Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (Assuming passive-reactive battlespace around camp extending few kilometers and not just areas in close proximity to camp):
COIN Specific Intelligence Preparation of the Battle space (IPB) – the systematic,
continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific area with the
NETWORK in perspective.
The commander uses IPB to understand the battle space and the options it presents to friendly
and threat forces.
By applying the IPB process, the commander gains the information necessary to selectively apply
and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space on the battle space.
Irregular Warfare IPB
The principal difference between IPB for a conventional warfare environment and that of irregular
warfare is the focus on people and the accompanying high demand for detailed information (e.g. –
census data and demographic analysis) required to support the commander’s decision-making
process.
Force protection in a COIN environment is dependent on several factors. These factors can be
studied and detailed by compiling all data, demographic, human terrain, enemy, environment and
census. The intelligence preparation of the COIN battlefield is very different than that of
conventional battlefield. Here we are concerned with specific physical data so as to be aware of
ambush points, egress and ingress routes,corridors,avenues of approach for the enemy, areas or
profiles which can serve as cover for our troops if the enemy launches a surprise attack, areas
which can provide a good cover for the enemy and which can serve as good concentration zones
for their personnel etc.Hence intelligence preparation of the battlefield is of prime importance to
avoid mishaps like Dantewada and the Kashmir cases. In case of jungle warfare this is more
important and severe constraints are imposed due to very thick foliage, canopy, water areas,
darkness etc.HUMINT is something which might be the only intelligence discipline which can work,
other assets being degraded in performance/capability due to the jungle environment.CI support is
to HUMINT of prime importance, particularly in inhabited areas belonging to the local community
as the insurgents HUMINT source is the same local population. This will be detailed later as to
how to employ CI techniques in a COIN environment.
1.All
details about the enemy identity , group identity , leaders , local
commanders , different groups , handlers in Pakistan , resort to open
source intelligence like vwebsites , newspapers , pakistani online news
portals , pakistani and chinese news , demonstrations , police records.
2.All
tactics employed during past at least 5 years ..IED Attack ,
diversionary tactics like sheperds or public emerging right at the
moment of engaging with terrorists or during hot chase or during search
ops , stone pelting during ops , consider the new tactic of escaping
after attack recently when they were being chased on road and public
appeared , right in the line of fire of our troops thus enabling
the terrorists to escape...small arms fire , ambush , direct and
indirect assault on camp and any other tactic.(Keep a note which
tactics have never been used or seldom used..kidnapping , suicide
bomber /Veh Borne IED , Rocket launchers , more powerful weapons like
MI5 Rifle or any other modern arms , usage of army ordnance grade
explosives , mines , satellite phones for communication..these could
very well next change in tactics.
Note this part of IPB can give
rise to newer intelligence satisfying intelligence gaps as all tactics
application are guided by that particular offensive action
specific intelligence about the target and this intelligence can be got
from insiders , from particular informers among the public in the areas
close to the camp or on the route convoys take while coming in or going
out of base , or those shops social places where commander and other
officers frequent during leisure time or for shopping or just moving
around with family.Any newer weapon / explosive seized from a terrorist
could very well signify future or current plans to offset our
fire/protection capability..a needs/mission/capability analysis using
red teaming can yield information about future courses of action and
most likely or most dangerous course of action of the enemy.
3.Weather and Terrain.
4.Social networks
5.Logistics
6.Human Terrain
7.Attack profiles , how many times successful/failure , why success/failure ,
Blue teaming:
FOCUS AREA: INTENT OF ENEMY TO ATTACK + CAPABILITY OF ENEMY TO CARRY OUT THE INTENT.
Now what are the enablers of this equation:
Local
Support:Stone pelting (its also an enemy tactic , to cauuse diversion
with twin objectives , countering the security forces fire by firing at
those personnel who are rendered vulnerable due to distraction by stone
pelters , and secondly to effect escape.Similarly in a recent incident
when being pursued by security forces after directing fire on them the
terrorists gained an advantage when locals came in between the fleeing
terrorists and security forces on the main road )..
Locals attending
funerals of slain terrorists.This is an enabler of terrorists intention
as it shows local support for their ideology.
Social media activity
of civilians.Terrorists keep a tab on face book , whatsapp , other
social networks to guage the extent of public support they have.They
then plan accordingly.
Attack profiling:
History:
Log every
attack soi far in an area say 20 km around the base.Log the type of
attack , the tactics used , the weapons used , the explosive types ,
ambush/direct assault/hidden fire , casualties on either side , public
support?From this historical data plot on map paper areas of frequent
attacks - hotspots , connect the hot spots by lines and search for any
emerging pattern.Are there any areas close to hotspots that are of
military or recognizable value?On the other hand are there any places
of religious worship that any areas cklose by never subjected to attack
despite the fact that army base or army troops are situated close
by?Keep an accurate log of all weapons and explosives used and caches
and weapons , explosives captured/seized.Mind it thart any newer
powerful weapon can mean change in tactic , maybe to offset our forces
firepower.Dont just think newer weapons just brought in for routine
enemy assault.A change in tactics can mean a lot.
Public
reaction:second and third order effect factors.Like effect on public of
terrorist attack--sympathetic/full support?.I include public
reaction--second and third order effect in IPB of COIN as these
indicate indirectly the strength of ther enemy in intangible
terms.Sympathy for dead terrorist?Anger at their killings?Resortring to
stone pelting during and after attack? Hindering ops against them
before commencement of mission by crowding the path or letting domestic
animals loose?Attending funerals?
All these should not be just seen
as public sympathy .These are ENABLERS of terrorist attack,evasion and
escape.MIND IT.They are as serious as attacks by the enemy.Hence i
include them in IPB and threat assessment.
Red Teaming:(Am the terrorist)
Any
vehicle movement and troop movement..pattern?during movement to and
from the base?Any pattern of movement of senior officers in evening to
shopping malls , eateries?Any personal relationships with civilians and
if so venues , weaknesses?
Terrain profile?For convoys?Any specific
area good for concealment of weapons , clearings for field of
fire?Suitable for laying mines?
While preparing the intelligence assessment of the battlefield in a COIN environment we need to
consider the geospatial aspects in its entirety. To achieve this we must put on paper a mapping of
all explosive hazards attributes and movement patterns of the people and insurgents. Detailed
tracking information should be mapped out on map and imagery templates. This tracking g
information can be the event and movement patterns of the community people and insurgents
prior to, during and after an explosive hazard detonation and the emplacement of explosive
hazards, types, composition, method of emplacement etc.Thereafter pattern analysis coupled with
terrain analysis can be executed on these information.
To enable mapping consider the following:
1. All EH detonations, arrest of people with EH devices over time need to be tracked
and displayed graphically on a map template.
2. The technology used ,whether the EH was buried or thrown at the security forces ,
whether it is of blast fragmentation type or shaped etc need to be documented. This will
yield the operational characteristics of the enemy. Again every EH needs to be
tracked...keeping a time frame in perspective.
3. Every IED explosion or seizure translates to information about the bomb maker –his
signature. Examine the IED to ascertain the nature of ingredients, technology used, tactics
etc.Again map out this signature profile for every IED.
4. Map the IED events density over the area. Locations, dates and frequency need to
be used as reference points.
5. Considering only the type of EH used if mapping is done then we can get a good
idea of sources of particular types of IED or any other interpretation.
6. Keep in mind that one should track all EH events with respect to adjoining structural,
organizational, religious entities. For example there can be a local village near frequent IED
explosions that is hostile to our security forces. Or say a religious unit is nearby which is
pro-insurgent. These entities can be processed for more intelligence.
7. Map out those areas of the physical terrain that can act as good ingress and egress
points/routes/corridors to potential sites for EH emplacement.
8. Recorded information about the flow of enemy personnel, weapons, etc need to be
considered in its entirety.
9. From all these EH events based mapping identify/locate areas which may be used
for deployment of Ordnance/EOD /Engineers personnel and equipment preferably under
cover to assist in rapid response to IED blasts or attempts for emplacement.
10. Map out all the routes usually taken by the security forces , especially in friendly
areas and study the corresponding terrain in detail so as to ascertain any area/s /points
worthy of IED emplacement /vulnerable to IED and post IED attacks..Identify those
movement patterns of the security forces which are very frequent and hence liable for
IED’ing.
11. Identify those areas where emplacement of an IED can potentially cause harm to
security forces but not to the local community shelters. Of particular note are those
communities who are pro-insurgency.
12. Of all the possible emplacement areas on the map identify those areas that can
serve both as emplacement and also offer terrain advantages for immediate secondary
gunfire attack by hidden enemy personnel.
13. Map out those areas of the physical terrain which can multiply the IED explosion
severity by virtue of natural structures and profiles.
14. Locate and map all areas that can offer good concealment for ammunition and
weaponry caches and IEDs.
15. Map HUMINT.For example an insurgent operative was arrested in a certain area
away from his place of residence, another defined area.
16. (6) From all the EH points on the map identify those that are of low damage capacity
than those that inflict mass casualties. The former takes less time for emplacement and
difficult to prevent compared to the latter. Color code these two type—thus a geospatial of
such ‘’White-noise’’EH devices and ‘’Mass-casualty; EH devices help the Commander to
get a better understanding, his situational awareness is heightened.