WHY WE NEED TO DEAL WITH THE ASYMMETRIC ENEMY IN A

DIFFERENT WAY , WHY THE DIRE NEED FOR TACTICAL INT

CAPABILITY

To hear the opening lecture from Radio ATAB please go to :

http://collegeofintelligencestudies.com/armyxxii/index.html

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My intent is to incorporate solution for UNCERTAINTY in warfare in existing Doctrine.

Uncertainty leads to Surprise , something which is the primary Endeavour of any

Commander in warfare. Indications and Warning surely affords a solution , but

indications and warning often leads to a reactive intelligence collection. we wait until a

new capability or weapons system is discovered , that capability or system is

implemented by the enemy with devastating results , still we cannot counter it as it being

new we do not have a defense system nor a counter-system , and by the time we develop

it they have either have had sufficient time to test it practically on us and develop it

further or we have had terrible losses in our armed forces , installation , C2 nodes or for

that matter overall defeat. Had we incorporated adaptability , creativity , exploration ,

continual experimentation , critical reviews of existing tactics , techniques , procedures

and SOPs in light of intelligence information about an asymmetric enemy with our

counterintelligence being totally offensive to get us information on plans before the

indicators surface (that’s why I said reactive intelligence collection--before the indicators

surface we know nothing of their plans) then we wouldn't be taken by surprise and we

would have been prepared for that new developed capability or weapons system.

In present times we are dealing with asymmetric enemies more and more be it insurgency

, terrorism or even conventional enemy with a solid devastating new capability or

weapons system or tactics which far offsets our capabilities , weapon system or tactics

granting him an asymmetric advantage.

Let’s start by touching on tactics and techniques and procedures in this light of

asymmetric warfare:

Tactics:

At the point of engagement. We have a repository of tactics , laid down the ages by

different types of combat scenarios. In order to counter an enemy’s attack we resort to an

arrangement of methods known as tactics. We cannot depend on one particular tactic.

What we have is a menu. We simply choose which one suits the current

tactical/operational environment to inflict a defeat on the enemy. We can never have a

surety of which tactic to use in the case of asymmetric warfare , each application is

unique. It could be that previously the tactic was used with success in one particular type

of combat situation. It could very well be the asymmetric enemy has adapted itself to

most of our existing tactics and invented their own newer tactics and here we are caught

badly; we have nothing in the menu to choose from. An adaptive enemy can inflict havoc

if our doctrine is not flexible. Is tuned to conventional form of warfare. We should

remember UNCERTAINTY leads to a lapse in the situational awareness and

development of the commander , thus he does not know what to plan , and thereafter

what tactics , techniques or procedures he will employ. Doctrine SHOULD focus well on

a WARNING system. To envisage and implement a good warning system so as to reduce

the critical factor uncertainty and hence eliminate SURPRISE , we need a solid proactive

intelligence setup in place with a robust counterintelligence framework.

1.Without a good intelligence setup we cannot fathom enemy's intentions ;hence

uncertainty exists.

2.We have intelligence reports about the timing , plan and even existence of an enemy

attack but we interpreted so badly that uncertainty still exists as to why the attack

happened. Here again intelligence failed. We did get intelligence on plan , timing and on

the attack itself but could not collect sufficiently to decipher the strategic intent. Or even

the intermediate intent. We defined our intelligence requirements improperly(critical in

collection management , given in my book on HUMINT);in fact facing an asymmetric

enemy or even the invisible terrorist it is very difficult to judger intent despite the

happening of the attack. This is usually not the case in conventional warfare. Where we

can make good guess about the OB , conduct an intelligence preparation of the

battlefield..conduct aerial reconnaissance , exploit using counterintelligence and intercept

radio signals. But in asymmetric warfare , in urban/jungle terrain; all this is very difficult

or near impossible.

3.Even the existence of a new weapon by the enemy. Or tactic. creates uncertainty.Ok we

have information on this new weapon.Fine.But did we study it closely? Did we log all the

attacks made by this new weapon or did we focus only on its particular characteristics

which just fits our current tactical requirements? If it’s a new tactic developed by the

enemy did we explore to see how often it has been used and to what degree of success?

The latter can pinpoint our vulnerabilities to this type of attack. As the potential for

asymmetry increases, so does the level of uncertainty and the potential for tactical,

operational, and strategic surprise.

These 3 cases demonstrate that despite good collected intelligence there will still be gaps.

And in the case of the elusive asymmetric enemy these gaps can be big. And these

intelligence GAPS NEED TO BE IDENTIFIED , INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

CAREFULLY DEFINED IN LINE WITH THESE GAPS AND A COLLECTION

PROTOCOL DEVISED. Only then we can reduce uncertainty and hence the critical

element SURPRISE. There is no playbook of tactical solutions;

Techniques and procedures.

Techniques are the general, detailed methods soldiers and commanders use to perform

missions and functions--in particular they are methods how we utilize equipment and

employ manpower. Procedures are standard and detailed courses of action to achieve

objectives or complete an assigned tasking. Doctrine is built up on the foundation of

techniques and procedures--these form the lowest rung. Techniques and procedures are

built in the force , integral to the force , are set standards and give uniformity to the

overall setup of the security of an installation or information acquisition/dissemination

and the security of plans , operations and other activities. If we have to project any

changes we keep as baseline the SOPs..The SOPs are the ''technicals'' in war matrix.

Techniques and procedures vary with organization , equipment and environment. In brief

techniques and procedures set down standards of operating and are instilled by repeated

training. The military saying--''Train as you fight and fight as you train'' aptly describes

the importance of techniques and procedures. The adage that forces fight as they train is

applicable. Armies cannot afford to make everything up as they go. Of necessity we

apply existing techniques and procedures against asymmetric opponents, and with some

adaptation, they work. In other cases, if there are no existing techniques and procedures,

and innovative combinations of existing Techniques and procedures will not work, we

develop new techniques and procedures to integrate into existing Ones to solve a unique

problem. If it appears the situation that prompted the change might recur, we must tell

other forces about the solution so they do not have to learn from bitter experience.

Uncertainty is critically responsible for defeat through surprise and to reduce uncertainty

combat forces need to be aggressively adaptive. Combat is adaptive in nature as all

military forces adapt to changing tactical , operational environment. No admixture of

tactics , techniques and procedures can be used as standard prescription solutions , doing

so might result in defeat. Here again I stress on uncertainty--be it conventional warfare or

asymmetric warfare. Military drills and OPs need to be continually assessed against

current scenarios. Especially so in an asymmetric type of conflict.Techniquers and

procedures need to be adapted to the current environment , for this creativity ,

experimentation , exploration training , dissemination and critical reviews are needed.

Existing doctrine e might have the answer to the employment of a tactic by the enemy to

ensure their asymmetric advantage. This means that the commander can selectively apply

existing tactics to counter that advantage by recognizing some inherent weakness in the

enemy. We have a certain weakness the enemy knows and who can capitalize on that. To

prevent that we go by selected relative strengths and complementary means to protect

that weakness. Say for example the enemy employs a hit and run technique with high

mobility in hilly areas and on the plains. As being on foot they can negotiate

areas/lanes/passes easily than us who are mounted on vehicles. The enemy here has a

clear asymmetric advantage. But come winter the commander got intelligence that they

cannot move far from their camps but we can as we are moving in self contained vehicles

to counter the winter and adequately armed and protected. Now the commander has an

asymmetric advantage. Hence during the winter the enemy does not venture far from

their bases so the commander envisages a plan wherein we attack hard right on the enemy

camps. As a result they either have to vacate and retreat to safer bases or get

killed/captured. So the commander develops an asymmetric approach which the enemy

cannot counter. Here we find the solution was standard tactics existing in our doctrine ,

only what needs to be done is to understand perfectly their weakness vs.-a visa our

weaknesses and hence the corresponding asymmetric advantages and disadvantages. The

commander need not develop any technology to solve the military problem. The answer

is there but available only if the commander can correctly asses the enemy actions. That

during winter the enemy is most vulnerable in terms of mobility. The commander MUST

EXPLOIT ANY ASYMMETRICAL DISADVANTAGE. OF THE ENEMY , or in other

words any asymmetrical advantage he gets his hands on. But the most important thing to

note here is even if we realize our asymmetric advantage we must properly tie it to a

strategy. Not just employ tactics randomly. We had the asymmetric advantage in winter

in terms of mobility. The strategy that worked was to hit them right at their bases .

So on one hand doctrine might not have the answer to a new tactic and again on the other

hand our commanders must possess creativity and the ability to take rapid initiative to

achieve an asymmetric surprise using standard selective tactics , techniques and

procedures against the backdrop of careful assessment of the enemy tactics ;or in other

words the commander executes doctrine in newer ways hitherto unexplored. .

Counterinsurgency or for that matter when we write doctrine for any form of asymmetric

warfare we must remember we have to adapt to the enemy’s asymmetric capabilities ,

both potential and actual and configure our asymmetric capabilities in tune of the formers

so that when they apply their new tactics they cannot counter our capabilities. True we

have a huge repository of tactics by virtue of being a much superior force in terms of all

military factors but these are useless if we do not incorporate flexibility and adaptability

in our doctrine. This is not the conventional enemy with a predictable order of battle ,

table of organization and equipment and standard army doctrine. While writing doctrine

we must not forget asymmetric warfare leads to second and third order effects which

further requires more flexibility and adaptibility.For example in a COIN environment

there are more players like local village heads , centers of political influence , corrupt

administration officials of the local government , press , social groups and the local

inhabitants themselves in the area of operations apart from religious institutions. Any

tactical victory ..that is to say victory in first sight can have second and third order

repercussions among these environmental variables and these can be negative or positive

, they can be capitalized by the enemy , the enemy can extract sympathy from affected

villagers or can resort to extensive propaganda highlighting the negative effects of the so

called victory on local variables. Second and third order effects can give rise to further

exploitation opportunities to both sides.

Characteristics of Effective Doctrine

Effective doctrine in an era of increasing asymmetry must have the following

characteristics:

Conventional warfare doctrine projects combat scenarios assuming a symmetric enemy.

We retain an edge over the enemy with our superior strength defined by superior

capabilities. As long as we have these capabilities we can match any symmetric enemy.

What if we are facing an asymmetric enemy which doesn’t stand a chance against our

capabilities? What if recognizing this fact they resort to a newer capability whose

configuration is so different that our conventional capabilities repository lacks an answer

to that capability? We resort to an examination of our capabilities vis-à-vis to their newer

capabilities and find we are short of effectiveness , say in one particular capability. We

delete it from our repository and unless we cannot design a superior capability an area of

vulnerability is created , inviting the enemy to resort to an effective course of action. We

must replace that void with a superior capability or we suffer defeat. It could very well be

that particular enemy capability is there before our eyes but we failed to assess the

efficacy of the capability in the long run. The Japanese lance torpedo inflicted good

casualties for quite some time on the US Navy in the Second World War until one day

this lack of counter-capability was realized by the Americans and they designed a

counter-system. Hence Doctrine must have an operational concept that includes more

than high-intensity conventional warfare.

During writing doctrine we must forecast , not predict what is going to happen in the near

term or in the long run. We should be able to accurately assess the enemy’s future intent

and mind you this is not predictive intelligence , this is forecasting based on collected

intelligence inputs. Prediction is different from forecasting. In forecasting we have as

premise a database of information which you can say acts more or less like a statistical

system on which operations are executed to infer , to forecast. In intelligence parlance we

conduct intelligence analysis. Again here we should have a solid collection and asset

management system with requirements management in the fore. Properly defined

requirements , that is intelligence requirements predicated by intelligence gaps , can save

a lot of time and effort and very less wastage of collection assets would result. Also ISR

synchronization will be feasible.

In our doctrine we must pull our past successes and failures , current developments ,

including all available combat information-be it theoretical , historical or empirical so

that the database on which forecasting is based can be well understood by our

commanders and line soldiers.

In asymmetric warfare we are confronted with an enemy which is quick to adapt , moves

unpredictably , has no properly discernible order of battle or movement patterns which

are rather very ambiguous , which uses the physical and human terrain very effectively ,

which resorts to cunningness and deception , which mixes in with the local population

and wears no uniform--all these factors present a highly asymmetrical enemy and hence

the first and foremost thing we need to incorporate in our doctrine is exactly what are we

after , the precise definition of the problem which is facilitated by an intensive study of

the physical and human terrain , sending in our HUMINT collectors and agents to

conduct a thorough intelligence preparation of the COIN battle space--so very diff from

conventional ones--to determine the social , cultural , demographic , political , military ,

logistical networks and ,physical terrain and other physical factors like safe houses ,

staging areas,--so that we clearly understand the problem in hand and devise a suitable

remedy. We must be adaptive. Highly adaptive--discarding standard intelligence

collection ops and resorting more to HUMINT , CI supported where possible by

IMINT.Tactical HUMINT teams at platoon level comprised of a mix of HUMINT and CI

operatives , one linguist , one psyops agent and one civil affairs /liaison operative can

accompany standard R&S Patrols --tactical questioning does not require specialized

intelligence training and there will be ample opportunity during recce when you come

across civilians , refugees , village heads who can be exploited and valuable information

extracted. Hence the bottom-line while writing a doctrine is you need to be adaptive and

creative like your enemy and be prepared to innovatively implement newer techniques of

intelligence collection. More important is that the entire command should be involved ,

right from the highest level to troop level. Pushing intelligence capability right down to

troop level is a MUST. Every soldier should be a sensor. even infantry men or support

services personnel. These are secondary collectors , very very vital for an accurate

assessment of the battle space , for building up the situation awareness of the

Commander. Only detailing intelligence detachment personnel to support units are NOT

enough. THIS POINT SHOULD BE NOTED. In my books elsewhere on this site I have

detailed company intelligence support teams structure , platoon level/company level

organic intelligence unit , projecting intelligence capability beyond area of operations (as

insurgency in the current AO can have second order effects in adjacent areas or it could

well happen that the moment current ops are over in a particular AO the commander is

ordered to proceed further into unexplored territory and doing so without previously

allocating some intelligence resources so as to gain advance info(while ops are currently

on in the previous AO) will cause a wastage of critical time as assets will have to be

deployed again with reconnaissance and surveillance teams to conduct an intelligence

preparation afresh--you just cant barge into unknown territory , particularly a jungle or

urban environment where a highly cunning adaptive asymmetric enemy lies in wait.

Doctrine must educate the Army to the fact that military actions often have second- and

Theodore

Effects (the law of unintended consequences).Uncertainty and asymmetry compound

these unintended consequences. The insurgent force for example may or may not have a

match for one particular capability of our much superior deployed military force If it

doesn’t then to them we are most asymmetric and hence will be deterred from making

attacks. Hence we must reinforce and capitalize on our strengths and apply them in an

asymmetric fashion. Doctrine should do exactly this , focusing on our particular strengths

and capabilities which may or may not find their equivalent in enemy forces and guiding

us to properly apply them in an asymmetric fashion to retain the asymmetric edge over an

asymmetric enemy.

Doctrine must include a system able to rapidly reassess current TTP against emerging

threats, capture innovative solutions to new tactical problems, and promulgate new TTP

to the field, actively and regularly collect lessons learned in the form of new and

modified TTP and produce and disseminate reports that capture new TTP. We need to

support this effort and improve its already superb ability

Promulgating New Doctrine

If out army is a dominant one , the enemy will resort to more and more asymmetric

attacks. We should recognize this and base our Doctrine on exactly this concept.

Offensive , Defensive , Stability and Support operations should evolve around the

nucleus of asymmetric dimension. In asymmetric environment , it’s a two sided street. In

fact tactical combat are the order of the day. we are fighting battles , not wars. The soldier

on the ground needs to take the initiative , intelligence capability must be pushed down to

him and all technological advancements should be made with the objective to

complement his capabilities , not replace them. Conventional ISR platforms should never

be solely depended upon , HUMINT should be given top priority along with CI and

SIGINT.C2 should emphasis ground level initiative , technical control should be more

refined and a must and asset , collection management predicated by sound requirements

defibnition.Tactical questioning , secondary collectors , and counterintelligence plugged

into modular intelligence support teams should come into existence rather than the

standard Det-type support networks. Execution of military operations should be

decentralized , more initiative given to lower and middle levels of command , every

soldier a sensor , mission command will be successful if all these levels are involved by

their commanders exercising a disciplined initiative keeping the the main commanders

primary intent in perspective.

We should not only assess the current operational environment by conducting pre and

post operation review on standard lines , such as intelligence preparation of the battlefield

, battle damage assessments ,successes of psyops , HUMINT and CI successes and

failures , but also on the 2nd and 3rd order effects , and tertiary effects like that on

contiguous area or near-distant areas where , say , insurgency is in the budding stage and

developments here can influence that movement t--for example the insurgents could

escape to safe areas there and reinforce while at the same time assist the budding

mo0vement , or post battle effects in current AO leads to a psychological effect in the

adjacent areas or other areas of interest initiated by political groups , pro-insurgent groups

and the like. Doctrine should stress creativity and exploration--the latter can also be

manifested by intelligence projection cum R&S Teams , foraying into unknown and

untested territory with the intent to aid the commander still busy in ops in current AO in

situation awareness and development of the area of interest where orders might come

anytime to move in to clear and secure , hence the commander wont have to waste time

and effort in intelligence collection and resources wont be wasted .Doctrine should

include all military theory of conventional battle operating systems and conduct a

thorough review in light of asymmetric conditions to achieve all what has been said so

far. Where do we stand right now in terms of Army Doctrine for operations against

increasingly asymmetric Opponents?

Based upon mission orders for effective MIS-soon accomplishment.

Uncertainty is the lowest common denominator for Doctrine to be written for current

operational theorems and recent operational experiences. Am not saying that we discard

earlier doctrinal concepts or expunge them. In fact Doctrine came into existence since the

earliest Wars like those during the era of Napoleon Bonaparte and during WW1.Over the

centuries combat principles , phenomena have been observed , distilled , compiled and

assimilated. Classical theories like battlefield operating systems have also been studied

and incorporated. Wars have been won using these doctrinal concepts. But wars have

been lost too--like the Japanese Lance torpedo , the sudden advent of the machine gun ,

tilting an asymmetric advantage in favor of the proponent force or the total lack of

technology to clear minefields. A conventional enemy could also get a huge asymmetric

advantage by the creation and successful deployment of a capability or weapons system ,

which springs as a total surprise for our military , has devastating destructive effect and

where we have absolutely no defense system. This is where previous existing doctrine

fails. We need to continually study and assess our past successes and failures , but most

important we need to undertake a critical review of our existing operational and tactical

environments , experience and leave room in our doctrine for adaptation to the

uncertainty arising out of asymmetric nature of current conflicts as uncertainty leads to

intelligence gaps and this gaps if not attended to leads to bad situational awareness of the

commander finally leading to the very tenet of victory in war by the enemy--SURPRISE.

Hence we must write doctrine where :

Doctrine must keep uncertainty in the fore , in focus , sharp focus and where applicable

may permit usage of prescriptive type of solutions (if absolutely the combat scenario is a

template mimicking a previous situation) but should not encourage only such type of

solutions but should keep uncertainty as a predicate or in other words , should be

prepared to adapt to the most asymmetric type of conflict where standard routine combat

templates don’t exist. Everything is fluid , changing , with the element of surprise not

only in the beginning of the conflict but can happen again anywhere during the course of

conflict. Doctrine should enable exploration , criticism , experimentation , creativity and

adaptation. Current TTPs should be creatively applied to newer battle configurations.

And there should be room to create entirely new TTPs to confront newer battle

conditions.

We must recognize our asymmetric advantages , these may not be recognized as such

..may be misinterpreted as enhanced capability--the term ''asymmetric advantage'' is

important here as if we view it from this perspective with all knowledge about nature of

asymmetric opponents and warfare , we can then leverage our advantage in a proper

manner , asymmetrically. Yes-asymmetrically.

Continual assessment , review and feedback with regard to e existing doctrine are

critically important. We must retain successful and useful concepts and discard those

which have failed to stand against our enemies or more important those that have been

rendered useless by our enemies.

Doctrine should emphasize a new form of leadership training where leaders are tuned to

asymmetric conflicts apart from education in conventional warfare. Just like a fresh

intelligence graduate from the intelligence officers school who is assigned to a Det takes

a long time to be an intelligence professional , thus his throughput being much low during

his tenure in the unit till he has imbibed professionalism , similarly commanders who

have led conventional operations find it difficult to properly handle asymmetric type

combat situations where their experience fails , where they get trapped in intelligence

traps wherein previous experience moulds their behavior while taking decisions ,

planning , setting COAs and issuing intelligence requirements to collection agents. Not

only this ,they , due to this intelligence trap ,discard others opinions with the ''I AM

RIGHT AS THIS IS THE ONLY WAY OUT , THE SITUATION IS MORE OR LESS

SIMILAR TO THAT SO AND SO OPERATION’. Here had he been exposed to an

academic programme together with real life simulation or training where asymmetric

opponents are the enemy he would have had entirely different perspectives about the

conflict. Hence we must not have just an education system but a professional military

education system where both conventional and asymmetric types of warfare are dealt

with , for enlisted personnel , for commissioned officers and also higher echelon staff and

commanders. If we don't do this we cannot do the most important thing about doctrine ,

promulgating it. It’s not sufficient to write a doctrine after understanding the need to

write it anew. It’s much more important to promulgate it in the field and the Army’s

educational system. We cannot make every individual study the doctrine , we can have

internet and other systems so that soldiers to commanders can access the doctrine but still

individual study cannot be 100% nor compliance to that can be ensured--to offset this we

can have educational programmes where studies are professionally oriented , leadership

courses are so configured so as to churn out professionals who have assimilated

thoroughly the new doctrine.

Intelligence-Asymmetric Warfare perspective

An efficient intelligence service must conduct planning, deployment and management of

collection assets and platforms, execute, control and evaluate the operations with the

primary mission to retain a decision advantage over the opponent, both in peace time and

during War/LIC.Two main approaches must be embodied: Criminalization Strategy and

Prevent disrupt and counter the enemy’s multidimensional intelligence threat. In the first

approach the apprehended elements are captured and convicted as per court of law

whereas in the second strategy we intend to thwart enemy actions using

HUMINT/Counterintelligence. Intelligence feeds into both strategies in four modes of

deployment: to make strategic assessments, including of the sources, nature and levels of

threat, and the need for new resources or security measures; to feed into criminalization

operations in which individuals may ultimately be dealt with through the courts; to feed

into control operations such as disruption and surveillance; to feed into control operations

which deal with individuals by overt executive measures. These modes are not exclusive

to terrorism, save for the final option.

HUMINT is generally considered ‘’passive’’—assets and platforms in the form of

HUMINT operatives and governmental/commercial (or official cover/unofficial cover)

bases. This is an approach with a fallacy---HUMINT should be proactive, sometimes

defensive and not always reactive. A patrol debrief tells us there is a sudden troop

movement in named area of interest alpha and so we begin intelligence activity.Thats

reactive.Had we deployed HUMINT agents well in advance to look beyond the forward

areas by intermingling with the local population on a daily basis, eliciting information,

keeping continuous contacts with the sources/informers,liasing with local police, keeping

a tab on political developments and open source intelligence like

publications,newspapers,media,rallies,public meetings, information gleaned from the

internet about enemy govt policies, their arms purchases, their foreign policies with

respect to our nation—all these will definitely give the HUMINT agent a feel of the pulse

in the area of operations and if there is any ‘’imminent’’ change in it (mind you, I didn’t

say any ‘’change’’ in it like the reported deployment) he is bound to catch the new pulse.

Before deployment to an area of operations HUMINT and CI personnel should move in

first to secure the ‘’human terrain’’ as well as the physical terrain from the intelligence

perspective. This is what we can term –‘’intelligence and force projection capability’’ for

an area of operations which is unknown to us in all terms. This is frequently the condition

when the tactical commander successfully wraps up an operation in a defined AO and

then is suddenly ordered to move into a new area much forward and totally unknown and

occupied by enemy provocateurs and agents. Had he projected his force and available

intelligence assets(after deploying his main assets for current operation and earmarking

those available for projection tasking , like HUMIT,CI..) in the new AO while he was

conducting his ops in the present AO , he could have been well prepared when the order

came in. Here intelligence preparation of the battlefield will focus on both the local

populace and the physical environment. The intent is to act as a forewarning system for

the to-be deployed troops. This is also a force-protection intiative.Similarly when

operations are being conducted in one Area of operations during a larger campaign

commander’s pitch in all platforms of intelligence collection systems to accomplish a

tactical victory. That is fine and is the standard procedure in the event of a conflict. What

the commander doesn’t think is to extend his view beyond the Area of operations far

away in hostile territory which is yet to see our troops in action and which is in control of

the enemy. We need to project a part of our intelligence collection assets into that

area/territory.

Foremost in the analysis of Intelligence tactics/strategies are the following questions:

what was the quality of the intelligence; what were the processes in which the

intelligence was used and did they put the intelligence to a suitable test?

Security Education and Training

The Indian forces need to be instilled with adequate security awareness and to this end

programs and education/training materials and methods should be designed more

appropriately/Personnel, installation and information—these three are critical assets and

need to be fully secured against multidimensional threat intelligence collection efforts.

Security education and training should be inducted in the force with exactly this intent.

The focus should be primarily on the multidimensional threat intelligence collection

efforts, the espionage threat and overall security threat factors. The soldier’s awareness

should be heightened in these fields. The concept of insider-threat should also be a major

area of study.Terrorism and insurgency should be dealt with Force Protection in the fore.

The basic philosophy (here it is defensive in nature) is to deny unauthorized access to

classified information together with personnel, physical, and information security. The

design of the training program should take into considerations unique characteristics and

requirements of each unit.We should push down intelligence to the boot level--Every

Soldier is A Sensor.This is the transformation in current intelligence doctrine.Even the

average infantry man can gain intelligence during patrolling , cordon and search ops or

during recce/surveillance by tactical questioning.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

The success of Counterinsurgency operations are predicated by the availability of timely,

accurate and specific intelligence about the enemy,its plans and intent and its

strength,dispositions,capabilities and TOE.

HUMINT and CI are two disciplines which help in detecting enemy capabilities , intent

and countering enemy intelligence collection activities.In a typical Army Intelligence

structure , the intelligence assets are located at Div and Bde levels , with the Bde having a

HQ company and Intelligence Bn , each Bn catering to a specific collection/counterint

discipline. For example there can be an Ops Bn , a reconnaissance Bn , a tactical

exploitation Bn,a forward collection Bn ,or a strategic SIGINT Bn.There is also a Div MI

Bn and a theater intelligence Bde.

Military intelligence brigades coordinate, manage, and direct intelligence and

surveillance; they conduct collection management, all-source intelligence analysis,

production; and they disseminate information in support of national, joint, interagency,

multi-national, regional combatant command, and Army service component

requirements.

I have attempted to create platoon/company level intelligence structures , intelligence

support teams , forward projection force with int as enabler--all three with HUMINT and

CI assets plugged in.A plug-and-play or modular int capability can achieve desired

results in today's unconventional warfare where it is distributed , non-linear.Such teams

can also play a major role in a very large operational battlespace.

Intelligence Whatever be the divisions in function or overall structure , HUMINT and CI

are indispensable to thwart enemy intelligence activities , to conduct force protection in a

optimum manner,to keep our forces combat-ready to deliver precision strikes and to

always keep the decision advantage in our favor with the element of surprise by the

enemy being put at the minimum.Both disciplines are time intensive and inter-human

interactions over prolonged periods have turned the tradecraft into a very specialized skill

involving human perception,behavior,psychology and other traits.Unlike other disciplines

like SIGINT,IMINT,MASINT,GEOINT HUMINT and CI have in common human

sources , the human element and hence is susceptible to error , deception by the enemy ,

fraught with risks and psychological stress including human vices predicated by money

and other factors which are usually the byproduct of information-transactions (quid-pro-

quo).But it is exactly these problems which prompts intelligence professionals to come

up with newer tactics so as to minimize these negative factors and the resulting

exploration and research in the field of HUMINT and CI leads to refined methodologies ,

TTPs which have been found to be effective in many cases.

ISR assets require the flexibility to detect a wide range of emerging threats. While the

ability to detect conventional military threats remains important, the ability to address the

asymmetric, non- conventional threat gains importance. Tracking the location and

activity and predicting the intent of individual threats is a new challenge at the tactical

echelon.