Force Protection Source Operations (FSO).
Force Protection Source Operations are different from the collection operations by HUMINT agents to answer commanders primary and other intelligence requirements through tactical questioning. The objective of FPSO is not a sudden intelligence requirement or intelligence gap but is something which should be a continuous consistent Endeavour , totally defensive in nature and conducted by developing and employing human-source-networks throughout the area of operations and also beyond.Developing,exploiting and maintaining these human-source-networks is a very time sensitive process and therefore are best executed in static situations or sustainment areas.Note further in the pre-deployment phase,before the boots hit the ground,HUMINT-CI teams should be dispatched with sufficient time in hand to make a preliminary but near-thorough assessment of force protection conditions satisfying FPSO objectives and also acquire all intelligence information about the area of operations from the departing force intelligence element.
Liaison.
CI personnel coordinate with adjacent units and staffs, key Army agencies such as the Military Police and Civil Affairs and maintain liaison contact with local national counterparts to obtain operational, threat and source lead information.
SCREENING OF SOURCES TO DETERMINE USABILITY
The TACHUMINT team will place the sources under the scanner to determine their usefulness. The HUMINT collector will basically place the source within one of four categories.
Persons who have information of immediate intelligence interest.They are interrogated or debriefed as the case may be on the spot.The mobile interrogation teams come in handy at this juncture.
Persons who may be of interest to other intelligence disciplines.For example the source may have information of TECHINT value.In that case the HUMINT collector can take the services of a technical savvy operative to interrogate or debrief the source.Again HUMINT collectors are presented with the ‘’profile of interest’’ by CI agents.If the source matches these requirements the HUMINT collector first extracts all what he can relevant to his domain and then transfers the source to the CI team for questioning.All this is coordinated by the OMT.
Persons who may provide good intelligence in the future by virtue of their placement and access to the enemy intelligence services or organization.The HUMINT collector after careful assessment comes to the conclusion that this individual has the potential to be a good source.As such his name is entered in the database in the folder of potential sources.
Persons who can provide no information of any intelligence value
CI PROFILES OF INTEREST WHILE SCREENING
The HUMINT elements in the TACHUMINT team liaise with the CI elements so as to know their requirements before conducting screening.This profile of interest is of two types.Persons of the enemy’s intelligence service conducting collection operations fall in the first category.Persons who can provide details (identifications,locations or activities)about the persons in the first category constitute the second profile of interest.Generally CI operatives are interested in persons who :
∙Have no identification documents.
∙Have excessive or modified identification documents.
∙Possess unexplainable large amounts of cash or valuables.
∙Are illegal border-crossers.
∙Attempt to avoid checkpoints.
∙Are on the CI personalities list, which includes members of an intelligence service.
∙Request to see CI personnel.
∙Have family in the denied area.
∙Speak a different language or dialect than is spoken in the area.
Examples of the two specific interest profiles are but not limited to:
∙Identified or suspected elements of the enemy’s intelligence services and their supporters.We must also include elements of criminal gangs ,terrorists or drug dealers who have liaison with these enemy intelligence personnel or supporters.
∙Identified or suspected espionage agents,saboteurs,subversives
∙Hostile political figures
∙Identified or suspected enemy collaborators/sympathizers from within the local community
∙Members of the underground ant insurgent groups or other groups who are willing to provide information.
∙Deserters from enemy organization
∙Persons who possess knowledge about enemy intentions,strength,capabilities
∙Persons who in the recent past had good influence in political or village panchayat circles in the area of operations
∙Displaced persons/refugees who hold information about the enemy