TRAINING

COIN INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

 

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Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat
and environment in a specific area. The commander uses IPB to understand the battlespace and the
options it presents to friendly and threat forces. By applying the IPB process, the commander gains the
information necessary to selectively apply and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and
space on the battlespace.
The CLIC has the ability to conduct all IPB requirements based on their training, intelligence environment,
and communications environment and the availability of intelligence assets. In addition, the granularity
provided by the CLIC will balance the intent and needs of the commander and the information available
to analysts.
For example, counterinsurgency (COIN) IPB requires existing data to be analyzed and assessed in a
different manner because it is focused on the local population’s potential courses of action (COAs).




Mission

4.Determine Threat COAs
3.Evaluate the Threat
2.Describe the
Battlespace Effects
1.Define the Battlespace
Evironment

Basic Skills
Census Ops; Kinetic/Nonkinetic Targeting; Economic Targeting and Analysis;
Black/White CA; IO Theme Design and Delivery with Cultural Attenuation;
Interagency Integration
Nonkinetic Targeting; Link Analysis; Operationalized Pattern Analysis;
Demographic Mapping and Leadership Analysis; CHD Integration;
Effective Intelligence Cells to Companies
Kinetic Targeting; Pattern Analysis; Trend Analysis;
UAS Employment; RadBn Employment; TFC Integration;
EMAC and TSE at Subordinate Elements
Weather Effects Operationalized; SOPs for Section
Operation Published; Watch Procedures Refined,
IM/Share Drive Organization; POI for Analysts as
Part of PTP
Degree of Difficulty


DEFINE THE BATTLESPACE   
In order to maximize the use of available resources, including time and personnel, each resource must be
used only on the commander’s areas of interest (AI). Clear boundaries must be set in order to prevent use of
resources in areas, or on topics, not relevant to the operational needs of the commander.
The CLIC should consider both current company operations and the battalion’s mission when identifying the
physical limits of friendly and enemy territory and outlining the AO, area of influence, and area of interest.
When the CLIC is identifying significant characteristics of the environment, they should examine the AI’s
physical environment and the influences of the people who occupy that area to include the following:
• Geography (weather/terrain).
• Population demographics.
• Political/socioeconomic factors.
• Infrastructures.
• Threat forces.

Once aware of the physical environment, the intelligence planner can evaluate the human dynamics within
the AI caused by the population centers or groupings. Items that should be taken into consideration within
the AI include the following:
• Physical lines of communications (LOCs).
• Tribal boundaries.
• Demographic boundaries.
• Geographic boundaries.
• Economical boundaries.
• Cultural boundaries.
The CLIC must identify the amount of detail required in the IPB and feasibility of completing the IPB
within the time available. Intelligence planning requires an examination of the information gained throughout
the IPB process. This IPB effort should result in a better understanding of the physical and cultural
influences on the commander’s operational scenario and yield suggested areas for IPB and COAs.

Therefore,
the following must be taken into consideration:
• Collecting initial intelligence for baseline IPB and identifying intelligence gaps based on the commander’s
operational scenario, commander’s intent, and possible COAs.
• Collecting the material and intelligence required to conduct the remaining IPB.
• Analyzing and evaluating a previous unit’s turnover products (e.g., updated IPB, targeting products)if available.

DESCRIBE THE BATTLESPACE EFFECTS  
Company level intelligence cell analysts must identify and analyze the various influences that may impact
civilian life and military operations. Basic considerations include weather, enemy, and terrain, but the commander
may prescribe additional considerations.
1.Weather
It is vital that the effects of weather—visibility, winds, precipitation, cloud cover, and temperature and
humidity—on civilian life and military operations be identified and analyzed.
2.Enemy
When deciding on the civil and military factors to be examined in the analysis of the battlespace, consider
both civilian personnel and equipment and military personnel and equipment.
3.Terrain
It is vital that elements of terrain be analyzed from both the friendly and enemy perspectives. There are
numerous models and formats used to identify terrain information; however, the most commonly used
methods are—
• The memory aid KOCOA:
—Key terrain (population centers, access control points, LOCs).
—Observation and fields of fire (Where can friendly and enemy forces see and shoot from?).
—Cover and concealment (from fire/view of friendly and enemy forces).
—Obstacles (manmade or natural, political, LOCs, or rules of engagement).
—Avenues of approach (mounted and dismounted ingress/egress routes).
• Areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE)  
—Areas.
—Structures.
—Capabilities.
—Organizations.
—People.
—Events.
Areas Structures Capabilities Organization People Events
Typical Civil Considerations Within Each Areas,Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events Category.

1. Tribe
2. Families/clans
3. Ethnicity
4. Economic districts
5. Smuggling routes
6. National boundaries
7. Social classes
8. Political districts
9. Military districts
10. School districts
11. Road systems
12. Water sources
13. Water coverage
14. Water districts
15. Construction sites
16. Gang territory
17. Safe areas/
18. sanctuaries
19. Trade routes
20. Power grids
21. Cemeteries
22. Religious shrines
23. Houses of worship
24. Bars/tea shops
25. Social gathering
26. places
27. Print shops
28. Internet cafes
29. Television stations
30. Radio stations
31. Hospitals
32. Banks
33. Dams
34. Bridges
35. Police stations
36. Gas stations
37. Military barracks
38. Jails
39. Water pumping
40. stations
41. Oil/gas pipelines
42. Water lines
43. Power lines
44. Storage facilities
45. Sewer
46. Water
47. Electrical
48. Academic
49. Trash
50. Medical
51. Security
52. Market
53. Employment and
54. commerce
55. Crime and justice
56. Basic needs
57. Public health
58. Economic (jobs)
59. Religion
60. Displaced persons
61. and refugees
62. Political voice
63. Civil/individual
64. rights
65. Tribal
66. Family/clan
67. Religious
68. Ethnic
69. US/coalition forces
70. Governmental
71. agencies
72. Farmers or unions
73. Community organizations
74. Military/milia units
75. Illicit organizations
76. Insurgent groups
77. Gangs
78. Business organizations
79. Police
80. Nomands
81. Displaced persons
82. and refugees
83. Volunteer groups
84. Intergovernmental
85. organizations
86. Political
87. Contractors
88. Nongovernmental
89. organizations
90. Labor unions
91. Phones
92. Speeches
93. Face-to-face meetings
94. Media (radio)
95. Media (TV)
96. Media (print, newspapers)
97. Visual (graffiti,
98. signs)
99. Visual (videos,
100. DVDs)
101. Audio (pirated or
102. illegal radio)
103. Rallies or demonstrations
104. Restaurants
105. Door-to-door
106. Internet
107. Market
108. Sports
109. Religious gatherings
110. Parks
111. Family gatherings
112. Gas lines
113. Bars/tea shops
114. Food lines
115. Job lines
116. Weddings
117. Birthdays
118. Religious gatherings
119. Funerals
120. Major religious
121. events
122. Anniversaries of
123. wars/battles
124. Holidays
125. Harvests or plantings
126. Reconstruction
127. openings
128. Town or council
129. meetings
130. Elections
131. Sports events

EVALUATE THE THREAT   
In order to describe the possible impact on friendly operations and to influence the commander’s decisionmaking
options/process during analysis, CLIC personnel must try to fuse the threat and the environment to construct likely COAs. Considerations for COIN IPB will also be useful in threat models for crisis.A threat is defined as any force, group, person, action event, or condition that would cause a commander to
fail to achieve the specified end state and therefore the mission. Different types of military operations will require specific threat identification. For example, conventional and COIN operations have significantlydifferent IPB considerations and require attention to the motivations of the threat, relationships between the
actors, and pattern of life changes. In a new AO, critical capability, critical requirement,and critical vulnerability are useful tools used to identify the threat

COIN Considerations for IPB

Eight Dynamics of the Insurgency
Leaders of the insurgency
Ideology of the insurgency
Objectives
Environment and geography the insurgency
prefers
Internal support to the insurgency
External support to the insurgency
Phase of the insurgency
Organizational and operational patterns
Description of TTP (shown graphically) with
intelligence and analysis products
Identification of HVTs
Threat model

Conventional IPB

Order of Battle
Composition
Disposition
Strength
Tactics
Training
Logistics
Combat effectiveness
Electronic/technical data
C2 warfare data
Miscellaneous data
Doctrinal template
Description of tactics and options
Identification of HVTs
Defense


Conventional warfare and COIN models reflect an asymmetric
environment and offer a basis from which to tailor CLIC analysis to other military operations.
After a thorough evaluation of the battlespace has occurred, the CLIC must identify threat activities and
capabilities by considering the geographic, environmental, civil, and military factors.


DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION
Intelligence preparation of the battlespace provides insight into actions the threat is capable (or incapable)
of attempting.The CLIC’s analysis provides the commander with the threat’s most likely and most dangerous
COAs. The identification of threat COAs helps refine the commander’s understanding of the battlespace,
allowing for the development of friendly COAs to combat anticipated threat action.The threat’s most likely COA depends upon his capabilities, doctrinal employment of forces, and intentions to affect a desired outcome. Examining a threat’s doctrinal employment of forces provides the CLIC with information to support anticipating future actions. The employment of forces must be examined using knowledge of the threat’s current strength and capabilities. The threat’s intentions are determined by examining his centers of influence—demonstrated, stated, or anticipated—that will direct his lines of effort.

EMAC - every Marine a collector
IM - information management
IO - information operations
IW - irregular warfare
Ops - operations
POI - program of instruction
PTP - predeployment training program
RadBn - radio battalion
TFC - tactical fusion center
TSE - tactical site exploitation
UAS - unmanned aerial system