UNIT MISSION , OBJECTIVES , TABLE OF ORGANIZATION & EQUIPMENT,TACTICAL COLLECTION , INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE COIN BATTLESPACE & SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS
Basic Training:
BN INT HQ
PILOT
PROJECT AT BIHAR REGIMENT AT SALTLAKE.
FORCE
PROTECTION AND ORGANIC INT CAPABILITY. ( MI Bn, Bn Int Sec ,CLIC)
Cleared
by Gen. V. K. Singh (Retd.) and for Preview by G-O-C-in-C, HQEC.
Tactical
units engage in combat with intelligence inputs coming from the MI dep’t from
higher echelons. In today’s asymmetric war scenario the Company-level units
should also have its own organic intelligence structures with very few
personnel and assets deployed. They can act on available intelligence from the ground
themselves without having to wait for collected, collated, analyzed information
from Brigade Int section or other agencies which takes time—add to it the
dissemination delays. In addition to conducting mission specific analysis and
kinetic or non kinetic attack, the Company-level unit can also disseminate the
intelligence acquired to subordinate units, parallel units or higher
headquarters as these intelligence inputs may be useful to these parties as
often intelligence about the enemy in one area of operations can help units in
other operational areas, the enemy may be adopting similar tactics or other
behavioral factors.
It
is very important to recognize the lack of an intelligence structure at
Company-level levels. The Company-level unit should have collection and
analytical capabilities. There have been instances of lethal attacks on camps
and bases itself-a force protection problem. We just cannot depend entirely on
civil police and other intelligence agencies to supply us intelligence about
the threat which usually is biased, and influenced by political and regional
faction influences. The soldier on the ground who is a part of say the Infantry
battalion engaging the insurgents , is face to face with the reality—the enemy
, the local population and other parties of interest. Say during a
reconnaissance patrol his team may come across a valuable source. After rapidly
dismounting and ensuring he has no weapons, the teams intelligence component
can start source cops like
Company-level
or platoon level questioning, debriefing, etc and if a counterintelligence
agent is also present the more the better for HUMINT collection.
|
The focus should be on operationally adaptable units. Unit soldiers should not be tied down by rigid training regimens template on standard battle scenarios., in asymmetric or for that matter hybrid warfare we are facing an enemy , engaging with a foe which is very unconventional with uncommon or even unheard of combat TTPs resulting in battle situations very different from that what standard battle training or actual ops project. Our units must be trained to adjust to any type of operation , but without The focus should be on operationally adaptable units. Unit soldiers should not be tied down by rigid training regimens template on standard battle scenarios., proper intelligence inputs about an uncertain enemy this is difficult. The Commander needs to have a perfect situational understanding and waiting for intelligence inputs from higher headquarters is not always the preferred solution as in a COIN/Hybrid environment it is the soldiers on the ground who have much more better access to raw information than the sensors deployed by higher Headquarters intelligence department. In many situations like the jungle environment where the canopy blocks the line of sight of overhead sensors or in urban terrain where the built up structures do the same thing, intelligence collection is badly hampered.SIGINT , IMINT offers some solution but that is not enough. It is HUMINT that does the work most effectively, that too at boot level—platoon/company-as soldiers come into contact often with local populace, suspects at check points, refugees, prisoners of war; then there are those returning R&S units/patrols which can be debriefed by the Company intelligence/CI JCO/Officer, or soldiers might chance upon documents/equipment or even capture them—exploitation of which may yield intelligence of significant actionable value and so on. Intelligence in such an environment flows bottom-up rather than down from higher headquarters to lower headquarters. Such an intelligence flow , in a wide battle space , if properly coordinated and channelized to the right people can significantly enhance the common operating picture of the Bde Commander or the Div Commander. In an area of operations where a Bde is engaged, all the companies involved cannot properly fetch intelligence and channelize it to higher headquarters firstly due to the fast tempo of the ensuing operations, secondly due to lack of organic intelligence capability, thirdly due to overall decentralized command and control and finally due to inappropriate communication channels to a centralized feed/fuse/analyze/dissemination center. The solution here is to have a main tactical operations center , accommodated in a 3 vehicle setup with the TOC Captain, in overall charge, Desk Intelligence and Ops NCOs assigned to each company…………….There will be company level intelligence cells looking after the companies intelligence requirements and supporting company operations…. with a Bn Intelligence and Ops section under the Brigade intelligence and ops staff officers .Another variation can be 3-4 Company intelligence support teams providing intelligence support to all the companies or we can have one dedicated Company intelligence unit falling under the command and control of the Bn Intelligence Section—this unit will see to all the intelligence requirements of the entire battalion and will be composed of collection and exploitation (CE) team, counterintelligence and interrogation of prisoner of war team(CI) and a combination of Humint/CI team(TACTICAL HUMINT or TACHUMINT). |
Let
us assume a Command (set up for COIN ops, or Antiterrorist ops in a State)
which has everything in order such as Command chain, combat machinery, defined
communication channels, civil administration support and police, civil
intelligence agencies support lacks only an organic intelligence unit and
depends on Higher HQ such as Battalion intelligence section and civil agencies
for intelligence information.
It
should be noted here that the necessary information is requisitioned first in
the form of Request of Information document, which will go through various
processing nodes as characterized by administrative channels, then finally landing
in the collection manager’s hands from the requested agencies higher authority
to whom the request was directed. Now the collection manager will access
already present records database and national databases to explore if the
needed information is already available—if so he further initiates request for
information, gets the information and passes it on to the commander of the
unit. If not available he prioritizes the requested information as per the
supported commands requirements, evaluates availability of suitable assets,
allocates the assets tasking as per their capabilities, capacity and
speciality,the assets are deployed,
information collected, again sent up channels for evaluation of information
quality , credibility (if source-submitted),analyzed, transformed into
intelligence product and then finally disseminated to the supported commands
commander.
All
the above processes takes time, sometimes very long time, rendering the
information useless as intelligence can at times be highly perishable,
especially combat intelligence. The commander needs actionable intelligence
fast and to enable this it would be far better if he himself has an organic
modular intelligence unit, ready to take up assignments, if needed be
integrated with the strike platoons itself for much faster information
gathering and analysis and immediate action by the platoon commander. Company
level/Platoon level intelligence capability can tremendously increase the
competitive edge of the commander over the enemy, increase his situational
awareness and be a force enabler.
Doctrine,
Personnel, Training and Education, Leadership, Materiel Development,
Organization, and Soldier Systems needs to be reviewed if intelligence assets
need to be pushed down to the lowest level. There are dozens of units deployed
in Company-level operations on the battlefield. If they are intelligence
capable the Commander will get the best up-to-date and regularly updated(in the
fluid war scenario of rapidly changing ground situations) intelligence inputs thus
heightening his situational understanding immensely and thus giving him that
decisive competitive edge over the enemy.
The
need for projected intelligence capability is all the more important if the
commander has to deploy to an unfamiliar area ,inhabited by an asymmetric
threat which unlike a conventional enemy has no defined order of
battle,organization,discernible patterns ,does not employ standard military
tactics and where ops may be simultaneous , non-linear and distributed. In such
a situation the commander needs to project his force by sending in interim
combat enabled (for self defense) reconnaissance teams who have intelligence
gathering ability as well as counterintelligence asset , not the usual
reconnaissance and surveillance patrols who are composed only of scouts and
which do not answer the ‘’why’’ of things observed.
Today
we are facing an enemy which is very unlike conventional adversaries who can be
identified using intelligence as to their leadership,TOE,order of
battle,strength,dispositions or anything which is determined by set doctrinal
military tactics, techniques and procedures.Todays enemy in low intensity
warfare is asymmetric in nature, taking refuge among the urban or rural
community who act as enablers of the insurgent movement wither wholly or
partially depending on the degree of acceptance of insurgent ideology and
insurgent leaderships always try to influence the local communities to the
maximum as they are well aware of the benefits of sanctuary among the latter.
The enemy recruits, rests and reinforces/resupply itself from amongst the
population. Here intelligence directly focused on the enemy is difficult in
practice; the enemy is elusive, deceptive and resorts to unconventional attack
modes and very adaptable but the enemy’s source of sustenance and very survival
depends a great deal on the local populations support. The company and platoon
sized units need immediate on scene intelligence support to deal with such a
population enabled asymmetric enemy. As such even the smallest fighting unit
must be capable of intense collection and analysis of information to get
actionable intelligence instead of waiting for intelligence from higher
headquarters which may entail time thus letting go of opportunities in combat.
It is always not realistic to depend on higher echelon staff for intelligence.
We must have an inbuilt intelligence capability in the smallest unit on the
ground. The main criteria here is to shorten considerably the time between
deciding on intelligence priorities ,detecting the enemy’s
OB,Strength,disposition,capabilities and T&OE ,delivering the attack
sequence and assessing the Battle damage and re-strike options.
COIN
targeting necessitates overwhelming intelligence from ‘’bottom-up’ for
successful kinetic/non-kinetic operations. Hence ground level units need to be
trained and tasked with intelligence collection. It is near impossible to
dedicate the very few specialized intelligence assets to all the operating
forces in the area of operations. Here are the key challenges of bottom- up
collections:
(1)Determining
what is important information. Leaders need to determine PIRs for each mission.
(2)Determining
where to start – in terms of information or geography. Based upon key terrain
(human and/or geographic).
Conventional
operations and COIN/Antiterrorist operations (This can be termed operation
against networked criminal enterprises) are different in that the intelligence
preparation of the battle space takes into consideration not only threat
elements but also the human terrain—that is the local population. Unlike
kinetic attack priority in conventional operations (kill/capture) in COIN
operations non-kinetic attack modes are often the desired outcome – non-kinetic
attacks taking into account civilian community heads, population psychological
operations, insurgent targets social network, targeting his social contacts to
judge his resultant movements and tracking him to finally locate his cell
members or leadership, exploitation of targets other community traits—in effect
besides personality targeting we are also concerned with the fact (non-kinetic
fires) that units must project the second and third order of effects after they
mount any operation. Operations on a population, with which the targeted
individual interacts, may have second and third order effects on that targeted
individual (e.g. – he may increase communications or flee the area—in the
former case SIGINT intercepts can yield a lot of information about his
immediate network , if his communications are verbal and physical meet ups
surveillance will be the preferred tool whereas in the latter case if he flees
the area he can be tracked to know his sanctuary—he is bound to contact his
team members , move in their hideouts.).All in all kinetic attack fires can yield
much more intelligence than just by acquiring battle order intelligence. Only
resorting to kinetic fires of kill/capture can never solve an insurgency
problem., As the soldiers on the ground are those who are frequently in direct
contact with community members (and hence those of them who are
affiliates/sympathizers/facilitators of the insurgents) they have the best
opportunity to gain intelligence information by conducting tactical questioning
(patrols, checkpoints, choke points) or by casual elicitation methods in normal
scenarios.
Later
it will be shown that setting up a company level intelligence cell and enabling
tactical teams with intelligence assets gives a major thrust in intelligence
collection and also counterintelligence activities.
There
needs to be a change in focus of effort between command levels.
1)Stress
should be given to the fact that tactical company and platoon level units
conduct operations with a high degree of success and hence higher levels of
command must push intelligence staff and information down to lowest points of
collection (initial points) , that is the company/battalion levels.
2)at
the same time low density high demand ISR assets need to be stretched and
spread across the area of operations to gain a better situational understanding.
With
these two initiatives the Command Headquarters will not lose control over its
intelligence assets and will neither lose the privilege of gaining situational
understanding exclusively. On the contrary it will be able to gain more accurate
intelligence inputs. Till so far the intelligence needs of individual ground
units or any feedback from them was generally ignored what with the Battalion
intelligence officer forwarding the intelligence summary report to higher
headquarters with the overall intelligence picture of the area of operations
falling under the Battalions jurisdiction.
REQUIREMENT
FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AT UNIT/PLATOON LEVEL:
It
is near impossible to allocate specialized intelligence assets to every
operating force in the Area of Ops as such assets are few in number and the
fact that majority of the information required for targeting flows ‘’bottom-up’
(that is the lowest level troops) necessitates the creation of intelligence
collection units at troop level either organic to the tactical combat ground
unit or as a modular unit capable of plugging into any company or unit as per
requirements. This fact should be taken seriously into Staff consideration for
targeting, particularly in asymmetric type warfare where the network must be
targeted and where delivery of fire-power is dependent on very specific
intelligence.
Intelligence
Requirements (PIRs) drive the military intelligence collection process.
While
military intelligence officers help in developing intelligence requirements, it
is the commander who is responsible for designating an intelligence requirement
as a priority. The intelligence staff regularly updates the commander on its
progress toward answering each PIR.speaking, that a military intelligence
officer (STAFF INT OFFICER) and his staff are tasked with answering.
Additional
intelligence requirements aimed at filling gaps in commanders’ understanding of
the operating environment and requests for information may come from higher
echelons, lower echelons, and lateral organizations, or from the intelligence
staff itself, but it is the PIRs that an STAFF INT OFFICER has been tasked with
that are most important.
While
emphasis shifts in various doctrinal publications, PIRs are generally supposed
to:
1.Ask
a single question.
2.Be
ranked in importance.
3.Be
specific: Focus on a specific event, fact or activity.
4.Be
tied to a single decision or planning task the commander has to make.
5.Provide
a last time by which information is of value (LTIOV).
6.Be answerable using available assets and capabilities.
Usually,
a commander only designates three to five intelligence requirements as PIRs at
any one time.
The
PIR model makes use of intelligence-led and problem-oriented policing models
that gained traction in combating crime in the United States after 11 September
2001 by refining them for practical use within the military dynamic. The recce
unit along with the embedded HUMINT /CI element conducts area reconnaissance
and community operations involving atmospherics, thus establishing a PIR
framework before resorting to tactical questioning, elicitation and
interrogation by using the PIRs to force conversations, gain community
perspective and prepare engagement summaries for analysis...The engagement
summaries are analyzed, community feedbacks are compiled thus highlighting the
causes that aid insurgency, enabling the unit in turn to recommend the targets
that are the driving causes of the insurgency.
We
can have an integral organic intelligence capability at the Battalion level:
The
Bn Intelligence section will consist of the Bn intelligence officer, a JCO , 2
havildars and 6 infantry soldiers. The Bn Intelligence section will interface
between the companies and the Bde.The companies pass on intelligence
information for processing to the Bn Intelligence section who in turn passes
them on to the Bde and also as per ground requirements from the companies and
Bn staff .The Bn intelligence section will develop sources and contacts from
among the local population and liaise with the civil police and intelligence
agencies. The question of deconfliction arises at this stage as the line
companies and platoons have their sources , contacts and liaisons as well as
the civil agencies. It is the responsibility of the Bn intelligence section to
deconflict its sources with all these sources, contacts and liaisons. The Bn
intelligence section will use its HUMINT and other capabilities to detect
weapons/explosives caches, collect incriminating evidentiary information for
prosecution by the civil agencies and increase the overall situational
understanding of the Bn and Bde commanders and staff. Delineation of sources
between the Bn , the line companies , the platoons and the HUMINT units is very
important by clearly defining the responsibilities of each with respect to the
sources. We can have contacts like community leaders of influence , local
politicians and councilors , surface and witting contacts as well as those
contacts who are very useful , can supply information of rich intelligence
value but need protection which will be the responsibility of the HUMINT units.
The overt contacts like the community leaders etc can be the responsibility of
the Bn intelligence section while the surface contacts and liaison can be given
to the line units and platoons. The same line units and platoons can forward to
HUMINT units any source of HUMINT interest which they come across community
operations , patrolling or tactical operations.
Just
like the Staff composition at Division level we can create similar structure at
the Divn Bn level. There will be an Ops Staff officer and an Intelligence Staff
officer. Compared to the Ops Staff officer the Int Staff officer, by virtue of
his direct contact with the Div Staff Officer is better aware of all Div
intelligence requirements, prioritized or otherwise and which requirements are
tasked to subordinate units. His duties include analyzing collected information
by Bn Int Section and effect the transfer of intelligence laterally and
vertically, laterally to adjacent units , higher headquarters , line companies
and even to the line platoon base camps. The Ops Staff officer will see to the
tasking of Div intelligence requirements to all subordinate units.
To
further push down the intelligence capability to the line companies’ level and
platoon level , we can assign 2 NCOs at each line company and one soldier to
take over as intelligence representative and co-located at the platoon level.
During patrolling , reconnaissance by the Company soldiers , platoon soldiers ,
all collected information will be filtered , categorized and forwarded to the
Bn Intelligence section for analysis and dissemination laterally and to higher
headquarters. The intelligence soldiers at Company and Platoon levels can also
requisition intelligence and imagery information from higher headquarters.
Secondary
Collectors:
HUMINT
collection is not limited only to HUMINT personnel. These can be termed primary
collectors.HUMINT can also be and is collected (sometimes unknowingly and never
reported) by secondary collectors like military police , troops and civil
affairs personnel.
Take
a scenario. A soldier comes across a man who offers information which the
soldier feels could be of use to the HUMINT people. He does not bring the
source in focus by detaining him or questioning him before others. He stays
friendly , eliciting as much as possible after the source finishes his
narration. He does all this discreetly. He manages to record the details of the
source and when he is back from the check post to his camp he discreetly meets
the Bn Int section officer and fills him up with all the information he has gathered.Thereafter
one and only one soldier in the Bn Int section passes on the information to the
HUMINT operative with the contact details of the source.
In
a second scenario the soldier may come across something , say a weapons cache ,
which he recognizes , and this exploitable intelligence he again passes on to
the Bn Int section discreetly. In both cases he won’t tell his colleagues or
anyone. Thus we find line soldiers and other secondary collectors, if they keep
their eyes and ears open, can create a good surface contacts base , thus
reducing the workload on primary HUMINT collectors by gathering exploitable
intelligence , the primary collectors can now focus on more important issues
like prioritized intelligence requirements of the Commander. If all or many of
the line soldiers or other secondary collectors work in this fashion the
surface contacts base grows phenomenally, thus creating a secondary source
base. Thus we achieve synchronization between primary and secondary collectors.
The fact that the soldier does not tell any of his colleagues or even the chain
of command renders the information to be exploited and away from any technical
or influence detractors by limiting the sphere of knowledge. Further it is
possible that any primary source may have links with the individual dealing
with the secondary collector or any other link and this can be of value to the
primary HUMINT collectors. Hence the bottom-line should be personal contact and
liaison with the local community for every patrolling member.
Mission
Responsibilities of commanders (with regard to soldiers who are not
intelligence personnel, but come across information on tactical
questioning—secondary collectors):
Squad/Section/Patrol/TCP/Roadblock/Convoy
Leader:
Patrols,
roadblocks, checkpoints, convoys—all these come into contact with enemy
personnel (captured), civilians, civil suspects/detainees and criminal elements
who can be subjected to tactical questioning. Hence the mission is to train the
involved personnel in tactical questioning and integrate it in the planning and
preparation/execution of the said activities. Pursuant to this prepare for
debriefing after all personnel of patrols etc report to the unit intelligence
officer
Prepare
reports , verbally (debriefing) or written on any observations or information
extracted after tactical questioning including being able to recognize any
information of so much importance(combat intelligence) that it must be reported
immediately without delay.
During
such activities like patrolling, convoy etc all EPW/Detainee and seized
documents must be subjected to exploitation carefully as these are prime
sources of intelligence.
All
the above should be predicated by the Unit intelligence officers tasking of
prioritized intelligence requirements but collection outside these should not
be ignored if such information is delivered by the source concerned. They might
be of tactical value to the Commander or HUMINT officers.
Platoon
Leader:
Squad/section/patrol/
CP/roadblocks, and convoy leaders are tasked by the platoon leader based on
intelligence requirements as laid down by higher headquarters.
Instruct
and see to it that it is followed to the book that all personnel returning from
patrolling, manning checkpoints, convoys etc report everything and get
subjected to full debriefing.
Highlight
before them the high importance of submitting information of immediate tactical
value without ANY delay. Make it very clear this is mandatory. To this effect
he should apprise everyone of the procedures laid down by the battalion
intelligence staff in this regard.
Company/Troop/Battery
Commander:
Squad/section/patrol/
CP/roadblocks, and convoy leaders are tasked by the platoon leader based on
intelligence requirements as laid down by higher headquarters.
All
intelligence inputs by the personnel involved in patrolling and tasked with
collection are reviewed and forwarded to the Bn intelligence staff and Bde
staff. While doing this highlight that information that is linked to the
current operations or the AO environment.
Make
it mandatory for everyone to be debriefed in keeping with the procedures laid
down by higher headquarters intelligence staff.
Ensure
that everyone understands that it is mandatory to report information
IMMEDIATELY of critical value.
Battalion
STAFF INT OFFICER and S3 Sections:
Task
the company, section, squad commanders on intelligence requirements and guide
them through the Staff headquarters.
Push
down intelligence information to these command levels so as to enable them to
get a better situational understanding and know what is expected of them. Thus
they will be able to frame tactical questions better.
See
to it that all patrols etc are debriefed and no one is left out.
Establish
procedures for immediate reporting of information of critical tactical value.
The
fighting forces engaged directly with the enemy, companies and the platoons
therein come into regular contact with the local communities, local
administration, village heads and panchayats, and the enemy itself. The
battalion may have its own intelligence section and if it does the section is very
understaffed with one intelligence officer and an aide. The troops depend
wholly on brigade intelligence inputs and intelligence feeds from other
agencies. These inputs come as a result for requests for information from the
ground and the process of requesting, tasking the request to brigade
intelligence personnel, gathering the intelligence using collection platforms
and pulling intelligence from adjacent headquarters, units and from national
agencies and finally pushing it down to the combat team all takes time
resulting in untimely intelligence feeds. Add to this the total lack of first
hand contact of Brigade level intelligence section with the human and enemy
terrain of the area of operations (human terrain is the local population) which
is enjoyed by the troops on the ground fully. This lack of contact leads to low
level of situational understanding of the higher headquarters and whatever
intelligence they gather is based on standard TTPs and intelligence sharing
with other agencies. Yes certain cases involve infiltration by HUMINT/CI assets
but as this is fraught with dangers and requires highly talented agents adept
in deception and which is lacking in our intelligence headquarters intelligence
acquisition using infiltration is scarce e are now left with the human terrain,
the local populace and higher headquarters intelligence personnel will not
commit to regular interaction with them like the soldiers on the ground do
during patrols or securing an area after an operation or mopping up operations
or during a cordon/search operation. Higher commands are not fully meeting
their intelligence requirements of the companies and platoons in a timely
manner; nor at the level of detail necessary for company commanders to
successfully operate in the asymmetric defined battlespace.The company and
platoon commanders must be able to portray the threat and disposition
accurately nominate targets-both for kinetic and non- kinetic attacks and
conduct successfully battle damage assessments so that the option of restrike
does not get overlooked for example. For this is required a company level
intelligence cell and pushing down further an intelligence enabled platoon. The
infantry company requires and organic capability to collect, process, and
disseminate intelligence to increase their operational effectiveness in full
spectrum conflict. Infantry units require company level intelligence cells
(CLIC) specifically organized, trained, and equipped to address this capability
gap.
Each
company (and in many cases several platoons) are assigned their own Area of Ops
where the company level intelligence team or platoon level intelligence cell
conduct intelligence collection activities and proper synchronization of ISR
and integrating with the targeting process is invariably attained as all round
collection involving the soldiers who are now the sensors leads to a far better
situational understanding.
Primary
tasks: Threat situation and disposition, Target nomination, BDA,Combat/security
operations, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance.
The
troops fighting on the ground are fed intelligence from Brigade level
intelligence HQ.There are certain limitations which must be taken cognizant as
well as the offered solutions ( points 1,6 , highlight the need for company level
intelligence structure)
Your
intelligence system has some limitations you must understand. These include-
1.Dissemination
of information is highly dependent on communications systems and architecture
and these are usually limited and under constraints in different fighting
environments. Often requests for information from ground units are not
disseminated in time. Accurate, timely and specific actionable intelligence is
necessary to drive operations with that distinctive competitive edge and this
is usually lacking.
2.Single-source
collection is susceptible to adversary control and deception.Muliple sources
need to be deployed and multidisciplinary intelligence collection platforms
should be employed.
3.Counterinsurgency
operations may be affected if the enemy resorts to non-usage of
communications/no communications equipment (to avoid getting intercepted or
DF’d) thus affecting adversely COMINT and ELINT based intelligence collection.
Thus our intelligence collection effort gets degraded by the enemy.
4.Weather
degradation of traffic ability and the negative effects of high winds on
antenna arrays and aviation collection and jamming systems.
5.Inability
of ground-based systems to operate on the move. Positioning and integration of
mutually supporting ground and airborne systems is critical to continuous
support.
6.Lack
of sufficient organic intelligence assets to satisfy all your intelligence
requirements.
Current
asymmetric intelligence collection is the primary means to combat insurgency
successfully by gaining a thorough situational understanding and developing
first hand combat intelligence. This tactical environment needs our fighting
troops to be trained in tactical intelligence collection to deal with an
asymmetric enemy.
When
a battalion is deployed, and usually stability and support operations are at
battalion level we usually see that the battalion itself rarely executes its
operation as a single unit. It devolves into sub-divisions which take up
strategic areas in the overall area of operations. Detached posts/stations are
set up in these strategic areas and these posts /sections create and maintain
unit intelligence cells engaged in tactical intelligence collection on the
enemy. Each garrison unit engages in low level source operations using standard
intelligence collection methods, and getting a feel of communication routes,locational
economics, topography and geography, human terrain intelligence and the
political forces operating in the community together with any other criminal
enterprises working hand in hand with the insurgent elements.
INTELLIGENCE
PROJECTION CAPABILITY
After
an area of operations is identified inhabited by an asymmetric enemy in a
complex terrain with weak transportation and logistical infrastructure. We need
to deploy an interim combat team complete with HUMINT/, CI/. SIGINT assets
which will act as an early combat team, mounted infantry organization with the
capability to rapidly assess the environment, physical terrain, community,
cultural and political and conduct an intelligence preparation of the
battlefield by assessing the enemy’s strength, capabilities, disposition, TOE
thus enabling the striking force to project itself before deployment. The
primary intent here is to develop a situational understanding of an unknown
area inhabited by an enemy against the backdrop of distributed, asymmetric,
nonlinear simultaneous operations. Here the problem is to determine the OB of
an enemy that doesn’t have a conventional standing force nor is easily
identifiable. We don’t see any typical military structure, units, rear and
forward areas or logistical networks characteristic of conventional enemy
forces. It is a big question how to deploy ISR assets for collecting
intelligence or conducting reconnaissance or for that matter determining the
center of gravity of the enemy.
Without
sending in the interim combat team to gain a situational understanding it is
totally impracticable to deploy the striking forces. What we need is a interim
combat force with reconnaissance, surveillance and target nomination
capabilities—all these facilitated by an organic MI company with organic
intelligence assets.
The
recce platoon, in addition to reconnaissance and surveillance should also
engage in HUMINT activities for thorough situational understanding. The
situation in asymmetric warfare is different. Here the recce platoon can
conduct HUMINT operations. The reconnaissance platoon should be equipped with
CI capability. This heightens its HUMNINT collection ability.
The
HUMINT teams (4 teams) are in effect Tactical HUMINT Teams each with 3 HUMINT
collectors and one CI agent. Once deployed, the teams report their information
to an operational management team (OMT), which collates intelligence data
gathered by the tactical teams. The information is then passed on to the
brigade INT section for further analysis and integration into the brigade's
collection plan.
Military
Intelligence Brigade
Military
intelligence brigades coordinate, manage, and direct intelligence and
surveillance; they conduct collection management, all-source intelligence
analysis, production; and they disseminate information in support of national,
joint, interagency, multi-national, regional combatant command, and Army
service component requirements.
Each
BRIGADE: ---4-5 SUBORDINATE MI BNS.
Brigade
designated combat team has striker team with HUMINT and CI capability in
addition to R&S assets.
Brigade
headquarters
Ops
Bn,
Aerial
exploitation/reconnaissance Bn
Fwd
collection Bn(CI/HUMINT) ,
Fwd
collection Bn (SIGINT),
Comm.
Bn.
And
electronics Bn,
Figure 1: Bn Level Int Platoon comprising of Company level intelligence units
OPTION
A: Military Intelligence (Ml) Battalion
The
MI Bn provides a focused approach for Bde Int staff as it is a fully contained
organization with specialized companies, the CI Company, the C&E Company
and the I&E company. All these companies provide a better situational
understanding of the Bde Commander by providing support to HUMINT, (Tactical
HUMINT teams), conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield,
interrogation and document/equipment exploitation operations, support to
targeting and battle damage assessment/restrike options, developing threat
disposition estimate. The Companies further have MI enabled platoons which on
account of being near the ground can collect and provide timely threat
intelligence data. Each platoon may be specialized in its own way; one can be a
tactical HUMINT platoon , HUMINT platoon, one an ISR analysis platoon all being
controlled by the Company headquarters element which also interfaces with the
Company
commander
and staff and laterally with the other specialty MI companies under the MI
Bn.Fusing of intelligence data from the platoons and lateral companies with
those that are pushed down from higher HQ on requisition gives a far better
threat assessment. Ultimately combat intelligence, target information and
otrher satisfied priority intelligence requirements are at the hands of the
Commander for necessary action.
The
MI company in support provides-
Communications
intercept, direction finding (DF), and ECM.
CI.
Interrogation.
Ground
surveillance.
Personnel
to staff the Intelligence Section, These soldiers conduct-
-Collection
Management.
-All-source
analysis and reporting.
-Dissemination.
-Technical
control and tasking.
-Multidiscipline
force protection and OPSEC support.
1.CI
2.interrogation
of prisoners
3.ground-based
SIGINT and EW support
4.and
LRS support to corps operations
COMPANY
LEVEL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNIT:
Organization
The
MI cell (C& E), shown at Figure 2, is organized into a headquarters
section, an MI unit (CI), an MI unit (interrogation and exploitation), and an
MI unit (collection and exploitation). Headquarters section provides C2, administrative
services, and logistic support for units of the company.
Roles
and Functions
The
Collection and Exploitation section provides interrogation and CI support.
Functions , include:
Setting
up interrogation centers and executing interrogation operations of enemy
prisoners of war.
Determine
enemy multidisciplinary intelligence threat, analyze it and recommend
countermeasures, both on the passive defensive side as well as offensive
methods.
Conduct
exploitation of turned enemy agents. Conduct polygraph techniques and technical
operations.
Conduct
DOCEX
Conduct
debriefing of high level military/political figures,refugees,patrols,military
personnel who are released by enemy from capture or who have escaped from
captivity,detained civilians and other people who have information of interest.
Conduct
Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO).
MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE UNIT (CI)
Mission
"The
mission of the MI Unit (CI) is to conduct CI operations and multidiscipline
counterintelligence (MDCI) threat analysis in support of the Commanders
intelligence requirements’’.
Organization
The
MI Unit (CI) will be composed of a section HQ, an Ops section, and CI platoon.
Roles
and Functions
Provides
C-HUMINT support
Conducts
Vulnerability assessment
Supports
OPSEC
Supports
targeting , nominates HVT
Conducts
CI investigations
Conducts
Counterintelligence FP Source Operations
Conducts
counterespionage,countersubversion and counter sabotage operations.
Liaises
with other intelligence agencies
Conducts
offensive operations during wartime Areas of interest:
Known
or suspected acts of treason,sedition,espionage by Army personnel
Known
or suspected association with elements of threat intelligence
Terrorism,
assassination incidents
Defections
and unexplained absence of Army personnel
People
impersonating as military intelligence personnel.
MI
UNIT (INTERROGATION AND EXPLOITATION I&E) Mission
"The
mission of the MI Unit (Interrogation and Exploitation) is to conduct
interrogation of enemy prisoners of war EPW,debriefing of persons having
information of intelligence value and exploitation of captured documents,media
and hardware.”
Organization
The
MI Unit (Interrogation and Exploitation) consists of a HQ section,an Ops
section,communications section and I&E platoon.
Roles
and Functions
Setting up interrogation facilities during
wartime
Interrogation
of EPWs.Establishment of a joint or combined interrogation facility and conduct
interrogations of EPWs. Conduct debriefings of high level political and
military personnel, civilian internees,refugees, displaced persons, and other
non- US personnel.
Conduct
debriefing of high level military/political figures,refugees,patrols,military
personnel who are released by enemy from capture or who have escaped from
captivity,detained civilians and other people who have information of interest.
Conducts
DOCEX,and translation of captured documents.Translate and exploit documents
acquired, found, or captured in the theater AO.
Debrief
US and Allied personnel having escaped after being captured or having evaded
capture.
MI
UNIT (COLLECTION AND EXPLOITATION C&E)
The
above two units, viz MI (CI) and MI(I&E) are combined into one UNIT ,
collection and exploitation MI(C&E) and hence executes all the functions
which are inherent in the 2 units. This is a modular unit, can hence plug as a
detachment support into any Battalion/Company which requires CI/HUMINT support
but does not require a full intelligence battalion /Company expertise. It can
also be situation may not allow the deployment of full intelligence assets –in
such a case the MI(C&E) can be scaled and tailored to suit the requirements
of the Battalion. This unit can pull operatives from both the MI (CI) and MI
(I&E) to create CI and I&E platoons to conduct tactical HUMINT
(CI/HUMINT) missions with the available CI, collection, and exploitation and
interrogation expertise.
Mission
"The
collection and exploitation unit collects intelligence information through the
acquisition, training, briefing and debriefing of HUMINT assets in support of
Army requirements and provides CI support within the area of operations,
conducts interrogations of prisoners of war and other personnel of intelligence
interest; translates and exploits selected foreign documents/ media; and
exploits foreign materiel of intelligence interest."
Organization
The
MI Unit (Collection and Exploitation) consists of a section headquarters, CI
operations section, interrogation operations section, and counterintelligence
and I & E platoons.
Roles
and Functions
Provides
C-HUMINT support
Conducts
Vulnerability assessment
Supports
OPSEC
Supports
targeting , nominates HVT
Conducts
CI investigations
Conducts
Counterintelligence FP Source Operations
Conducts
counterespionage,countersubversion and counter sabotage operations.
Liaises
with other intelligence agencies
Conducts
offensive operations during wartime
Areas
of interest:
Known
or suspected acts of treason,sedition,espionage by Army personnel
Known
or suspected association with elements of threat intelligence
Terrorism,
assassination incidents
Defections
and unexplained absence of Army personnel
People
impersonating as military intelligence personnel.
Setting
up interrogation facilities during wartime
Interrogation
of EPWs.Establishment of a joint or combined interrogation facility and conduct
interrogations of EPWs. Conduct debriefings of high level political and
military personnel, civilian internees,refugees, displaced persons, and other
non- US personnel.
Conduct
debriefing of high level military/political figures,refugees,patrols,military
personnel who are released by enemy from capture or who have escaped from
captivity,detained civilians and other people who have information of interest.
Conducts
DOCEX,and translation of captured documents.Translate and exploit documents
acquired, found, or captured in the theater AO.
Debrief
US and Allied personnel having escaped after being captured or having evaded
capture.
Areas
of interest:
Known
or suspected acts of treason,sedition,espionage by Army personnel
Known
or suspected association with elements of threat intelligence
Terrorism,assassination
incidents
Defections
and unexplained absence of Army personnel
People impersonating as military intelligence personnel.
OPTION B
Under
the command and supervision of the Inf Bn STAFF INT OFFICER Int officer
intelligence platoons can be created. From among the Bn soldiers according to
capability, availability and performance should be selected.
There
will be two echelons in each platoon.
SECTION
A supports Bn HQ.The Bn Int HQ Section will be composed of one Int officer,one
intelligence specialist of the rank of JCO, and 3 enlisted soldiers. The Int
officer can serve both as staff officer for the Bn Command and also as
Commander of the operating forces in the Company. He is responsible for
analyzing intelligence and planning deployment and tactical employment of ISR
assets. The intelligence specialist can be a ground recon specialist whose
duties involve observe and report on enemy activity and other information of
military importance in close operations.
(Close
operations are operations that are within the commander's area of operation
(AO) in his battle space . Most operations that are projected in close areas
are usually against hostile forces in immediate contact and are often the
decisive actions. It requires speed and mobility to rapidly concentrate
overwhelming combat power at the critical time and place and exploit success.
Dominated by fire support, the combined elements of the ground and air elements
conduct maneuver warfare to enhance the effects of their fires and their
ability to maneuver. As they maneuver to gain positions of advantage over the
enemy, combined arms forces deliver fires to disrupt the enemy’s ability to
interfere with that maneuver.)
SECTION
B is the CLIC.Colocated with the Company. (One intelligence analyst and five
enlisted infantrymen.)
Each
company of the Bn should select and train at least 6 personnel.
The
formation of this platoon will facilitate initial and sustainment training by
ensuring consistency throughout the battalion and eliminating additional
training requirements for the companies. It will also ensure standardization in
processes and reporting formats, and further promote lateral communication
among the CLICs. Armed with the BLIP the Commander now has his own organic
intelligence unit which will provide him additional support apart from the
intelligence feeds as a result of his request for information from higher
ups.Moreover and more important the BLIPs of all the companies in the Bn conduct
lateral communication , exchanging combat intelligence and other information,
thus keeping abreast of latest developments and enemy tactics which the other
company is confronting and the tactics, techniques and procedures employed by
the company with an element of success. With the passage of time the initial
training given to say the enlisted soldiers or the intelligence specialist
helps in sustainment training ,the training a byproduct of the operations the
soldier is involved with without resorting to tutored training. Soon the BLIP
transforms itself into a robust intelligence unit of the Bn
Company
Level Intelligence Cells
Coming
to the CLIC level we have an organic capability to acquire combat intelligence
directly at the ground level. Actionable intelligence is needed desperately by
our fighting forces but the time delay from sensor to shooter(sensors on
receipt of request for information collect the data matching given coordinates,
pass it on to the intelligence section for interpretation who in turn sends it
to his higher up for evaluation and dissemination to the ground unit; in case
of map/imagery obtained by aerial surveillance the time delay is much more) is
often so much that despite accurate target nomination the operation slips out
of hand. With the CLIC at his disposal the commander now can obtain, analyse
and act on readily available combat intelligence without having to wait for
intelligence feeds.C2, intelligence and operations are hereby synchronized and
integration achieved successfully. That too at the lowest level. The CLIC is
supervised by the company commander. The two sections of CLIC , collection and
analysis and production are looked after by the officer in charge , usually a
JCO and there will be two soldiers , one from each section to function as
intelligence watch and are assigned to the company combat ops center.
Functions/responsibilities:
CLIC
O-I-C: Reports to Company Comander,assists the watch officer in operations
situation development (common tactical ops picture),managing and supervising
CLIC ops,interacting with adjacent units , lower units and higher echelons and
utilizing the intelligence flow.
If
required, the CLICs now have the capacity to surge intelligence trained
soldiers to support operations such as cordon and searches and raids.
After
an area of operations is identified inhabited by an asymmetric enemy in a
complex terrain with weak transportation and logistical infrastructure. We need
to deploy an interim combat team complete with HUMINT/, CI/. SIGINT assets which
will act as an early combat team, mounted infantry organization with the
capability to rapidly assess the environment, physical terrain, community,
cultural and political and conduct an intelligence preparation of the
battlefield by assessing the enemy’s strength, capabilities, disposition, TOE
thus enabling the striking force to project itself before deployment. The
primary intent here is to develop a situational understanding of an unknown
area inhabited by an enemy against the backdrop of distributed, asymmetric,
nonlinear simultaneous operations. Here the problem is to determine the OB of
an enemy that doesn’t have a conventional standing force nor is easily
identifiable. We don’t see any typical military structure, units, rear and
forward areas or logistical networks characteristic of conventional enemy
forces. It is a big question how to deploy ISR assets for collecting
intelligence or conducting reconnaissance or for that matter determining the
center of gravity of the enemy.
LRS
units provide reliable HUMINT against second echelon and follow-on forces and
deep targets. LRS units conduct stationary surveillance and very limited
reconnaissance. They deploy deep into the enemy area to observe and report
enemy dispositions, movement and activities, and battlefield conditions. They
arc not equipped or trained to conduct direct-action missions..
PROJECTING
COMBAT POWER WITH ORGANIC ISR CAPABILITY
Reason
for creation of interim team:
Without
sending in the interim combat team to gain a situational understanding it is
totally impracticable to deploy the striking forces. What we need is a interim
combat force with reconnaissance, surveillance and target nomination
capabilities—all these facilitated by an organic MI company with organic
intelligence assets.
The
recce platoon, in addition to reconnaissance and surveillance should also
engage in HUMINT activities for thorough situational understanding. The
situation in asymmetric warfare is different. Here the recce platoon can
conduct HUMINT operations. The reconnaissance platoon should be equipped with
CI capability. This heightens its HUMNINT collection ability.
The
HUMINT teams (4 teams) are in effect Tactical HUMINT Teams each with 3 HUMINT
collectors and one CI agent. Once deployed, the teams report their information
to an operational management team (OMT), which collates intelligence data
gathered by the tactical teams. The information is then passed on to the
brigade INT section for further analysis and integration into the brigade's
collection plan.
C2:
The reconnaissance platoon HQ and the HUMINT platoon HQ both should contain one CI NCO.The reconnaissance squads each should have one CI soldier. Thus at the lowest tactical level organic CI capability with the deployment of maximum possible CI soldiers is hereby achieved thus increasing significantly the reconnaissance troops HUMINT collection capability. We can optimally have in the recce patrol 3 six-man squads, each having a CI soldier.
HUMINT OR MI BN IDEA
INTERIM COMBAT TEAM WITH ORGANIC
INT AND R&S CAPABILITY – TO PROJECT FORWARD OF AO
Operations
Battalion
Collection
Management Section
Production
Section ASPD & OB Teams
BDA
& TGT Team
CI
Team
Single
Source Teams.
MASINT
Team
SIGINT
Team
HUMINT
Team
IMINT
Team
Corps
Military Intelligence Support Element
Intelligence
Support Elements
HUMINT
Collection Operations
Combating
terrorism support
Rear
operations support
Civil-military
operations support OPSEC support
Information
operations support
Civil
disturbance support
Local
operational data collection
Debriefing
and interrogation
HUMINT
threat assessment
Reconnaissance
HUMINT Missions
Elicit
information from the local populace.
Interrogate
EPWs and Detainees.
Debrief
Allies and U.S. personnel.
Document
exploitation.
Threat
vulnerability assessments.
Source
screening operations.
Spotting/assessing
for Tactical HUMINT Teams.
The
early entry force, the interim combat team along with HUMINT/CI capability
executes both an operational mission and intelligence endeavour.It shapes the
battle space before the strike force moves in, makes conditions disadvantageous
for the enemy in the initial stage , facilitates the arrival of the strike
forces. It also conducts a preliminary intelligence preparation of the
battlefield, makes a human terrain study and interacts with local populace
using tactical questioning and elicitation to identify threats. In other words
it helps in projecting the force into the new area of operations. In the case
of asymmetric warfare projecting the force should be the case, not just deterrence.
The latter part is force protection—is indeed very important, but if we have to
uproot the enemy we need to be proactive, offensive and resort to projecting
right into the heart of the enemy’s base.
THE INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
Intelligence
estimate. The intelligence estimate is derived from the intelligence
preparation of the battlefield (lPB). It is based on all available intelligence
and considers everything of operational significance. It will help point out
gaps in the intelligence database. It is from these gaps that requirements are
derived. It will provide information on the mission, AO, weather, terrain,
enemy situation, enemy capabilities, and conclusions. It will cover all of the
standard OB topics.
In
the Army at the Division or higher HQ level the intelligence estimate is
prepared by the Intelligence Officer and his staff...it is instrumental in
devising the COAs by the Commander. The estimate sums up the intelligence
factors affecting the mission. It identifies the enemy’s probable COAs and the
order of their adoption. It takes into account the Terrain and weather
characteristics which might affect both the gauged intentions of the enemy and
our mission and details the area of operations, the enemy situation and the capabilities
of the enemy. The estimate is continually updated so as to keep the Commander
abreast of any latest developments or changes in the intent of the enemy. This
intelligence estimate is briefed at the Brigade/Battalion level. The
intelligence estimate is predicated by the Intent of the enemy. Or Intents. The
Staff Running Estimates helps each staff officer recognize and interpret the
indicators of enemy intentions, objectives, combat effectiveness and potential
enemy COAs which may counter the commanders end state. Thus the aim of the
commander is to study the intents and devise appropriate course/s of actions
taking into account several factors including order of battle, intelligence
preparation of the battlefield, behavioral indicators, table of organization
and equipment, enemy capabilities and so
on.(Order of Battle refers to the compilation of a systematic and methodical
analysis of assets, capabilities, composition, and disposition of an
adversarial organization, whereas TO&E refers to the organization table of
units and associated equipment.)
To
prepare this very important document the intelligence officer and his staff
draw on the intelligence reports prepared earlier by the intelligence units
detailing the terrain, weather characteristics and enemy strengths
,capabilities and limitations and the intelligence officer's conclusions about
the total effects of the area of operations (AO) on friendly courses of action,
the courses of action most likely to be adopted by the enemy, and the effects of
exploitable enemy vulnerabilities. In other words we’re conducting a
CAPABILITIES BRIEF of the ENEMY Our
MISSION is to develop an understanding of the ENEMY through the collection and
analysis of available information, and then create an Intelligence product for
dissemination.
These
intelligence feeds by the units upwards which aid finally in the preparation of
the intelligence estimate, is the result of tasking handed down to the
collectors/HUMINT personnel by the Collection Manager. It is here where the intelligence
efforts of the HUMINT/collector agents come into play which is governed by the
intelligence cycle.
DERIVATION FROM ABOVE ..
1.MODULAR
FORCE DESIGN : The resources and capabilities at the hands of the Commander
with respect to intelligence assets are limited , sometimes scarce .From the
above we can introduce the concept of ‘’Modularity’’ in force design. That is
to say we can create a deployable, scalable, modular intelligence capability to
plug into the requirements interface of any adjacent unit/company/headquarters
who lack the necessary intelligence capability or whose resources are very
limited. This modular plug-in can be tailored to suit the needs of the
Commander of that unit. For example if HUMINT assets are more in demand than
the CI or DOCEX elements , the former can be augmented to the plug-in by
pulling from the parent units MI Company’s sub-components , with the Company’s
capabilities not being reduced in any way. The MI (C&E) is a good example
of a plug-in.
2.
Tactical HUMINT team formed at company level from CI and I&E platoons of
the C&E Company.( Please refer to the Appendix for further details on
Tactical HUMINT.)
Production
Section
The
all source production and dissemination team (ASPD) in concert with the Order
of Battle (OB) Team, determines if intelligence requirements and RFIs can be
satisfied with its existing information and data base holdings. Information not
available defines the collection requirements. The collection manager then
tasks collection assets within theater or requests support from national level
assets. These two teams determine what enemy information is available to help
identify specific indicators of enemy intent and provide a current, integrated
picture of the battle space. During the analysis and production portion of the
intelligence cycle, the ASPD and OB teams coordinate with and receive
information from the other production section teams. This constant exchange of
information ensures single discipline reporting is fused into all- source
products.
BDA
& TGT Team
BDA
and targeting team (TGT) performs target development selection and assessment.
Based on collected all source intelligence, the team identifies target
vulnerabilities, provides targeting data and nominates targets in accordance
with the commander's HPT lists and the attack guidance matrix (AGM). The BDA/
TGT will also assess battle damage based on physical damage sustained by the
target and their remaining combat effectiveness
CI
Team
The
Counterintelligence Team performs CI analysis. The team assesses the
adversary's intelligence collection capabilities and operations directed
against friendly forces, missions, and installations. The adversary uses many
methods to collect information against friendly forces, including HUMINT,
SIGINT, and IMINT. As a result, the CI analytical capability includes a diverse
mix of specialists who fuse information to identify and isolate collection
operations. The CI team and other elements of the production section exchange
critical information required to analyze the enemy. Intelligence gaps and lack
of holdings are provided to the CM section for action as appropriate. Specific
functions of the CI team include:
o
Develops and maintains CI data bases. o Monitors CI collection efforts.
o
Produces IPB products to support CI operations.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
--not the same as intelligence
estimate--
We
have to conduct a counter intelligence study of the area of operations, so as
to ascertain details about the enemy ,the existing situation , the military
geography, weather, characteristics of the local population from the
perspective of the enemy- that is to say who are the sympathizers,
corroborators of the enemy, where and
how the enemy intelligence operates, how it conducts sabotage - terrorist-
subversive and counter intelligence and counter reconnaissance activities. We
must estimate the effects of Enemy counter intelligence and intelligence
activities on our mission, operations ,capabilities and all steps that are
undertaken to attain mission success. Details about the enemy must include[
in counterintelligence context] location
and disposition, composition, strength which should include local abettors and
sympathizers, replacements and to what extent they are available, how much
efficient are the enemy organizations that conduct intelligence, sabotage,
subversive and terrorist activities. We must take into account all what the
enemy counter intelligence services know about our intelligence and counter
intelligence efforts. Historical, recent and present intelligence, sabotage,
terrorist and subversive activities of the enemy should be maintained in
database form which can be queried whenever required especially during mission
formulation and counterintelligence planning. Those activities which are highly
significant must be highlighted and all movements of the enemy during the
conduct of such operations must also be recorded. We must know in detail the
peculiarities and weaknesses of the enemy counter intelligence service and we
must be fully aware of the operational tactical and Technical capabilities of
the enemy as well as the type of equipment used by the enemy. All other factors
must be recorded in fact sheets which must be attached to the estimate or
recorded as annex.