PART B
Intelligence has two objectives:
First, it provides accurate, timely, and relevant knowledge about the enemy (or
potential enemy) and the surrounding environment.
The second intelligence objective is that it assists in protecting friendly forces through
counterintelligence. Counterintelligence includes both active and passive measures intended to
deny the enemy valuable information about the friendly situation. Counterintelligence also includes
activities related to countering hostile espionage, subversion, and terrorism. Counterintelligence
directly supports force protection operations by helping the commander deny intelligence to the
enemy and plan appropriate security measures.

Stated differently it acts as an early warning system by attempting to provide accurate and
timely information about the adversary’s intention, and the surrounding environment. It
also provides a counterintelligence tool to deny the adversary valuable information and
also to combat terrorism, subversion and espionage. Thus intelligence is protective,
exploitative and positive in that it supplies us with positive intelligence about the adversary
and protects our own infrastructure. Intelligence thus renders our actions either offensive
or defensive.
“Intelligence supports the commander’s force protection needs by estimating an enemy’s
intelligence, terrorism, espionage, sabotage, and subversion capabilities as well as recommending
countermeasures against those capabilities’’

Today’s war scenario is of the 4th Generation type. Asymmetry has factored in most battle or
tactical operations to a great deal. In fact most of the conflicts around the Globe are asymmetrical
in nature , with the players in the combat environment being terrorists, insurgents with very limited
firepower , elusive and most of the time operating while mobile , very less identifiable with no
conventional forces insignia , very limited personnel strength , distributed and sporadic operational
tactics, undefined infrastructure logistical capabilities on one hand and a national power or allies
with a formidable military, attack and defense platforms and a central military organization with
subordinate headquarters and units spread at unique identifiable geographic locations. Hence not
to be subdued by this disparity between themselves and govt. forces the asymmetric adversary
resorts to sudden, sporadic, hit and run type attacks on the forces bases , installations , camps ,
ordnance depots, communication systems, personnel and information systems with the sole
objective to degrade the forces combat capability and kinetic termination of its key leaders at top
echelons or middle and ground level tactical units. A kill is a kill. A kinetic hit is a kinetic hit.
Whether it’s a bazooka attack destroying an armored personnel carriers drive system immobilizing
it or whether it’s a timed explosion resulting in the destruction of a combat helicopter in the hangar
, the end result is the same….we have lost combat capability. In this fashion attacks on our
installations,camps,bases,personnel and information systems/communications are designed to
degrade our capabilities, exhaust our ordnance on nonexistent targets or dummy targets / proxy
targets (deceptive measures of the adversary) –this realm of Threat to our forces itself while in
transit or before deployment or in personnel stations and bases and the Govt. forces actions to
thwart these threats with intelligence feeds predicating the plans/COAs design is called Force
Protection.

CI supports Command Force Protection efforts by:

   1. Identifying the potential threat forces and multidisciplinary threat intelligence
   2. Identifying threat capabilities and intent together with the most likely course of action
   3. and the most dangerous course of action (keeping all the possible COAs parallel for review)
   4. Using deception to mislead the enemy about our capabilities, vulnerabilities and
   intentions.

CI & SECURITY REQUIREMENTS:

   1. Protecting classified information
   2. Protecting critical resources
   3. Protecting weapons and weaponry systems
   4. Safeguarding visitors to the installation
   5. Protecting dignitaries
   6. Protecting Senior government officials or military senior stafdf visiting the installation
   7. or areas outside the installation but falling within military jurisdiction
   8. Sustain mission objectives
   9. Protect information systems

Within the installation thee may be specific person/s,resources,assets,activity,operation or
information that if targeted by the enemy can adversely affect the installation operations , mission
objectives or any risk dimension—in other words it has ‘’Target value’’ to the adversary. During
security planning such entities should be identified (in most cases using red-teaming or
counterintelligence support to vulnerability assessment) and secured against enemy actions.

Include with this the need to ascertain what adverse effects the local threat can have over the
installation as a whole and what missions or contingency plans can be designed to support the
installation, and what results is the minimum security requirements in the light of the threat
perceived due to the existence of local threat forces.

Local threat assessment usually provides a threat picture specific to a single installation or
grouping of installations based on the threat factors mentioned above. This means that each
installation may have specific security requirements tailored to its individual assessment.

Resource economy-probably the most important factor in inefficient Force protection

Due to erroneous planning, or improperly defining intelligence requirements or even due to enemy
deceptive/denial measures it could very well be that the Commander deploys his resources,
combat power and other combat-related assets in the wrong place and time thus
exhausting/wasting them and hence resource economy is of prime consideration during any
mission and to this end the value of intelligence cannot be overstated. These false responses can
be limited and brought down to a minimum by specific, timely and accurate intelligence.
Intelligence helps the commander to prioritize his security options. The commander can direct his
efforts towards the most important requirements, such as handling the most serious security risks
first, mitigate the threat/s which is of lesser severity and accept the inevitable danger and be
prepared for risks which are of least severity. Thus the countermeasures will be more appropriately
directed against the enemy without any wastage of resources, manpower or lessening in combat
effectiveness. All this proper threat driven intelligence and counterintelligence operations, the term
‘’threat-driven’’ assuming greater significance as it then goads the commander to know the
unknown aggressively. It should be emphasized that other security agencies should be consulted
and information shared with them, both horizontally and vertically to get a complete picture of the
threat.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN CI AND HUMINT:
CI Does Not Equal HUMINT
CI and HUMINT , although sharing most of the time similar collection techniques , are not the
same thing in the sense that CI is not a subset of HUMINT.HUMINT is an intelligence discipline
whereas CI is a multidiscipline function supporting HUMINT.We should not confuse the information
collection methods and operational intention. This incorrect doctrinal terminology error will lead to
a weakening of both/
HUMINT is solely concerned with collection , not the purpose of collection of the information or the
requirements which predicate this collection. Yes the HUMINT collector is aware that the purpose
of his collection efforts are geared to collecting information from designated human sources using
specific collection techniques. In this sense he is conducting a ‘’pure’’ collection effort, not
concerned with what this information will be used for and what necessitated the collection in the
first place. HUMINT collection includes “operations conducted using HUMINT collection
techniques regardless of the ultimate use of that information.” HUMINT activities include a great
variety of operations, analysis, and liaison duties.
CI on the other hand uses human sources too as source of information but goes few steps further
in that CI is aware of the intent of collection and aggressively uses specific techniques to either
neutralize or exploit the enemy intelligence activities using the gathered information. Most of the
techniques in his repository are similar to that of the HUMINT agent; It is this use of HUMINT skills,
particularly investigation and source operations that has created the confusion. CI is a
multidiscipline function with the purpose to detect,identify,deter,exploit.neutralize the enemy’s
collection efforts—it seeks to counter enemy intelligence geared towards
terrorist,subversive,espionage,sabotage or insurgent attacks on our forces and installations and
lend support to HUMINT in its activities, protect the intelligence cycle and ensure force
protection—a very important factor. Thus we find CI to be composed of several
attributes,aggressive,never relenting and protecting the other intelligence disciplines activities(for
example , determining whether a source is a source who wants to wittingly give information or is
an enemy plant).HUMINT contributes to an all-source visualization of the battlefield , increases the
situational awareness of the commander.HUMINT is intelligence derived from
persons,documents,a pure intelligence activity whereas CI is somewhat like the hand in
darkness..exploring,detecting,getting a hold. Moving ahead with all help that is available in an
unknown enemy specific darkness , the enemy lurking in the shadows , whose actions once
discerned by the hand will lead to the latter’s firm clasp on his neck.
Hence we must not tend to associate CI solely with HUMINT collection nor define HUMINT in
terms of CI.Commanders should understand this.It should not be the prerogative of only
intelligence personnel.Commanders,staff officers of operations etc functions should understand
this intelligence issue clearly so as to synchronize ops well with intelligence.ISR effort should not
be degraded by weaknesses in both HUMINT and CI as a result of this confusion.CI and HUMINT
are highly complimentary. Very true but of opposing mindsets.

Conclusion
HUMINT collection and CI are and will continue to become increasingly important as we enter the
21st century. Both efforts are vital to mission success across the entire spectrum of operations.
The understanding of the doctrinal distinction between HUMINT collection and CI is fundamental.
This distinction drives the doctrinal description of both efforts and our understanding of how they
are mutually supportive and intertwined in stability operations and support operations.
Whatever be the divisions in function or overall structure, HUMINT and CI are indispensable to
thwart enemy intelligence activities, to conduct force protection in a optimum manner, to keep our
forces combat-ready to deliver precision strikes and to always keep the decision advantage in our
favor with the element of surprise by the enemy being put at the minimum. Both disciplines are
time intensive and inter-human interactions over prolonged periods have turned the tradecraft into
a very specialized skill involving human perception, behavior, psychology and other traits. Unlike
other disciplines like SIGINT,IMINT,MASINT,GEOINT HUMINT and CI have in common human
sources , the human element and hence is susceptible to error , deception by the enemy , fraught
with risks and psychological stress including human vices predicated by money and other factors
which are usually the byproduct of information-transactions (quid-pro-quo).But it is exactly these
problems which prompts intelligence professionals to come up with newer tactics so as to
minimize these negative factors and the resulting exploration and research in the field of HUMINT
and CI leads to refined methodologies , TTPs which have been found to be effective in many
cases.
Improving Army CI Doctrine
The first step in improving the Army’s ability to collect force protection intelligence is building
appropriate doctrine that clarifies the role of Army Intelligence and CI personnel. Make its
information operations doctrine more complete by publishing comprehensive CI doctrine. This
doctrine should explain the primary CI missions of collections, investigations, operations, and
analysis and production.
Doctrine guides the employment of military forces, and shapes how military professionals “think
about the use of the military instrument of national power”. Army doctrine details a basic
understanding of the tactics , techniques and procedures to be employed to support combat
requirements. Air Force doctrine provides commanders and their staffs a basic understanding of
how various Air Force organizations can be used to meet or support combat requirements.
INDIA historically lacked comprehensive CI doctrine.This lack of doctrine has resulted in
confusion, and hampered the ability of Force commanders to use CI to improve force protection
efforts.
Force protection efforts must be threat driven.Vulnerabilities should be identified , the
corresponding threats identified and then protective measures are put in place.To this end MI and
CI play a very important role.This should be the basis for the creation of a comprehensive CI
doctrine. .
“CI is the systematic acquisition of information concerning espionage, sabotage, insurgency, and
related foreign activities conducted for or on behalf of foreign nations, entities, organizations, or
persons and that are directed against or threaten our military interests.” To this end a variety of
HUMINT sources , like walk ins , casual sources , defectors , official sources , liaison contacts ,
recruited sources are employed by CI elements. CI collections and investigations lead to a
repository of information on threats.Thereafter by cueing other intelligence disciplines and using all
source analysis a complete picture of the threat is obtained.Thus we reach our main objective—
the precise warning of hostile attack and we also identify the probable targets of the attack and the
time of attack.In a nutshell CI usage of HUMINT is the first line of defence.
Army force protection requires a separate force protection doctrine. Not only intelligence personnel
will benefit from the doctrine directly but also tactical commanders who must have a basic
knowledge about force protection so as to understand what requirements ought to be defined and
handed over to the intelligence and counterintelligence personnel to adequately protect the force.
The commanders battlefield operating system at his disposal are fire support and maneuver and here
is where intelligence and counterintelligence act as force multipliers –the Intelligence and CI BOS
must be successfully integrated in the Commanders BOS so that his PIRs are successfully answered
giving him ideally a perfect situational awareness about the battlespace so as to conduct operations
successfully. The commander focuses on the intelligence system by clearly designating his priority
intelligence requirements (PIR), targeting requirements and priorities. Intelligence is a continuous
process which keeps IEW operations tied to the commander's critical decisions and concept of
operations. CI collection, analysis, and dissemination, like other intelligence, have to meet the
commander's time requirements to be of any use other than historical.
They can then better understand the limitations and capabilities of the CI support elements. Force
protection doctrine requires intelligence and counterintelligence personnel to obtain and analyze
information on:
Enemy units
Terrorist groups
Insurgent groups
Enemy special forces
Criminal enterprises
Cybercriminals
Radical elements
That part of the local populace which supports the enemys ideals
Environmental/chemical/health/radiological/biological hazards
Weaponry systems of the enemy units,terrorists,insurgents and crimninal
enterprises
Force protection doctrine should compel the creation of Service capabilities to collect, receive,
evaluate, analyze, and disseminate all information on terrorist
activities,strength,capabilities,organization,intent,past history, current activities in the area in
question or areas of interest and indicators of imminent attack.
We can categorize the threats based on intent. This can be incorporated in the force protection
doctrine. Hence we can allocate HUMINT resources in an appropriate manner without any
duplication or wastage. Type 1 can be criminal activity geared towards army bases ,Type 2 can be
penetrative reconnaissance and sabotage operations, terrorist and insurgent attacks , and Type 3
can be major land , amphibious , air and missile attacks.
TYPE1, 2 and 3 threats can be adequately determined by the employment of counterintelligence
assets which use HUMINT sources to collect force e protection information and conduct
investigations , security surveys ,threat and vulnerability assessments. Casual sources, official
sources, liaison contacts and recruited sources comprise the source database of the CI repository.
All source intelligence is also used for all the threats, particularly TYPE4.These include HUMINT,
SIGINT.MASINT, IMINT, ELINT AND OSINT.Fusion of all information from multidisciplinary
intelligence platforms with data from national level intelligence agencies result in far better
situational understanding of the Commander. ISR synchronization is a must if we have to have a
robust advance warning system to avoid the element of surprise.

We can make certain observations after studying force protection failures from around the
globe:

1.HUMINT was not given priority in force protection efforts , neither the HUMINT
support was precise, effective and tailored to the Commanders needs. Instead standard
operating procedures detailing standard and routine defensive methods and access control
were implemented.HUMINTs capability in predicting on how , where and when a terrorist
attack might take place was ignored.HUMINT can predict the specific target ,time and
nature of attacks.

2.Lack of organic intelligence capability at tactical level.. “They did not have a
dedicated, organic, and focused [force protection] intelligence analytical
capability.”Plus there is a weakness in both collection and analysis of force
protection intelligence. If intelligence capability can be pushed down to company/platoon
level with the soldiers being augmented with 2-3 HUMINT and 1-2 CI operatives (or the
soldiers themselves being trained in the basics like tactical questioning and interrogation)
then instead of sending request for information to higher headquarters the tactical capability
to investigate , gather information and analyze it would have been achieved. The ‘’always
top-down’’’ intelligence flow could have been avoided and a four way flow implemented with
interaction between the tactical units and higher headquarters, adjacent company
headquarters and intelligence elements.Hence there is a desperate need for military
units operating in high-threat environments to possess organic intelligence
collection, analysis, and investigative capabilities.

3.Military intelligence lacked the necessary impetus to devote time, effort and
resources for long-term and mid-term terrorist threat intelligence collection and analysis –
such as trends, intentions and capabilities of terrorists. National intelligence agencies were
larger in operational and administrative size and were given priority rather than the MI in
collecting intelligence but national level agencies cater to a wide range of requests for
information apart from terrorist threat to forces whereas MI can exclusively set up collection
taskings for force protection intelligence given adequate weight age , administrative and
financial aid and clearance by the Government. This was absent.

4.The installation in question fell prey to terrorist attacks because the intelligence
arrangement at Command level in higher headquarters or at the installation headquarters itself
was focused on outward attacks like tactical missions, or defensive postures dictated by air
threat and totally ignored the need for HUMINT/CI based intelligence collection for ground
defense of the installation, personnel, information and communication facilities.

To execute a CI operation successfully liaison is needed with other civil agencies and with the
intelligence agencies of the 3 services.To effectively build up a liaison time is required,it cannot be
achieved overnight.In case of COIN operations liaison is much needed with the local
administrations intelligence branch and with the police as they are the ones who know the local
area,population,criminal elements and insurgency profile in terms of attack history, police records
of personalities and elements who have been apprehended and surrendered..the latter can be put
to use by the counterinsurgents as pseudo-insurgents to penetrate the adversary’s setup. Liaison
relationships are an investment in the future, and the return on this investment is directly
proportional to the time and effort expended on developing and maintaining the relationship.

We can transfer say 2-3% personnel from the MI to the CI unit as CI units are generally
understaffed compared to the standard HUMINT units , and the liaison units. Even transferring 3%
personnel can significantly raise the strength of all the units overall. Thus with this transfer the
Commands HUMINT assets get a boost and now coupled with CI augmentation the HUMINT
teams can handle all three types of threats , Basic , Levels 1&2.
Simply transferring will not suffice, proper training in counterintelligence need to be given. But this
wont be a problem as the MI soldier already has basic intelligence training and acumen. Yes they
need to be granted clearance to access compartmentalized intelligence information and hence
prior to transfer the soldiers need to undergo a counterintelligence investigation process as to their
suitability.

The CI effort focuses on the overall hostile intelligence collection, sabotage, terrorist, and
subversive threat. The CI effort is also sufficiently flexible to adapt to the geographical
environment, attitudes of the indigenous population, mission of the supported command, and
changing emphasis by hostile intelligence, sabotage, terrorist, and subversive organizations.


What Are We Protecting?
In protecting an installation and its information systems, operations and general security from
enemy multidisciplinary intelligence threat we must identify the vulnerable and critical areas to be
given more weightage during security review. Not all assets and activities warrant the same level
of protection. To this end a careful and thorough vulnerability analysis needs to be conducted
resorting to red teaming methodology.
It should be noted at this juncture that it is always the attempts of the enemy intelligence service
to subvert our knowledgeable personnel. In a military production unit , say ordnance factory , the
senior engineers and quality control scientists have access to sensitive designs and information
related to weaponry systems. Similarly classified and top secret documents/information are in the
hands of cleared senior personnel. These people are often the target of aggressive enemy
counterintelligence agents.
The five basic categories include the following:
1. People
2. Military personnel
3. Activities/Operations
4. Intelligence collection/analysis
5. Sensitive movement of operations/personnel
6. Conduct of sensitive training
7. Communications/networking
8. RDT&E and sensitive technology
9. Production of sensitive technology
10. Protection of nuclear/chemical/biological materials
11. Protection of weapons, explosives, and equipment
12. Information
13. Classified
14. Sensitive Compartmented Information
15. Top Secret
16. Secret
17. Confidential
18. Unclassified
19. System designs
20. System capabilities/vulnerabilities
21. Sensitive methods
22. Facilities
23. Headquarters
24. Field offices/administrative buildings
25. Training facilities
26. Storage facilities
27. Production facilities
28. R&D laboratories
29. Power plants
30. Parking facilities
31. Aircraft hangars
32. Residences
33. Equipment/Materials
34. Transportation equipment/vehicles
35. Maintenance equipment
36. Operational equipment
37. Communications equipment
38. Security equipment
39. Weapons
40. Automated information systems equipment
Now that the CI agent is knowledgeable about these assets and activities that need protection, he
can execute a vulnerability and criticality analysis and recommend suitable protective measures as
well as countermeasures to the Commander. He can recommend which critical units need
protection first and what resources to allocate and how and where to implement general security
and countermeasures.


UNIT PROTECTION:
We will define unit not be size or specific function but by any military group capable of offensive,
defensive or stability operations.
Unit protection is the process through which combatant and noncombatant personnel, physical
assets and information are protected from adversarial threats including adversarial
multidisciplinary intelligence threats.Multi layered, active/passive, lethal/non-lethal offensive and
defensive measures are adopted for this purpose. Protection is composed of a variety of active
and passive measures (for example, weapons, pre-emption, and warning) in the air, land, sea, and
space domains. The goal of unit protection is preventing attacks on the three unit resources ,
manpower, physical assets and information so that the capability of the unit to maintain its fighting
potential without any degradation by the enemy is constantly maintained.
The Army must:
In order for unit protection to be 100% effective we need to ensure that the following are taken into prioritized consideration by the unit commander:The above factors are contained in the Detect-Assess-Decide system.”(DAD).
In addition unit Command and Control must be properly defined as C2 aids the Commander to
take proper decisions in the light of what needs to be done exactly to protect the unit and ensure
that this is carried out efficiently.

Protection:
Protection is a function which should be given a holistic treatment. Protection should
not separately focus on weapons deployment , pre-emption and warning. All three must be
integrated. No one is a separate entity. Protection must be proactive. In fact unit protection should
never always be passive but must also include active measures.Intellighence , counterintelligence
and an admixture of military and cross government capabilities should be employed to the full.
Installation/camp protection should look beyond the perimeters. Just employing passive
measures(check posts, access control, perimeter security , guard functions , lighting) and OPSEC
isn’t sufficient. Surveillance teams , counterintelligence operatives should foray outside into
adjoining areas , even areas of interest located far from the unit , and the communities in these
areas so as to gain information/intelligence and counter enemy
reconnaissance/HUMINT/subversive /sabotage/terrorist activities. Counterintelligence should be
employed to screen contract workers and suppliers. A counterintelligence review should be
conducted periodically on unit personnel. Red teaming should be taken up by the commander and
his staff to ascertain unit vulnerabilities and critical areas.
Add to Detect , Assess and Decide the functions Act and Recover and we have the foundation for
a complete protection system on which to base our decisions regarding collection of intelligence ,
fortifying and strengthening/hardening our bases, decide on the optimum courses of actions ,
employ forces optimally to act on these decisions and in case of an attack which could not be
prevented , recover in the shortest possible time without the base collapsing totally during/after the
attack using redundancy measures/backups and thorough protection of critical assets. We should
also remember protection has yet another dimension. The enemy might know the protective
measures we have employed using intelligence and might attempt to block /prevent/deter our
post-attack or pre-emptive actions , hence protection must take these into account also.
Protection means ‘’time-critical tactical operations’’ ..not just tactical operations. Protection should
be a 360 degrees hemispherical capability , meaning protection from land , air and sea based
attacks.
For protection intelligence is critical as everything needs to be known about the enemy ,
environment and self. The last factor is determined by counterintelligence reviews , technical
experts and red teaming.All intelligence platforms and ops must be thoroughly integrated to
handle attacks fro m land , air, information , electronic,CBRNE,and intelligence domains of the
enemy. This integrated approach heightens the commander’s situational awareness considerably ,
thus acting as a force e and decision-superiority enabler thus leading to optimum effective course
of action/s by the Commander with a decisive finish.
Thus it is clear from the above that protection must be proactive , intelligence-led and an
integrated approach.

Objectives of unit protection are:
1.Install a warning system
2.Intelligence preparation of all areas adjoining the base ,camp , the route along which the troops
movement takes place –in fact it must be made mandatory for units intelligence section to keep an
updated file on the intelligence preparation of the entire area surrounding the base/troop
movement route whether or not there is a perception of threat.IPB should include , among other
things
Damage to our forces in combat on the battlefdield or in case of an assymetrical
combat , in hilly/urban/jungle terrain but away from base is different than that of an attack
on an unsuspecting troop movement or installation/base itself where an attack means
catching us off guard , unprepared and things move so fast due to the element of surprise
our forces do not have enough time to recover , regroup and counterattack in time to thwart
the enemy.The enemy may have critical assets in mind when they attack the
installation/camp/base.Thus tactical operations are ‘’time-critical’’.Hence to successfully
thwart an attack ,should our defences fail …we must be prepared to execute time critical
axctions without falling prey to the shock due to the surprise element.This is more so say in
the case of an attack on an unsuspecting convoy or troop column.
  1. Reducing vulnerability to minimum
  2. Identifying critical assets , protecting them priority of all unit protection systems
  3. Understanding that most operations will be in a non-linear unconventionaloperational environment and hence all intelligence , counterintelligence , surveillance ,reconnaissance , target determination and nomination, combat oiperations,passive andactive protection measures , red teaming , and recovery options should be seen from this perspective.
  4. Should understand that a complete 360 degree hemispherical protection systemmust be installed which must be a thoroughly integrated intelligence and operations function keeping the factors DAD in perspective and the factors which come next , viz..Act , Finish and Recover
The following types of threats should be expected in any future conflict-
We must remember we are now facing a fourth generation enemy , who will attempt to put in use
every means including confusion and deception to overcome the asymmetry/mismatch by
increasing uncertainty and making us more susceptible to the element of surprise. The enemy will
resort to continuous , random, and non-decisive engagements. The enemy will randomly and
continuously threaten and interdict lines of cooperation’s and communications. They will use
camouflage and deception to to reduce weapon engagement rangers and degrade our forces
advantages in ‘’stand-off’’ engagements. There are two objectives herein—first to confuse us so
much that we cannot execute the targeting process correctly , target
determnination.identification.nomination becomes very difficult against an elusive enemy
employing random attack methods , and secondly frequent loss of contact with this elusive enemy
has more negative consequences than that which would have occurred with a conventional more
predictable echeloned enemy.

HUMINT and CI are two disciplines which help in detecting enemy capabilities, intent and
countering enemy intelligence collection activities. In a typical Army Intelligence structure, the
intelligence assets are located at Div and Bde levels , with the Bde having a HQ company and
Intelligence Bn , each Bn catering to a specific collection/counterint discipline. For example there
can be a Ops Bn , a reconnaissance Bn , a tactical exploitation Bn,a forward collection Bn ,or a
strategic SIGINT Bn.There is also a Div MI Bn and a theater intelligence Bde.
Military intelligence brigades coordinate, manage, and direct intelligence and surveillance; they
conduct collection management, all-source intelligence analysis, production; and they disseminate
information in support of national, joint, interagency, multi-national, regional combatant command,
and Army service component requirements.

For full treatment please refer to this link to access the manual on Force Protection

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