COUNTERINSURGENCY training

CRPF academy

This is not a CRPF Site.Its an endeavour to complement existing CRPF Officers training.

Points to Ponder

DEFICIENCIES
INDIAN ARMY/CRPF INTELLIGENCE – A REVIEW
Lack of Boot-level intelligence capability (Organic int capability – CLIC BLIP)
Lack of Common Operating Picture from Div to Coy level
Lack of aggressive/surge component in HUMINT/CI
Lack of int-enabled RSTABDA – ‘’Fighting for Information’’..rather its ‘’avoid engagement passive R&S’’
Lack of complete understanding of HUMINT term. Confusion between HUMINT and CI.CI Relegated.
Lack of TOCs at every level. Even for deep R&S ops.
Lack of organic int-capability for far flung tactical units engaged in ops—away from Bde HQ Int Section/SO.
Lack of well defined TOE for COIN units.
Lack of full understanding of center of gravity in case of COIN.
Lack of a systematic preparation of intelligence/CI products like Int Estimate ; CI Estimate; Current int brief. CI Review,Targeting report,CI Worksheet
Lack of intelligence preparation of the battlefield ‘’in its entirety’’.No Int/Ops template to find Int gaps from history in AO.
Lack of Force Protection Doctrine and the embedded condition of CI as an enabler.
Lack of functional HUMINT teams such as CEE Team , Human Exploitation Team, Human Terrain Teams.
Lack of Mobile Interrogation Teams
Lack of a complete Int architecture with full technical control , requirements-collection-asset management protocols, synchronized ops-intel,4-way (Higher/lower HQs and adjacent unit HQs)push-pull especially bottom-up push, controlled int-reach for soldiers on the ground and need-to-know at every echelon, integrated WAN/LAN for COP at every level, and many other factors not excluding professional military education for all officer ranks and training routines for enlisted soldiers , NCOs and Senior NCOS/JCOs (with openings for induction of non-int MOS Riflemen).
Lack of Asymmetric Warfare Doctrine – Int
Lack of mission-needs-capability analysis.
Lack of line soldiers indoctrination in basic tactical questioning , screening and DOCEX.
Lack of Concentric-rings methodology
Lack of CI Ops inside camps/bases in peace-time to create vulnerability assessment report. Same during military ops other than war.
Lack of ‘’insider threat’’ prevention-controls enforced by CI.
Lack of Battle-hand off –Int.Be it MOOTHW or Stability Ops.Or URI type scenario.
AN EARLY WARNING

INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence is not just sourced information..corroborated and ops undertaken.Ops should not be designed around only corroborated or validated information..even if the three attributes of intelligence are met..viz specificity accuracy and timeliness.

We are the Blue Forces.Enemy is Red.Like we call on our int assets to visualise Red during the entire int collection process we must use Counterintelligence to visualise ourselves by keeping ourselves in enemy's shoes..red visualising blue.Only then can we know Enemy Intent..the primary goal of the int-counterintelligence double edged sword.