activities should be preceded by a prebriefing, which is a consolidated summary of the AOs historical activities.
SALUTE FORMAT (US term)
These four levels help the unit int section record and disseminate both important and subtle details of for use in
Table 1. SALUTE format line by line.
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
Line
No.
Type InfoDescription
1 (S)ize/Who
Expressed as a quantity and echelon or size. For example, report “10 enemy Infantrymen” (not “a rifle squad”).
If multiple units are involved in the activity you are reporting, you can make multiple entries.
Relate this line to the PIR being reported. Make it a concise bullet statement.
2(A)ctivity/What Report what you saw the enemy doing, for example, “emplacing mines in the road.”
This is generally a grid coordinate, and should include the
3(L)ocation/Where should include an
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will include “from” and “to” entries. The route used goes under |
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“Equipment/How.” |
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Identify who is performing the activity described in the “Activity/What” entry. |
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(U)nit/Who |
Include the complete designation of a military unit, and give the name and |
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other identifying information or features of civilians or insurgent groups. |
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For future events, give the DTG for when the activity will initiate. Report |
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(T)ime/When |
ongoing events as such. Report the time you saw the enemy activity, not the |
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time you report it. Always report local or IST time. |
Clarify, complete, and expand on previous entries. Include information about
6(E)quipment/How equipment involved, tactics used, and any other essential elements of information (EEI) not already reported in the previous lines.
HANDLING AND REPORTING OF THE ENEMY
The following paragraphs detail adequate protocol for handling enemy documents, EPWs, and equipment:
CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS
A CED is defined as any piece of recorded information obtained from the threat. CEDs are generally created by the enemy, but they can also be US or multinational forces documents that were once in the hands of the enemy. CEDs can provide crucial information related to answering the commander’s PIR or even be exploited to put together smaller pieces of an overall situation.
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
Every confiscated or impounded CED must be tagged and logged before being transferred through the appropriate channels. The tag contains the specifics of the item, and the log is a simple transmittal document used to track the transfer of CEDs between elements. Your leaders are responsible for creating the initial CED log.
While the information required is formatted, any durable
was captured.
recognition.
TREATMENT OF EPWS AND DETAINEES
EPWs/detainees are a good source of information. They must be handled without breaking international law and without losing a chance to gain intelligence. Treat EPWs humanely. Do not harm them, either physically or mentally. The senior Soldier present is responsible for their care. If EPWs cannot be evacuated in a reasonable time, give them food, water, and first aid. Do not give them cigarettes, candy, or other comfort items. EPWs who receive favors or are mistreated are poor interrogation subjects. In handling EPWs/detainees, follow the procedure of search, segregate, silence, speed, safeguard, and tag (the 5 Ss and T). It implies the legal obligation that each Soldier has to treat an individual in custody of, or under the protection of, Indian Soldiers humanely. The 5 Ss and T are conducted as follows:
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
Note: Exercising speed, in this instance, is critical because the value of information erodes in a few hours. Human intelligence (HUMINT) Soldiers who are trained and who have the appropriate time and means will be waiting to screen and interrogate these individuals.
PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT TAGS
Use wire, string, or other durable material to attach , Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag, or a
∙Date and time of capture.
∙Location of the capture (grid coordinates).
∙Capturing unit.
∙Circumstances of capture (why person was detained).
—Who?
—What?
—Where?
—Why?
—Witnesses?
OPERATIONS SECURITY
Operations security (OPSEC) is the process your leaders follow to identify and protect essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). The Army defines EEFI as critical aspects of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limits success of the operation and therefore must be protected from detection. All Soldiers execute OPSEC measures as part of FP. Effective OPSEC involves telling Soldiers exactly why OPSEC measures are important, and what they are supposed to accomplish. You must understand that the cost of failing to maintain effective OPSEC can result in the loss of lives. Understanding why you are doing something and what your actions are supposed to accomplish, allows you and your fellow Soldiers to execute tasks more effectively. However, this means that you and your fellow Soldiers must–
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
∙Avoid taking personal letters or pictures into combat areas.
∙Avoid keeping diaries in combat areas.
∙Practice camouflage principles and techniques.
∙Practice noise and light discipline.
∙Practice field sanitation.
∙Use proper radiotelephone procedure.
∙Use the challenge and password properly.
∙Abide by the Code of Conduct (if captured).
∙Report any Soldier or civilian who is believed to be serving with or sympathetic to the enemy.
∙Report anyone who tries to get information about US operations.
∙Destroy all maps or important documents if capture is imminent.
∙Avoid discussing military operations in public areas.
∙Discuss military operations only with those persons having a need to know the information.
∙Remind fellow Soldiers of their OPSEC responsibilities.
OBSERVATION TECHNIQUES
During all types of operations, you will be looking for the enemy. However, there will be times when you will be posted in an OP to watch for enemy activity. An OP is a position from which you watch an assigned sector of observation and report all activity seen or heard in your sector.
DAY OBSERVATION
In daylight, use the visual search technique to search terrain. You must visually locate and distinguish enemy activity from the surrounding terrain features by using the following scanning techniques:
Rapid
∙Search a strip of terrain about 100 meters deep, from
∙Search another
∙Continue this method until the entire sector of fire has been searched.
Slow
Detailed
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
avenues of approach.
LIMITED VISIBILITY OBSERVATION
Although operating at night has definite advantages, it is also difficult. Your eyes do not work as well as during the day, yet they are crucial to your performance. You need to be aware of constraints your eyes place upon you at night, because 80 percent of your sensory input comes through them. Your ability to see crisp and clear images is significantly reduced.
Dark Adaptation
Dark adaptation is the process by which the human
body increases the eye’s sensitivity to low levels of light. Adaptation
to darkness occurs at varying degrees and rates. During the first 30
minutes in the dark, eye sensitivity increases about 10,000 times. Dark
adaptation is affected by exposure to bright light such as matches,
flashlights, flares, or vehicle headlights. Full recovery from these
exposures can take up to 45 minutes. Your color perception decreases at
night. You may be able to distinguish light and dark colors depending
on the intensity of reflected light. At night, bright warm colors such
as reds and oranges are hard to see and will appear dark. In fact, reds
are nearly invisible at night. Unless a dark color is bordered by two
lighter colors, it is invisible. On the other hand, greens and blues
will appear brighter, although you may not be able to determine their
color. Since visual sharpness at night is
Normal Blind
Night Blind
Night Observation Techniques
The following paragraphs detail night observation techniques:
Dark Adaptation
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
about 10 minutes in a dark area. The
Night Vision
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
LIMITED VISIBILITY DEVICES
The three devices used to increase lethality at night include night vision devices (NVDs), thermal weapon sights, and aiming lasers. Each provides different views of the infrared (IR) spectrum, which is simple energy. The electromagnetic spectrum is simply energy (light). Before you can fully operate these devices, you must know how they work in the IR range, and you must know the electromagnetic (light) spectrum. You should also know the advantages and disadvantages of each piece of equipment. This is the only way to know when to employ which.
NOTE: THIS PART I HAVE INCLUDED HERE FOR INFORMATION ONLY.HOW THE DEVICES ARE BEING USED BY AMERICAN ARMY TO RENDER LINE SOLDIERS GOOD SENSORS USING OBSERVATION SKILLS ENHANCED BY USING THESE DEVICES
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For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
Thermal Imaging Devices
The second type of device that uses IR light is the
thermal imaging device . This type of device detects electromagnetic
radiation (heat) from humans and
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For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
Aiming Lasers
Aiming
PROPER ADJUSTMENTS TO THE IMAGE INTENSIFIERS
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
You must make the proper adjustments to the image intensifiers in order to get the best possible picture. The aiming lasers cannot be seen with the unaided eye; they can only be seen with image intensification devices. You must know how these devices work to maximize the quality of what is being viewed by making the proper adjustments to these devices.
Scanning
The NVDs have a
Walking
Once a target has been located, you must be aware of the placement of the aiming laser. Laser awareness is necessary. If you activate your laser and it is pointing over the target into the sky, you will waste valuable time trying to locate exactly where your laser is pointing. Also, it increases your chances of being detected and fired upon by the enemy. When engaging a target, aim the laser at the ground just in front of the target, walk the aiming laser along the ground and up the target until you are center mass, and then engage the target. Walking your laser to the target is a quick and operationally secure means of engaging the enemy with your aiming laser.
IR Discipline
Once a target has been located and engaged with the aiming laser, the laser must be deactivated. On the range, IR discipline means actively scanning with the laser off. Once a target is located, walk the laser to the target and engage. After the target has been engaged, the laser goes off.
RANGE ESTIMATION
You must often estimate ranges. You must accurately
determine distance and prepare topographical sketches or range cards.
Your estimates will be easier to make and more accurate if you know
various
FACTORS
Three factors affect range estimates:
Nature of the Object
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
Outline…………………………. An object of regular outline, such as a house, appears closer than one
of irregular outline, such as a clump of trees.
Contrast……………………….. A target that contrasts with its background appears to be closer than it
actually is.
Exposure ……………………… A partly exposed target appears more distant than it actually is.
Nature of Terrain
Contoured terrain ………….. Looking across contoured terrain makes an object seem farther.
Smooth terrain………………. Looking across smooth terrain, such as sand, water, or snow, makes a
distant object seem nearer.
Downhill………………………..Looking downhill at an object makes it seem farther.
Uphill …………………………..Looking uphill at an object makes it seem nearer.
Light Conditions
Sun behind observer ……… A
Sun behind object………….. A
ESTIMATION METHODS
Methods of range estimation include–
∙The
∙The
∙The
∙The
∙A combination of these.
Picture a distance of 100 meters on the ground. For ranges up to 500 meters, count the number of
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To use the
Table 2. Appearance of a body using
RANGE (in meters) WHAT YOU SEE
200 |
Clear in all detail such as equipment, skin color |
300 |
Clear body outline, face color good, remaining detail blurred |
400 |
Body outline clear, other details blurred |
500 |
Body tapered, head indistinct from body |
600 |
Body a wedge shape, with no head apparent |
700 |
Solid wedge shape (body outline) |
This method is best at night. Sound travels through
air at 1,100 feet (300 meters) per second. That makes it possible to
estimate distance if you can both see and hear a
Combination of Methods
Battlefield conditions are not always ideal for estimating ranges. If the terrain limits the use of the 100- meter
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haze may obscure the target details, but you may still be able to judge its size or use the
Mission Responsibilities of commanders (with
regard to soldiers who are not intelligence personnel, but come across
information on tactical
I have written this particularly from the perspective of our soldiers deployed in Kashmir. Keshav
How our soldiers can act as secondary collectors
Squad/Section/Patrol/TCP/Roadblock/Convoy Leader:
1.Patrols, roadblocks, checkpoints,
2.Prepare reports , verbally (debriefing) or written on any observations or information extracted after tactical questioning including being able to recognize any information of so much importance(combat intelligence) that it must be reported immediately without delay.
3.During such activities like patrolling, convoy etc all EPW/Detainee and seized documents must be subjected to exploitation carefully as these are prime sources of intelligence.
4.All the above should be predicated by the Unit intelligence officers tasking of prioritized intelligence requirements but collection outside these should not be ignored if such information is delivered by the source concerned. They might be of tactical value to the Commander or HUMINT officers.
Platoon Leader:
Squad/section/patrol/ CP/roadblocks, and convoy leaders are tasked by the platoon leader based on intelligence requirements as laid down by higher headquarters.
Instruct and see to it that it is followed to the book that all personnel returning from patrolling, manning checkpoints, convoys etc report everything and get subjected to full debriefing.
Highlight before them the high importance of submitting information of immediate tactical value
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without ANY delay. Make it very clear this is mandatory. To this effect he should apprise everyone of the procedures laid down by the battalion intelligence staff in this regard.
Company/Troop/Battery Commander:
Squad/section/patrol/ CP/roadblocks, and convoy leaders are tasked by the platoon leader based on intelligence requirements as laid down by higher headquarters.
All intelligence inputs by the personnel involved in patrolling and tasked with collection are reviewed and forwarded to the Bn intelligence staff and Bde staff. While doing this highlight that information that is linked to the current operations or the AO environment.
Make it mandatory for everyone to be debriefed in keeping with the procedures laid down by higher headquarters intelligence staff.
Ensure that everyone understands that it is mandatory to report information IMMEDIATELY of critical value.
Battalion STAFF INT OFFICER and S3 Sections:
Task the company, section, squad commanders on intelligence requirements and guide them through the Staff headquarters.
Push down intelligence information to these command levels so as to enable them to get a better situational understanding and know what is expected of them. Thus they will be able to frame tactical questions better.
See to it that all patrols etc are debriefed and no one is left out.
Establish procedures for immediate reporting of information of critical tactical value.
ADVISORY BDE (A special note for Commanders)
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We have 5 geographical combatant Command HQs
handling day to day administrative duties (theater command?) and in
case of sudden major operational task would require major
reinforcements. Yes Corps HQ can be deployed to run the operation but
it remains to be seen to what proximity to the potential warzone are
they located. The 5 Command HQs are located far from these war zones
and emergency deployment is impracticable. We must conduct a thorough
study to calculate the optimum combatant command requirement
considering all operational plans if the need arises for simultaneous
multiple fights. Administratively focussed theater armies (the 5
Command HQs) cannot fulfill the purpose so why not amalgamate the CHQ
and the Corps HQ into operations focused Corps organization? All can be
termed Corps? India is a place with diverse culture , language and
relationships.We must build up on these regional knowledge and
relationships if we have to effectively combat the enemy , particularly
in North East and elsewhere and mind you the Command HQ Staff are in no
position to develop this situational awareness/cultural understanding
CU (Leading to the all important Situation Development SD for mission
success) by being located inside major cities far away from
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combat but also regional knowledge
(geography,demographics,other atmospherics like cultures , language ,
customs , political system , religion factors etc ) and relationships
are extremely important when taking cognizance of the entire area of
operations..so instead of creating small disparate advisory ad hoc
teams out of combat units it is far better and practicable to have
dedicated units with language skills and regional knowledge. Or else
the conventional troops will have to do the job with little or no
training at all. Why not create an Advisory Brigade or a Security
Assistance Brigade or an Advisory Corps? Echeloned under the newly
Corps HQ in the particular geographic command area? Further we can set
up an Advisory School. Now say the Brigade has 200 personnel. These
personnel can rotate amongst the various Companies/.units ..Impart
training and stay in that commands geographical area their entire
career and intermittently attend refresher and other courses to keep
abreast of current knowledge in the Advisory School. Again and again
they would return to the same units to impart knowledge and training.
In the long run the Army Command will have the pulse of the region and
the deployed units too , and the factor of uncertainty and surprise by
the enemy will be reduced significantly giving our forces a heightened
SD and that competitive combat edge for effective and accurate
kinetic/non kinetic targeting and overall mission success. To build up
and retain talent and institutional memory of COIN ops we require this
organizational and cultural change. Mind you , how many individual
platoons really have combat experience in COIN operations? Apart from
routine parade and combat training and deployment to peace areas
thought the country? It is not important to assess how the current COIN
ops are being handled; it’s important to note how quickly experiences
in COIN operations are fading."Experiences’’..Soldiers trained in COIN
operations in real time ..not soldiers who are graduating out of COIN
schools and only a very small fraction getting deployed , that COIN
combat patch..and then being routinely phased out to a peace area
unit..The experience going to a waste. In any given platoon or Coy its
roughly
A DEDICATED BRIGADE
Military Intelligence Brigade
Military intelligence brigades coordinate, manage,
and direct intelligence and surveillance; they conduct collection
management,
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Each BRIGADE:
Brigade designated combat team has striker team with HUMINT and CI capability in addition to R&S assets.
Brigade headquarters
Ops Bn,
Aerial exploitation/reconnaissance Bn
Fwd collection Bn(CI/HUMINT) ,
Fwd collection Bn (SIGINT),
Comm. Bn.
And electronics Bn,
We need to push down intelligence capability to boot level. \We start by creating a MI Company
Military Intelligence (Ml) Battalion
The MI Bn provides a focused approach for Bde Int staff as it is a fully contained organization with specialized companies, the CI Company, the C&E Company and the I&E company. All these companies provide a better situational understanding of the Bde Commander by providing support to HUMINT, (Tactical HUMINT teams), conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield, interrogation and document/equipment exploitation operations, support to targeting and battle damage assessment/restrike options, developing threat disposition estimate. The Companies further have MI enabled platoons which on account of being near the ground can collect and provide timely threat intelligence data. Each platoon may be specialized in its own way; one can be a tactical HUMINT platoon , HUMINT platoon, one an ISR analysis platoon all being controlled by the Company headquarters element which also interfaces with the Company
commander and staff and laterally with the other specialty MI companies under the MI Bn.Fusing of intelligence data from the platoons and lateral companies with those that are pushed down from higher HQ on requisition gives a far better threat assessment. Ultimately combat intelligence, target information and otrher satisfied priority intelligence requirements are at the hands of the Commander for necessary action.
The MI company in support provides-
Communications intercept, direction finding (DF), and ECM.
CI.
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Interrogation.
Ground surveillance.
Personnel to staff the Intelligence Section, These soldiers conduct-
The TEB Unit provides
1.CI
2.interrogation of prisoners
4.and LRS support to corps operations
CLIC (This part is relevant to your UNIT in Agartala)
Under the command and supervision of the Inf Bn STAFF INT OFFICER Int officer intelligence platoons can be created. From among the Bn soldiers according to capability, availability and performance should be selected.
There wil be two echelons in each platoon.
(SECTION A supports Bn HQ.The Bn Int HQ Section will be composed of one Int officer,one intelligence specialist of the rank of JCO, and 3 enlisted soldiers. The Int officer can serve both as staff officer for the Bn Command and also as Commander of the operating forces in the Company. He is responsible for analyzing intelligence and planning deployment and tactical employment of ISR assets. The intelligence specialist can be a ground recon specialist
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whose duties involve observe and report on enemy activity and other information of military importance in close operations.
(Close operations are operations that are within the commander's area of operation (AO) in his battle space . Most operations that are projected in close areas are usually against hostile forces in immediate contact and are often the decisive actions. It requires speed and mobility to rapidly concentrate overwhelming combat power at the critical time and place and exploit success. Dominated by fire support, the combined elements of the ground and air elements conduct maneuver warfare to enhance the effects of their fires and their ability to maneuver. As they maneuver to gain positions of advantage over the enemy, combined arms forces deliver fires to disrupt the enemy’s ability to interfere with that maneuver.)
SECTION B is the CLIC.Colocated with the Company. (One intelligence analyst and five enlisted infantrymen.)
Each company of the Bn should select and train at least 6 personnel.
The formation of this platoon will facilitate initial and sustainment training by ensuring consistency throughout the battalion and eliminating additional training requirements for the companies. It will also ensure standardization in processes and reporting formats, and further promote lateral communication among the CLICs. Armed with the BLIP the Commander now has his own organic intelligence unit which will provide him additional support apart from the intelligence feeds as a result of his request for information from higher ups.Moreover and more important the BLIPs of all the companies in the Bnb conduct lateral communication , exchanging combat intelligence and other information, thus keeping abreast of latest developments and enemy tactics which the other company is confronting and the tactics, techniques and procedures employed by the company with an element of success. With the passage of time the initial training given to say the enlisted soldiers or the intelligence specialist helps in sustainment training ,the training a byproduct of the operations the soldier is involved with without resorting to tutored training. Soon the BLIP transforms itself into a robust intelligence unit of the Bn,
Company Level Intelligence Cells
Coming to the CLIC level we have an organic capability to acquire combat intelligence directly at the ground level. Actionable intelligence is needed desperately by our fighting forces but the time delay from sensor to shooter(sensors on receipt of request for information collect the data
matching given coordinates, pass it on to the intelligence section for interpretation who in turn sends it to his higher up for evaluation and dissemination to the ground unit; in case of map/imagery obtained by aerial surveillance the time delay is much more) is often so much
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that despite accurate target nomination the operation slips out of hand. With the CLIC at his disposal the commander now can obtain, analyze and act on readily available combat intelligence without having to wait for intelligence feeds.C2, intelligence and operations are hereby synchronized and integration achieved successfully. That too at the lowest level. The CLIC is supervised by the company commander. The two sections of CLIC , collection and analysis and production are looked after by the officer in charge , usually a JCO and there will be two soldiers , one from each section to function as intelligence watch and are assigned to the company combat ops center.
Functions/responsibilities:
CLIC
If required, the CLICs now have the capacity to surge intelligence trained soldiers to support operations such as cordon and searches and raids.
After an area of operations is identified inhabited by an asymmetric enemy in a complex terrain with weak transportation and logistical infrastructure. We need to deploy an interim combat team complete with HUMINT/, CI/. SIGINT assets which will act as an early combat team, mounted infantry organization with the capability to rapidly assess the environment, physical terrain, community, cultural and political and conduct an intelligence preparation of the battlefield by assessing the enemy’s strength, capabilities, disposition, TOE thus enabling the striking force to project itself before deployment. The primary intent here is to develop a situational understanding of an unknown area inhabited by an enemy against the backdrop of distributed, asymmetric, nonlinear simultaneous operations. Here the problem is to determine the OB of an enemy that doesn’t have a conventional standing force nor is easily identifiable. We don’t see any typical military structure, units, rear and forward areas or logistical networks characteristic of conventional enemy forces. It is a big question how to deploy ISR assets for collecting intelligence or conducting reconnaissance or for that matter determining the center of gravity of the enemy.
LRS units provide reliable HUMINT against second echelon and
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EXTRA NOTES:
PROJECTING COMBAT POWER WITH ORGANIC ISR CAPABILITY
Reason for creation of interim team:
Without sending in the interim combat team to gain
a situational understanding it is totally impracticable to deploy the
striking forces. What we need is a interim combat force with
reconnaissance, surveillance and target nomination
The recce platoon, in addition to reconnaissance and surveillance should also engage in HUMINT activities for thorough situational understanding. The situation in asymmetric warfare is different. Here the recce platoon can conduct HUMINT operations. The reconnaissance platoon should be equipped with CI capability. This heightens its HUMNINT collection ability.
The HUMINT teams (4 teams) are in effect Tactical HUMINT Teams each with 3 HUMINTcollectors and one CI agent. Once deployed, the teams report their information to an operational management team (OMT), which collates intelligence data gathered by the tactical teams. The information is then passed on to the brigade INT section for further analysis and integration into the brigade's collection plan.
C2:
The reconnaissance platoon HQ and the HUMINT
platoon HQ both should contain one CI NCO.The reconnaissance squads
each should have one CI soldier. Thus at the lowest tactical level
organic CI capability with the deployment of maximum possible CI
soldiers is hereby achieved thus increasing significantly the
reconnaissance troops HUMINT collection capability. We can optimally
have in the recce patrol 3
HUMINT OR MI BN IDEA
INTERIM COMBAT TEAM WITH ORGANIC INT AND R&S CAPABILITY – TO PROJECT FORWARD OF AO
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Operations Battalion
Collection Management Section
Production Section ASPD & OB Teams
BDA & TGT Team
CI Team
Single Source Teams.
MASINT Team
SIGINT Team
HUMINT Team
IMINT Team
Corps Military Intelligence Support Element
Intelligence Support Elements
FUNCTIONS AT BN/PLATOON LEVEL(CLIC)
HUMINT Collection Operations
Combating terrorism support
Rear operations support
Information operations support
Civil disturbance support
Local operational data collection
Debriefing and interrogation
HUMINT threat assessment
Reconnaissance HUMINT Missions
Elicit information from the local populace.
Interrogate EPWs and Detainees.
Debrief Allies and U.S. personnel.
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Document exploitation.
Vulnerability assessments.
Source screening operations.
Spotting/assessing for Tactical HUMINT Teams.
Civil
OPSEC Support
MY DESIGN OF DEDICATED INT COMPANIES/BN
COMPANY LEVEL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CELL:
Organization
The MI cell (C& E), shown at Figure 2, is organized into a headquarters section, an MI unit (CI), an MI unit (interrogation and exploitation), and an MI unit (collection and exploitation). Headquarters section provides C2, administrative services, and logistic support for units of the company.
Roles and Functions
The Collection and Exploitation section provides interrogation and CI support. Functions , include:
Setting up interrogation centers and executing interrogation operations of enemy prisoners of war.
Determine enemy multidisciplinary intelligence threat, analyze it and recommend countermeasures, both on the passive defensive side as well as offensive methods.
Conduct exploitation of turned enemy agents. Conduct polygraph techniques and technical operations.
Conduct DOCEX
Conduct debriefing of high level military/political figures,refugees,patrols,military personnel who are released by enemy from capture or who have escaped from captivity, detained civilians and other people who have information of interest.
Conduct Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO).
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNIT (CI)
Mission
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"The mission of the MI Unit (CI) is to conduct CI operations and multidiscipline counterintelligence (MDCI) threat analysis in support of the Commanders intelligence requirements’’.
Organization
The MI Unit (CI) will be composed of a section HQ, an Ops section, and CI platoon.
Roles and Functions
Provides
Conducts Vulnerability assessment Supports OPSEC
Supports targeting , nominates HVT Conducts CI investigations
Conducts Counterintelligence FP Source Operations
Conducts counterespionage,countersubversion and counter sabotage operations. Liaises with other intelligence agencies
Conducts offensive operations during wartime Areas of interest:
Known or suspected acts of treason,sedition,espionage by Army personnel
Known or suspected association with elements of threat intelligence Terrorism, assassination incidents
Defections and unexplained absence of Army personnel People impersonating as military intelligence personnel.
MI UNIT (INTERROGATION AND EXPLOITATION I&E) Mission
"The mission of the MI Unit (Interrogation and Exploitation) is to conduct interrogation of enemy prisoners of war EPW,debriefing of persons having information of intelligence value and exploitation of captured doicuments,media and hardware.”
Organization
The MI Unit (Interrogation and Exploitation) consists of a HQ section, an Ops section, communications section and I&E platoon.
Roles and Functions
Setting up interrogation facilities during wartime
Interrogation of EPWs.Establishment of a joint or combined interrogation facility and conduct interrogations of EPWs. Conduct debriefings of high level political and military personnel, civilian internees, refugees, displaced persons, and other non- US personnel.
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Conduct debriefing of high level military/political figures,refugees,patrols,military personnel who are released by enemy from capture or who have escaped from captivity, detained civilians and other people who have information of interest.
Conducts DOCEX,and translation of captured documents. Translate and exploit documents acquired, found, or captured in the theater AO.
Debrief US and Allied personnel having escaped after being captured or having evaded capture.
MI UNIT (COLLECTION AND EXPLOITATION C&E)
The above two units, viz MI (CI) and MI(I&E)
are combined into one UNIT , collection and exploitation MI(C&E)
and hence executes all the functions which are inherent in the 2 units.
This is a modular unit, can hence plug as a detachment support into any
Battalion/Company which requires CI/HUMINT support but does not require
a full intelligence battalion /Company expertise. It can also be
situation may not allow the deployment of full intelligence assets
Mission
"The collection and exploitation unit collects intelligence information through the acquisition, training, briefing and debriefing of HUMINT assets in support of Army requirements and provides CI support within the area of operations, conducts interrogations of prisoners of war and other personnel of intelligence interest; translates and exploits selected foreign documents/ media; and exploits foreign materiel of intelligence interest."
Organization
The MI Unit (Collection and Exploitation) consists of a section headquarters, CI operations section, interrogation operations section, and counterintelligence and I & E platoons.
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BN HQ CO INT SEC (RELEVANT TO AGARTALA UNIT)
We can have an integral organic intelligence capability at the Battalion level:
The Bn Intelligence section will consist of the Bn intelligence officer, a JCO , 2 havildars and 6 infantry soldiers. The Bn Intelligence section will interface between the companies and the Bde.The companies pass on intelligence information for processing to the Bn Intelligence section who in turn passes them on to the Bde and also as per ground requirements from the companies and Bn staff
.The Bn intelligence section will develop sources and contacts from among the local population and liaise with the civil police and intelligence agencies. The question of deconfliction arises at this stage as the line companies and platoons have their sources , contacts and liaisons as well as the civil agencies. It is the responsibility of the Bn intelligence section to deconflict its sources with all these sources, contacts and liaisons. The Bn intelligence section will use its HUMINT and other capabilities to detect weapons/explosives caches, collect incriminating evidentiary information for prosecution by the civil agencies and increase the overall situational understanding of the Bn and Bde commanders and staff. Delineation of sources between the Bn , the line companies , the platoons and the HUMINT units is very important by clearly defining the responsibilities of each with respect to the sources. We can have contacts like community leaders of influence , local politicians and councilors , surface and witting contacts as well as those contacts who are very useful , can supply information of rich intelligence value but need protection which will be the responsibility of the HUMINT units. The overt contacts like the community leaders etc can be the responsibility of the Bn intelligence section while the surface contacts and liaison can be given to the line units and platoons. The same line units and platoons can forward to HUMINT units any source of HUMINT interest which they come across community operations , patrolling or tactical operations
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MY DESIGN FOR COP
(Can be skipped for now.Its slated to come up after a year of
the creation of organic int unit.)
ASYMMETRIC/HYBRID ENEMY
BATALLION LEVEL INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY (PUSHING INT CAPABILITY TO BOOT
LEVEL)
INTRODUCING CENTRALISED INTELLIGENCE AND COMBAT OPERATIONS CONTROL
THROUGH TOCs
BATTLE STAFF NCOs
&
INT/OPS NETWORKING THROUGH THE CREATION OF THE DIV INTELLIGENCE NET FOR
NORTH EAST (EASTERN COMMAND)
....Contd..(2)BN STRUCTURE (OPS/INTELLIGENCE STAFF)
BN INT SEC STAFF
S1
S2
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S3
S4
Mission precise definition
Mission breakdown into subcomponents & Analysis
Wargaming
Planning
Operation execution
( He will coordinate with S3 throughout so as to integrate intelligence and operations.Intelligence drives ops;and vice
(The Division must maintain an intranet capability
wherein all intelligence and operations data,historical , current and
projected are maintained in the database.For example,all
sensors,humint-
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chain of all the States; each LAN being comprised of all the
During deployment for combat the Bn intelligence section int officer can enter this Div NET AND CAN ACCESS THE division ops and intelligence activities if necessary.He can thus maintain a current intelligence situation report/map within the Bn TOC reflecting the current enemy situation.At every level trends,pattern recognition , analytical (link diagramming,forecasting trends,association mapping,time series analysis,PERT/CPM applied to operations etc)software can be used to manipulate and research information on the servers.Such information may be pushed down on request to operational/tactical levels.
(To be elaborated more in subsequent pages....,with detailed intelligence requirements,asset
management and collection management , Company int cells for each specific adversary function/activity/ops,insertion of collected information to each soldier terminal , push to sector TOC , push to sector LAN , uploaded to MAIN WAN SERVER..trend recognition , analysis and pattern recognition software installation on server to work on all information contained in servers , and
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querying syntax specifically designed from boot level to seniormost oficers
CP/TOC
BATTLE STAFF
FUNCTION
Roles and Functions of Battle Staff
Noncommissioned Officers in the Intelligence Warfighting Domain
Battle staff noncommissioned officers (NCOs) focus on assisting their respective
staff officers and senior NCOs. The entire staff contributes to making and executing timely decisions. Commanders and staffs continually look for opportunities to streamline cumbersome or time- consuming procedures. The following paragraphs, organized by warfighting function (WFF), suggest activities and functions common to all members of a particular staff section. Principal staff officers along with their senior NCOs determine what specific functions are performed within their sections based upon the skill sets of available personnel.
Commanders and Staff concentrate on achieving a streamlined picture of the ensuing battle , in fact at any moment of time the Staff and the Commander should be able to grasp the immediate current situation as simply as possible without the presentation getting inundated with information
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overflow.This common operating picture viewed explicitly and concretely enables the Commander to take swift decisions in an otherwise fast evolving uncertain battle environment.It is not possible for the Staff to accomplish this by themselves and the standard office personnel who assist them (in the Tactical Ops Center)..what is required that the battle staff from among the JCOs,Senior NCO and NCOs assist the Staff Officers in the respective warfighting functions , viz: intelligence and
CI;maneuver;sustainment;command,control,communicationandcomputers C4;plans;fires;protection;engineer and provost marshall functions.The main objective is to acquire the best situational understanding about the common operating picture within the tactical operations center/command post. . The
TOC/CP has two primary functions:
. • To track Soldiers and equipment during the battle to assist the leader in
the command and control of the unit.
• To serve as a data center that processes enemy and friendly information
Intelligence (Intel) Function
Intelligence
readiness,tasks,synchronization,counterintelligence,other intelligence
support and support to force protection , coin , and other security
Intel readiness:
•Throughout the AO the Battle staff NCOs should coordinate with horizontally dispersed units and intel staff and lower and upper echelon staff,establishing and maintaining the proper
relationships/procedures.
•There should be a proper command intelligence training plan and the Battle staff NCOs should see to it that threat force considerations,intelligence,counterintelligence and force protection are properly integrated in this training plan.This will ensure good intelligence readiness.
•Prepare the command
and enemy/threat considerations into other training plans.
Intel tasks:
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• Recommend priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
•Execute and manage the intelligence preparation
of the battlefield in line with changing intelligence requirements due
to the rapid tempo of
Create situation reports,intelligence estimates,update enemy/threat/terrain/weather factors so that the commanders situational perspective is heightened thus leading to a clear common operating picture COP.
Provide support to indications and warning with respect to operations.
Provide support to Force Protection
Provide intelligence support to battle damage assessment.
Provide support to targeting:Develop targets,Create and manage target grey,white and black
lists,target folders,target reduction,target acquisition and tracking of HPTs.
Information operations is the mainstay in any battle and to this end the Battle staff NCOs should
provide intelligence support by providing intelligence feeds during IO planning and while intelligence
planning to consider IO factors.
Other intel support:
•Provide intel updates, other products, and additional support to ISR integration, the concept of operations, and mission accomplishment.
•Advise the commander so that all collection, production, and
dissemination adhere to special security, legal, and regulatory restrictions.
•Facilitate the
•Prepare the intel annex to plans and orders and the intel estimate.
•Coordinate technical control and technical support for military intel assets
and units.
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•Debrief friendly personnel.
•Identify linguist requirements pertaining to intel support.
•Determine all foreign languages and dialects proficiencies needed for mission accomplishment.
•Coordinate security investigations of
Counterintelligence:
1.See to it that the counterintelligence activities are conducted properly, in line with standard TTPs (technical control) and coordinate all such activities keeping deconfliction in perspective.
2.Keep a tab on all contingency funding and
3.Identify threat multidimensional collection capabilities and activities which are geared against the unit.
4.Match these intelligence collection capabilities against the unit’s security and intelligence
capabilities , activities and plans. These include
operational security,countersurveillance,signals security , military
security, deception planning, force protection,PSYOP,area security
operations. Here it is very important to conduct a mission-
Support to security programs:
1.Conduct a counterintelligence review of the unit
2.Evaluate security programs of the command. Supervise these programs as they relate to
Command , personnel , information.
3.Support to OPSEC
4.Support to deception practices as applied to units plans , intent and actions.
5.Ascertain unit vulnerabilities and advise accordingly
6.Ensure biometrics systems are in place and functioning properly.
TACTICAL OPS CENTER/CP BATTLE
STAFF INTEL NCO
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The Commander needs to see , shape , shield ,
strike and move within the Battlefield most efficiently while retaining
that competitive edge over the enemy.Battlefield conditions are
extremely fluid and the current type of prevailing
I would like to view the Battlespace not as a whole , operationally or strategically but rather as a
on the ground being unobtainable. We need to make the average soldier on the ground int- savvy.It is not difficult , as he needent be trained in all intelligence functions but rather be acquainted with tactical questioning,screening and document exploitation plus
surveillance/reconnaissanceskills. Regarding the last two he need only understand how R&S is conducted , and all the factors that go into
predeployment,insertion and the two activities
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bit.
Battle Staff man the TOC/CP;besides the
officers/JCOs there are the Senior NCOs and NCOs.These people can be
trained to assist in intelligence duties; if the TOC/CP suffers
casualties and if we have a pool of
againoperational. The next section will elaborate Battle Staff (NCOs and Senior NCOs) functions w.r.t the intelligence warfighting function.
____________________________________________
The CP officers role is to configure operations in
such a manner so that he can ‘’see’’ the battle space in the most
simple, direct manner , without any ambiguity or inundating information
and maintain a wide view of operations. Military decision making and
planning processes occur at all levels of Command and similarly at the
CP/TOC too. Battle staff officers should be able to analyze higher
headquarters mission orders , adjacent headquarters feeds/requirements
and lower units requirements and
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
...TOBECONTINUED
_____________________________________
Commanders and Staff concentrate on achieving a streamlined picture of the ensuing battle , in fact at any moment of time the Staff and the Commander should be able to grasp the immediate current situation as simply as possible without the presentation getting inundated with information overflow.This common operating picture viewed explicitly and concretely enables the Commander to take swift decisions in an otherwise fast evolving uncertain battle environment.It is not possible for the Staff to accomplish this by themselves and the standard office personnel who assist them (in the Tactical Ops Center)..what is required that the battle staff from among the JCOs,Senior NCO and NCOs assist the Staff Officers in the respective warfighting
functions , viz: intelligence and CI;maneuver;sustainment;command,control,communication and computers C4;plans;fires;protection;engineer and provost marshall functions.The main objective is to acquire the best situational understanding about the common operating picture within the tactical operations center/command post. . The TOC/CP has two primary functions: • To track Soldiers and equipment during the battle to assist the leader in the command and control of the unit. • To serve as a data center that processes enemy and
friendlyinformation.
The role of the battle staff is a critical component to achieve mission success in a counterinsurgency environment. Battle staff noncommissioned officers (NCOs) perform a multitude of vitally important roles and functions in the tactical operations centers and command posts. They are the principal managers of battle tracking, which supports the timely analysis and processing of plans and orders, and they continually adapt these plans and orders to counter the threat.
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
Please use Cntrl+click on links below to get complete picture.
NOTES
REPORT FOR GOC EASTERN COMMAND A / B
BATTLE STAFF NCO #1
PUSH #2
DETAILED DISCUSSION CAN BE FOUND IN THE MAIN HEADQUARTERS SITE HERE AND UNIT HOME PAGE HERE.
DESIGNED BY KESHAV MAZUMDAR FOR INDIAN ARMY (Antiterrorism Officer ID A7949976535G)
http://collegeofintelligencestudies.com/armyxxii/COMMANDER/instantpic1.html
http://collegeofintelligencestudies.com/armyxxii/COMMANDER/instantpic.html
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
http://www.securityantiterrorismtraining.org/HEADQUARTERS/BATTLE%20STAFF%20INTEL.html
http://collegeofintelligencestudies.com/armyxxii/TOC/toccomm.html
http://collegeofintelligencestudies.com/armyxxii/armyxxii3ii.html
http://collegeofintelligencestudies.com/armyxxii/armyxxii3.html
http://securityantiterrorismtraining.org/INDIAN%20ARMY%20MODEL%20UNIT/index.html
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
Keshav Mazumdar Landscape Appt.
Career Snapshot
∙Present : Vice President (Committees) Antiterrorism Accreditation Board USA
∙Present : Advisor RIEAS (Athens)
∙Present : Advisor European Intelligence Academy (Athens)
∙Administrator War College
Five years Terrorism
Research/Studies
16 yrs Intelligence
HUMINT/CI/TACHUMINT studies/field work
Managing
Liaison with army/parallel int agencies.
Recent Achievements
Taken up as Sr President ATAB USA
Antiterrorism Officer credential from S2 Institute USA
Authorized by ATAB USA to impart training in intelligence/counterintelligence to security forces combating insurgency and terrorism (Academic level)
Intelligencer/Antiterrorism Officer
My expertise consist of the following:
∙Adequate knowledge of Intelligence Management, Enterprise and Architecture.Indications & Warning. Policy formulation
∙Adequate knowledge of HUMINT/CI TTPs.
∙Force Protection.
∙Counterintelligence Review.
∙Terrorism Threat Assessment and Criticality Analysis o (CARVER)
oAccess Control.
oAdministering online course in
Key Skills |
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Threat profiling |
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Understanding |
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Threat Assessment |
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HUMINT/Counterin |
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CARVER |
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telligence |
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Surveillance |
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Architecture |
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Managing 16 |
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Elicitation |
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Committees from |
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Devising & applying |
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every security |
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Compliance Controls |
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domain as Senior |
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OSINT |
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Vice President- |
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Understanding deception |
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delegating/allocatin |
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Cyber crime |
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g |
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Authoring texts/training |
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resources/ensuring |
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manuals on |
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compliance/indoctri |
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Intelligence/Counterintelligenc |
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ning- |
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e/Terrorism. |
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training/managing |
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Administrator of online |
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training |
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Counterintelligence Course. |
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repository/Preparin |
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Advising on contributions |
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g Summary |
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findings and |
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making |
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Recommendations. |
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Reports & |
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Documentation |
Professional Experience
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
Launch (preliminary stage) of first ever easy access Counterintelligence course on web for verified Security professional’s only. Non profit dissemination.
Fellow of New West Minster College Canada
Authored 2 Books on
HUMINT/CI & COIN
Computer Skills
Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Access, Outlook,
INDIAN ARMY LU
LAW ENFORCEMENT BIS
ATAB USA
Handling graft charges, Surveillance and busting a civil- Bangladeshi nexus. Vol/Status. Surveillance
Independent maintenance of crime/terrorism threat profiles and analysis.
Committee Management , Policy formulation , Delegation of Authority
To Senior most staff including Admirals/Generals.
Mission Statement
My mission is to perform so efficiently that I may succeed..in my own little way..to remove the stigma on CI..that it is not prestigious..is not fast track..only complements intelligence..and deliver the goods so well that young officers will be attracted to follow us in what we know is a noble profession and where the need is so great.
Further.. Any CI program worthy of the name has to be able to engage the opposition on the street. And when we do go to the street, we have to be the best service there.If we are beaten on the street, it is worse than not having been there at all.I want to be the best on the street. And NOT concede it to
Performance Review Excerpts
He is more than qualified to conduct training of
security forces in a vast number of Intelligence, Crisis and Terrorism
Recognition and Response, intelligence led policing and
counterintelligence in
Keshav has retired Admirals and Generals chairing training
committees under him that have expressed their appreciation for his abundance of knowledge and his motivation to the furtherance of setting the world standards in terrorism response.
(Keith Flannigan , Certification Chairman , ATAB , USA +1-
Seconded by : Admiral Peter Kikareas (NATO)..Retd.
“I highly recommend him to be nominated as Fellow of New West Minster College, Canada. His excellent knowledge of current intelligence/ counterintelligence practices in combating terrorism/ insurgency renders him ideal for imparting to security forces. His latest book on counterintelligence and ES2 is rich in “the need of the hour” actionable intelligence and counterintelligence TTP.”
Prof John M Nomikos Dir RIEAS European Intelligence Academy Athens
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
enemy intelligence.
Antiterrorism Officer
Badge
S2 INSTITUTE
OF
Safety & Intelligence Institute
Tampa Florida USA
+302109911214
Education
Associate Degree Military Science
ATO Course Graduate S2 Institute Tampa Florida USA
Dip. Criminology(Associated College , UK)
Dip. Project Management
Courses/Certifications
CERTIFICATIONS
Certified Master Antiterrorism Specialist (CMAS) Certification from Antiterrorism Accreditation Board
USA
Certified Antiterrorism Specialist (CAS) Certification from Antiterrorism Accreditation Board USA
Antiterrorism Officer (CERTIFIED) credential from S2
INSTITUTE OF SAFETY & INTELLIGENCE , USA
Ant sabotage Certified (ASC) credential from The American College of Forensics Examiners
Crisis Response
Certified Protection Officer (CPO) from International Foundation of Protection
Certified HUMAN RESOURCES PROFESSIONAL CHRP Expertrating.
SAC Dip in Criminology from Stonebridge Associated College
Level 3 NCFE Award certificate in criminology
Course: National Security & Defense Strategy from Interamerican Defense College.
Certificate in Homeland Security: Defining Directives, Organization and Policies
Certificate in Tactics for
Certificate in
Counterdrug Taskforce Training Program , MCTFT. Certificate in Analytical Investigative Tools, MCTFT Certificate in Explosives,Boobytraps & Bomb threat
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR
PROPOSED UNIT BRIEF
December 22, 2017
management,MCTFT
Certificate in Global Terrorism from Peace Operations Training Institute, UNO
Certificate in UN Police: Restoring Civil Order following Hostilities from POTI UNO
Certificate in criminal profiling from IFS India. Certificate in criminal intelligence analysis. Certificate in Information Quality Assurance Certificate in Competitive Intelligence Certificate in Psychology of Cyberspace Certificate in Negotiation & Interrogation
For the Commanding Officer 12 BIHAR