SIR

Good Morning.

The first initial brief for the Cdr (link below).Please kindly read only the text matter (your time is very valuable,rest can be previewed later) in the middle of the page--the gist.Ill elaborate on that.Am also giving it below in this mail.

(Text: SUMMARY:
My intent is to enable the soldier on the ground , the Coy Rifleman to gather his own unit Commanders intelligence requirements , actionable intelligence that is
and deliver it to the Commander in time so that the fire-team gets it on the right time to conduct tactical missions.Combat intelligence should be accurate , specific and timely.All three attributes are compulsory.

The platoon Cdr gets intelligence from higher HQ MILITARY INTELLIGENCE Section and he plans according to it.Fine.Now all intelligence supplied to him
may not be complete--may contain ''information-gaps''.It is not possible for non-organic/other int assets like aerial surveillance platforms..SIGINT..IMINT..etc
to gather all the information needed by the platoon Cdr (for example the local inhabitants and the degree of their affiliation/support for insugent groups ; any new stranger in the immediate locality; thick canopy preventing aerial surveillance thus missing areas/points of interest; inability of  higher HQ Int personnel to conduct tactical screening/elicitation; failed/lack of human exploitation ops due to unfamiliar human terrain , no knowledge of local culture/customs, no knowledge of areas-of-attention  within the main center of graviy for both insurgents-counterinsurgents alike --the local populace due to aversion of govt troops
by prospective sources/informers..there are endless reasons which can lead to information gaps)..we need ''intelligence inputs ''locally''..say from ''an organic int cell of the Coy supporting the platoon''..to provide accurate ,meaningful intelligence to the ''tactical thought process'' of the Cdr and his 2-i-c.The less meaningful and timely this ''local intelligence feed'' the less accurate will be the estimation of the enemys scheme of maneuver.Why?Information gaps.And as no localized intelligence , Cdr resorts to assumptions and assumptions to fill the gaps with the result that the friendly scheme of maneuver is fraught with risks as the enemys scheme of maneuver is not known accurately.
During execution of the plan..the tactical mission, things become more uncertain as operations evolve..We admit but rarely recognize the critical fact that intelligence drives ops and vice versa.It is exceedingly important that the platoon has access to combat intelligence at various points in the ops cycle.This enhances his situational understanding..directly affects the speed of his decision making capacity by helping him to monitor battle-conditions, rapidly observe and orient on changes in the situation.Now thats combat intelligence in essence.Thats what we need.And thats why the dire need of the organic intelligence cells/platoons manned by the Coy Riflemen themselves.)