NEWS CLIPPINGS:
Kashmir attacks: Indian troops killed
INCIDENT 1 : Security forces in Indian-administered Kashmir say they have shot dead three men who stormed a police station and an army camp, killing at least 10 people. The gunmen were wearing Indian army uniforms when the attacked the station in Kathua district and the base in Samba district, said police.
Kashmir has seen an armed insurgency against Indian rule since 1989.
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described the attack as barbaric, but said it would not derail peace efforts.
He is due to meet his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly this week.
Peace talks between the two countries have been stalled for the past two years, and dialogue is expected to ease recent tensions along the Line of Control that divides Kashmir between the two countries.
India has a large security presence in Kashmir with tens of thousands of police and paramilitary forces deployed in the region.
On Thursday morning the attackers, dressed in army uniforms, arrived at a police station in Hiranagar in Kathua and opened fire.
Four policemen and two civilians were killed in the attack, police said.
The militants then hijacked a truck and fled, senior Kashmir police official Rajesh Kumar told Reuters news agency.
"They abandoned the truck on the national highway and perhaps took another vehicle and carried out an attack on the army camp in Samba," he said.
“Militants early this morning attacked the Mesar camp of 82 armored regiment in Samba district. They are using grenades and automatic gunfire to carry out the attack. Most likely, two militants are involved in the attack,” a senior police officer told IANS.
The Army camp houses 82 armored regiment which comes under the command of Army's 9th Corps that is headquartered in Yule Camp (Dharmshala) in Himachal Pradesh.
The same camp was also attacked on September 26, 2013 by militants after they had attacked the Hiranagar police station in Kathua district. Twelve people had been killed in that attack.
Today's militant attack came on the morning of the start of the nine-day Navratri festival, and on a day when Muslims are celebrating Nowruz, or the Persian New Year, in the state.
Just yesterday, six people including two militants were killed in a similar attack on the Rajbagh police station in Kathua district. Intelligence reports had indicated that four militants were involved in Friday's attack, but only two had been killed.
Intelligence sources said that they believe the Saturday's attack is being carried out by the two guerrillas who survived in yesterday's attack after escaping from the spot.
REPITITION? The Mesar camp was also attacked on September 26, 2013 by militants after they had attacked the Hiranagar police station in Kathua district. Twelve people had been killed in that attack. On Friday, six people including two militants were killed in a similar attack on the Rajbagh police station in Kathua district.
INCIDENT 2 : Jammu: A civilian and three security personnel were killed on Friday when two heavily-armed militants stormed a police station in Jammu and Kashmir before being gunned down, police said.
The attackers were killed over seven hours after they barged into the Rajbagh police station complex in Kathua district after gunning down the lone guard at the main gate, police officials said.
Armed with automatic weapons and grenades, the militants, dressed in military fatigue, carried out the sudden attack at around 6 a.m.
Once the attackers sneaked into the complex, about 65 km from Jammu on the highway to Pathankot and just 15 km from the Pakistan border, they opened fire at a building occupied by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), killing two of its men.
A civilian was also killed but it was not clear in what circumstances. Ten others, almost all of them security personnel, suffered varying injuries in the audacious attack.
Inspector General of Police Danish Rana announced the death of the two militants. The others dead were a policeman, two CRPF personnel and a civilian.
The injured included seven CRPF men, a deputy superintendent of police, a police constable and a civilian, Rana added.
INCIDENT 3 : 300 rebels initially attacked a convoy of the paramilitary Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in the Talmetla area as they were returning from an operation. India's home minister P Chidambaram said that it appeared that the forces had "walked" into a rebel ambush by returning to the police base via the same route they had come. "Something has gone very wrong. They seem to have walked into a trap set by the [Maoists] and casualties are quite high," he said. Police sources reported that the Maoists triggered two land mines targeting the mine protected vehicles carrying the jawans. The attack took place when the CRPF unit belonging to the 62 Battalion entered the forest for an operation between 6 and 7 am and were ambushed by the Maoists.
The Threat.
The threat, the adversary must be known as much as possible for successful CI operations. A thorough analysis of threat and its capabilities is very necessary. The adversary conducts multidimensional intelligence activities and its doctrine dictates that to be successful it should be aggressive, conducting its reconnaissance operations actively and continuously under every set of conditions and that continuity, timeliness and accuracy is essential
Adversary may use HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES operated through a variety of collection platforms and to counter this tactical or strategic threat, as the case may be, we must have a comprehensive CI program in place. The adversary uses multisensor collection means to offset our attempts of countermeasure and deception.
The foreign intelligence service conducts intelligence collection about our forces and hostile attack. Herein comes the very important concept of force protection. They target defense personnel , resources , activities and critical information.CI support to force protection involves actions to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against these entities.It should be noted that the military police functions are not adequate to cover the security of these entities –CI support is a must.In a deployable situation the enemy targets the vulnerable rear positions and the support elements.Hence security is beefed up where troops are housed , dependants and other personnel are made aware of the threat—this is where the CI elements are active..
The military police and allied elements take stock of the situation in the army area but are less aware of the ground situation ‘’outside the fence’’.Hence recourse is made to establish contact with civil intelligence agencies and local police for updates on any threat intelligence in the proximity of the base. Moreover the military police have no jurisdiction outside the base. Strengthening the physical defenses is one way to prevent the application of hostile intent but what is more important is enemy pre-operational surveillance activities. But the difficulty is that these activities are innocuous.
Let’s take an example to illustrate the point. A vehicle approaches the gate of a military camp. On being questioned by the guard on duty the driver says he had no intention to turn up there—he had made a wrong turn. Now this is an acceptable excuse and further interrogation may not help. The driver is instructed to leave the area.Fine.It is equally possible he is saying the truth. But consider the situation where the the threat index in the area is high and hence from the force protection perspective the driver who can equally well be a insurgent has just conducted successfully a preoperational surveillance. There are options. The license details of the driver can be jotted down. The car details and license plate number can be taken. Offhand queries can be made. A listing can be made of all ‘’lost motorists’’. The information can be shared with the local police. If it is found out the same driver has turned up at other installations with the same story , well we have a case of pre-operational surveillance and with the jotted information in hand steps can be taken. But still the case is rare as there are several instances of genuine lost motorists.
Whatever any installation together with its constituent personnel , their dependants , operations and information is susceptible to hostile attack and intelligence collection.CI elements must shield the installation from such intent by guarding the rear and vulnerable areas.CI should lend support to mobilization security , major records repositories , anti and counterinsurgency operations , rear operations , psychological operations , battlefield deception , operations security and CSIGINT.
We can categorize the threats based on intent. This can be incorporated in the force protection doctrine. Hence we can allocate HUMINT resources in an appropriate manner without any duplication or wastage. Type 1 can be criminal activity geared towards army bases ,Type 2 can be penetrative reconnaissance and sabotage operations , and Type 3 can be major land , amphibious , air and missile attacks. Thus commanders can tailor defensive actions compatible with the type of attack. Mission of CI can be clearly defined , objectives stated and qualitative/quantitative protocols in collection efforts underscored. Keeping each type of attack in perspective and with the notion of CI as ‘’looking inwards’’ in mind we can identify the critical areas of installations, and implement security measures. At the same time we can launch aggressive CI operations to frustrate enemy intelligence collection efforts.
It is true that a multidisciplinary intelligence approach is effective to thwart enemy collection efforts but CI and force security measures play key roles. To neutralize/destroy enemy intent we need CI to the fullest capacity. Other intelligence disciplines can be cued but CI is top priority. To identify our vulnerabilities we must resort to counterintelligence. Intelligence is looking outward but CI is looking inward. Intelligence collection is not concerned with the end result but counterintelligence is concerned with the ‘’intent’’ of collection.CI should always be on an aggressive footing. We need a comprehensive CI doctrine detailing all of these and more.
We should bear in mind that this era is not exclusively the era of conventional combat. Asymmetric warfare is the order of the day. Insurgents take years to plan an operation. They conduct extensive pre-operation surveillance , they have their own counterintelligence networks and this long period justifies the employment of intelligence and CI .
The CI department should tackle the type 1 , 2 and 3 threats.CI cells should come into existence and should be staffed with HUMINT , SIGINT and IMINT elements. Priority should be on analysis of threat intelligence.MI should be particularly in charge of analysis of Type 3 threats.Elements from Special task forces , explosive ordnance disposal, medical , operations and communications should also staff the CI cells. The CI elements should fortify their collection and investigation capabilities. They should maintain a threat database which will include the structure and capabilities of foreign intelligence services , details of insurgent organizations and timeline of attacks perpetrated by them and also criminal enterprises because it is well established that insurgents and criminals share information and resources. This database should be continually updated. The intelligence information contained in this database should be readily available on request. Included in this database should be latest physical security measures , details of explosive ordnance effects—all contributed by specialists. All source intelligence should be further fused in with the intelligence contained in the database.
The CI analytical cell should not only produce daily threat summaries but also act as and I&W system. It should receive worldwide inputs of insurgent developments as well as national cases. It should interface with civil intelligence agencies through liaison methodology thus updating threat information. The unit CI cells should be extrapolated to the creation of similar cells at all major commands which will focus on the respective area of responsibilities. These cells would produce threat and vulnerability assessments.
In addition to these functions these CI cells should be ready to be deployed to support major exercise and contingency deployments.
These CI cells will facilitate the formulation of the commander’s information requirements as the dissemination of intelligence products to the latter will heighten his perception of the situation , also these cells can communicate two ways with the collectors on the ground from parallel intelligence units thus achieving coordination between different intelligence disciplines. Investigative leads and operational opportunities result from all these efforts.
The Army Head Office (AHO) exercises technical control, review, coordination and oversight of CI
Controlled activities. a. Will execute a system of review of CI activities , ensure compliance and proper accounting. Will have direct control over an investigation, task the CI elements , provide guidance to operational and investigative CI activities and if necessary refer the CI activity to a sub-office. But the Head office assumes full and direct control. Monitor the management of case files and other records storage and retrieval system , processing of these and transfer to the repository , maintaining the quality assurance of of investigative reports, monitor source ops and CE projects, ensure liaison activities with other agencies are properly conducted with optimum exchange of information and dissemination of information falling under their purview in a timely manner and approve or disapprove CI case summaries.
In summary the AHO
∙Provides technical support to all CI assets and coordinates and deconflicts CI activities in the deployed AO
∙Coordinates and supervises CI investigations and collection activities conducted by all services and components in the AOIR.
∙Establishes and maintains the theater CI source database.
∙Coordinates with the HOC (see HUMINT section) for CI support to detention, interrogation, refugee, and other facilities.
∙Manages requirements and taskings for CI collectors in the AO in coordination with the HOC.
∙Expedites preparation of .CI reports and their distribution to consumers at all levels.
∙Coordinates CI activities with senior CI officers from all CI organizations on the battlefield.
∙Performs liaison with national level CI organizations.
The Sub offices will coordinate technical direction and tasking from the head office , monitor all CI activities within its area of operation and provide feedback to the head office , conduct CI investigations tasked to it by the head office , and also those that it assumes worth taking up , excepting those investigations directly controlled by the head office , ensure proper dissemination to end users as well as the head office and ensure the accuracy , compliance with CI policy of all CI reporting. Briefing commanders and intelligence officials.Liasing with external agencies and disseminating information to them that falls under their purview.
We need to have a force protection intelligence doctrine,strengthen it,define the role of MI in force protection efforts and priotize collection and analysis of intelligence on force protection threats.We need a robust HUMINT capability supported by CI—the optimum integration of both is the need of the hour.We have the LU , CI and IFSU but still we lack a viable HUMINT mission.Whatever HUMINT we have is afforded by these units directly or indirectly and we must use this to the fullest potential to counter force protection threats.To improve the HUMINT capabilities MI should assign additional resources.Duplication resulting from the efforts of the MI constituents need to be removed and the respective roles clarified.Duplication creates confusion and wastage of resources.We must have a comprehensive CI doctrine.The CI units should be staffed with more personnel , both in major cities/foreign areas and in collection activities.Analysis of force protection intelligence should be properly delegated to CI cells and to this end CI Analytical cells should be dispersed at Army Headquarters and major commands
DEFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS IN COIN
PROTECTION
Protection is the maintaining the effectiveness and survivability of military installations, camps, personnel, equipment, information/communication systems and other facilities located within the area of operations in any COIN mission. In case of COIN the protection concept is different than that of a conventional force protection scenario in that the element of the protection of the local populace/communities inhabiting the AO is also taken into account. Now if this element is granted due protection, is secured from the insurgents psychological ops and transactional overtures(seeking safe houses, staging areas in the local area, taking pseudonyms or as family members to deceive the forces against a false or ideologically goaded sense of protection for the community members or any other assumed social benefit not accorded by the government) then in turn the security forces gain allies who will feed intelligence about the enemy and information pertaining to military security thus enhancing the security of the tactical units and installations itself.
TECHNIQUE CONSIDERATIONS DURING COUNTERINSURGENCIES
Insurgents resort to lethal and nonlethal attacks against groups of soldiers, unit commanders and civilians. Lethal attacks include killing and IED whereas non-lethal attacks are kidnapping and ransom, subversion or psychological/intimidation/threats. To thwart such attacks and deter the enemy the following basic site-protection operations may be included as foundation steps in the overall unit protection program.
Observation Post: An OP is inadequately capable of protecting any vital asset of the unit using combat power but it can observe any enemy visual action and alert combat support immediately. It should be capable of defending itself and must have a communications backup/night vision devices and long range binoculars.
Stationary posts and static bases: Each post/base must take into consideration following factors before being assembled:
Critical asset dimensions Threat severity
Nearest reserve troops in terms of the time to inform them and the distance.
Keeping these into consideration a detachment/s occupies the post/base, full time and equipped with night vision devices and surveillance equipment. It’s a very good idea to include mobile surveillance teams to keep an eye in the area in close proximity of the base perimeter.
Patrols:
a)Foot patrols: Both critical and low priority assets may be covered by foot patrols but usually low priority assets are allocated for protection. Foot patrols are susceptible to ambush and hence patrol timings must be random. This also helps in maintaining the element of surprise. Patrols must be well armed to defend themselves and have the necessary communication facility toi call for support if the need arises. The support team should be locally positioned and not far away.
b)Vehicle patrols: All the above apply equally to vehicle patrols.
c)Aerial patrols: Inaccessible areas can be kept under routine patrolling surveillance. Here they supplement foot and vehicle patrols in that they offer an extension in the coverage area. It can so happen that critical assets are positioned long distances away in terrain unsuitable for foot/vehicular patrolling.
RANDOM ANTITERRORISM MEASURES
It is very likely that the enemy keeps our forces and installation under surveillance. Their priority is to discern the overall security plan. Hence to throw them off track we must introduce a random element whenever possible. This also helps us to spring a surprise on the enemy. The main criterion here is to alter the security posture from time to time thus defeating the enemy’s surveillance attempts. The enemy through surveillance attempts to know our possible actions,intent,order of battle,dispositions,etc.True surveillance is not strictly an intelligence activity on the part of the enemy but it is an enabler of intelligence. Hence we should tackle enemy surveillance on an equal footing with our intelligence and counterintelligence efforts. Just like we use deception in counterintelligence based defensive and offensive activities.
Similarly we must use randomness to thwart enemy surveillance efforts.
•Vehicular barriers to route traffic around base.
•Random security patrols
•Floodlights should operate at random times.
•Guard duty shifts must be practiced at random times.
•Changing access time for entry points.
•Access procedures/passwords must be changed at random.
•Searching personnel must be randomized—the method that is.
•Maintaining random observation of surrounding areas utilizing unmanned systems if available/remote systems.
Armor Protection
We can increase the quantum of protection considerably by vehicle and personnel armor. But it must be kept in mind armor weight reduces the mobility of both the vehicle and soldier—in the case of the latter his maneuverability and endurance gets affected adversely..In addition heavy armor wears engine parts of the vehicles. But it is true that insurgent attacks become very much ineffective on armor shielded vehicles and personnel.
Hardening
Hardening is intended to defeat or negate /deter an attack. Hardening makes it very difficult for insurgents to carry out attacks.
Study the terrain carefully and see to it that natural obstacles can be emplaced to deter the movements of the insurgents. Naturally available materials can be used to protect personnel,
equipment and facilities. Physical protection can be effected using sandbags, walls, shields, concrete barriers. Proper selection should be made in keeping with nature of attacks: Blast, indirect/direct fires, heat, and radiation. Electronic warfare demands a different set of materials/systems.
COUNTERINSURGENCY BASES
COIN forces must have a base from which to operate and also project. Bases are secure areas from which the COIN objective is to isolate the insurgents from the support facilities and protect the local populace/communities. The base must be carefully selected, reinforced and rendered fully defendable. Command relationships should be clearly defined. Bases can be of 3 types: Forward operating bases, Combat outposts, and Patrol bases. The nature of the mission and size of the unit (Company etc) determines the size and location of the base.
FORWARD OPERATING BASES
Sometimes the nature of operations, the terrain, the size of the AO as well as the size of the units necessitate a separate forward placed operating base for the Battalion which itself commands controls, communicates and supports deployed units. It provides intelligence support, sustainment, replenishment and personnel support as well as functions also as staging area. Each area of operation may have one forward base. A forward operating base acts as a secure location for the planners and command staff so as to plan operations, provides security to the local populace and acts as a deterrent for the insurgents nearby by hampering their mobility and subjecting them to an increased threat. We can have both Brigade FOBs and Battalion Fobs. In the case of Bde FOBs they act as rear areas for Bn Companies which are forwardly deployed. FOBs should maintain either secured road/water or air sustainment capability.
COMBAT OUTPOSTS
Observation posts are reinforced with fire power and combat teams and hence take the shape of a combat outpost. They are positioned at strategic points inside insurgent-0dominated areas , are company or platoon sized, possess the ability to conduct combat operations on a limited scale and are in contact with base headquarters as well as horizontally with other combat outposts , in effect networking both horizontally and vertically so as to:
Cut of insurgent logistical lines
Provide security to the local populace in the immediate neighborhood of the COP
Maintain direct contact with the local populace and hence keep an eye on the activities / strangers
These are not possible from remote bases operating from outside insurgent dominated areas. The negative factors in this type of arrangement are increased risk to the soldiers and limited area of
operations , nevertheless proper networking among the combat outposts helps greatly in keeping a grip on the insurgency and the kill ratio as well as protecting the populace. It is very important to plan the position of the outpost, the emplacement, complete with secure logistical lines, communication systems and reinforcement capability. Each COP is assigned a sector of the AO.
Outposts may be employed—
•To secure key lines of communication or infrastructure.
•To secure and co-opt the local populace.
•To gather intelligence.
•To assist the government in restoring essential services.
•To force insurgents to operate elsewhere.
Priorities of Work
Certain factors need to be considered while establishing combat outposts.
∙The selected area must be free of noncombatants , civilians and the like.
∙To hinder the enemy’s movement , obstacles to his entry to streets , underground passages,marked areas in rough/jungle terrain should be emplaced.
∙Carefully choose positions to set up weapons to cover likely avenues of approach.
∙Clearing fields of fire
∙Cover and camnouflage.
∙Obstacles/barriers may be integrated with weapons so as to be auto-triggered.
∙There should be easy access between positions and the routes must not hinder speed.
PATROL BASES
Patrol bases are secured areas which serve as long period halting points for patrols. They may be permanent or temporary.
1.Sometimes it is important for patrols to remain hidden or halt all operations as information is received that they are liable to be detected.
2.Again detailed study of an area requires long periods of reconnaissance so they need a place to hide,and then later launch recce ops.
3.After long periods of recce operations,the troops get exhausted and hence retire to a patrol base for food,sleep or rest,weapons/equipment maintenance
4.After detailed reconnaissance the patrol commander needs to sit down with his senior NCOs and devise future course of action.
5.In cases when the patrol is in enemy area after infiltrating the area,in small groups , they set up temporary patrol bases where they can later meet and regroup and make further plans.
6.Finally a patrol base is a good launching pad for consecutive or concurrent operations such as
7.raids,reconnaissance,surveillance and ambush.
Purposes
In counterinsurgency operations, collocating patrol bases in population centers enables combined forces—
•To deny the insurgent access to the local population.
•To influence and assist the local government.
•To provide security.
Methods of Establishment
The same priorities of work described for combat outposts apply also to patrol bases:
• Move in with the indigenous population. The advantages are that Soldiers
will have more direct contact with the local administration, the locals will identify the forces with the government.
The disadvantages insurgent sympathizers from among the masses may inform insurgents about patrol movements with relative ease, attacks on the base will have collateral damage effects, and houses cannot be really hardened against attacks..
• Build a new patrol base. Although more isolated from the population, new patrol bases are usually on chosen ground and, therefore, easier to defend. Additionally, they are far more resource and personnel intensive during construction. It is generally advisable to set aside detailed planning time before sending a combined force to occupy the terrain.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR A BASE DEFENSE
TERRAIN
Key terrain factors to consider include the following:
∙ The terrains may add to defense by virtue of its natural characteristics.Hence conduct a thorough study of the terrain.To enhance its natural defensive characteristics more utilize artificial obstacles/barriers.
∙ The patrol bases must have all access routes to it , by road or waterways , under control.The same applies for all lines of supply and communication and civilian access.
The best technique for base defense is the perimeter defense.
RSTA AND ISR OPERATIONS
Intelligence drives operations and vice versa. In effect the enemy situation drives operations. For the enemy situation to drive operations we must have perfect intelligence about the enemy. To this end Reconnaissance , Surveillance and Target Acquisition should work hand in hand with ISR SO AS TO ACHIEVE PERFECT SYNCHRONIZATION in the deployment and operation of sensors, assets and processing, exploitation and dissemination of intelligence.RSTA/ISR should focus on the priority intelligence requirements.Recconnaisance and Surveillance confirm or deny threat actrivities,plans,courses of action which were gauged by the Commander and his staff during planning , war gaming and sessions with the collection manager and counterintelligence specialists.By focusing RSTA/ISR on the commanders needs, his critical and priority intelligence requirements we can deploy and use RSTA/ISR sensors and assets in the most optimum fashion , totally integrated and synchronized resulting in timely and accurate information, combat information and intelligence to be disseminated to the targeting platforms.
Every operation is initiated as per plan and this planning has certain decision points.RSTA/ISR should take these critical decision points in perspective , primary perspective and focus all collection platforms and assets on these points and see to it that al information linked to these decision points are gathered , nothing left out and disseminated in time to the commander. Again for this synchronization is essential. Targeting requires proper detection of the target and evaluation of its importance. Further there should be sufficient reason to nominate the target to the attack platforms. To this end synchronized RSTA/ISR operations collect all possible information about the target and pass it on for evaluation and thereafter if the target satisfies the criteria for nomination the intelligence on the target is passed on to the targeting platform. After an attack on the target, kinetic/nonkinetic attack or exploitation operations, RSTA/ISR is required to assess the effectiveness of the attack.
DETECT
HPTs need to be detected and located accurately in order to engage them and here is where all assets available to the Commander must be used to maximum efficiency.HPTs are critical nodes in the insurgent network.Engaging and destroying them successfully can render the mission of the insurgent group unsuccessful.
The priority intelligence requirements associated with the HPT should be carefully defined and resources allocated accordingly to get intelligence on the target. As time goes on and collection assets bring in information in line with the priority intelligence requirements the situation development for the commanders needs is more accurate and continuously updated. Detect the HPT involves tracking him as movement is a factor. Detecting involves assets like HUMINT source,
an anonymous tip, UAS, a combat patrol, SIGINT, DOMEX, rotary wing aircraft, military working dog teams. The best means of detecting a target during an insurgency is HUMINT, such, the detect activity requires a detailed understanding of social networks, insurgent networks, insurgent actions, and the community’s attitude toward the counterinsurgent forces. For a target that must be engaged by nonlethal means, the detect function may require patrols to conduct reconnaissance of a leader’s home to determine if they are there, an assessment of a potential project, or attendance at a greeting to meet with a leader.