I am independently on my own initiative  providing this report for your information and use. Policies and memorandums of understanding should be updated to adequately address Force Protection Detachment (FPD) requirement , creation of a seperate Force Protection Doctrine and a new intelligence discipline , namely Force Protection Intelligence and there is a need for a standardized and consistent training program. In addition, the current validation and prioritization process should be strengthened to continually monitor FPDs once they have been established. 

 

Objective

Am conducting an assessment of the Force Protection capability and the associated intelligence component in the background of the recent Pulwama suicide bomber attack on security forces in transit. Am particularly reviewing in transit force protection. While listing the findings of the commission attention areas dealt with were existing Sops, intelligence inputs, security measures employed, the authority-direction-control of the CRPF Command with respect to the outbound movement and security, present and missing training requirements. Data for the commissions enquiry is essentially open source but I was careful in collection of open source information, extracting information only from credible websites with a history of providing accurate, unbiased and government-worded statements. An extensive web search was conducted while collecting all information.

Background

I have studied past cases of terrorist attacks in J&K and elsewhere and took time to compare and draw parallels with such incidents in different parts of the Globe.I studied in detail intelligence practices of terrorists/insurgents from open source and the existing Force Protection and Intelligence doctrines of several nations militaries.I took into cognizance the rate of failures and successes in tactical operations preceding and after instance of attacks on our forces , be it on military bases or in-transit.I compiled data on how the local populace behaved in response to such attacks and the rising number of stone pelting and the speeches delivered by Hurriyat leaders /politicians in the aftermath of attacks.I gathered as much information as possible from open source Pak based terrorist indices of behavior as apparent from hate speeches and veiled/direct threats.One such incident was the declaration to use suicide bombers.I categorized collected intelligence from open source into intelligence , counterintelligence and force protection intelligence by applying context and greater world knowledge (knowledge repository) to the various attacks.   


THE FINDINGS

                        Finding1:HQs from unit to command components must lay down policies and procedures so as to enable the creation of dedicated Force Protection units and to this effect it is imperative that newer policies/procedures be appended to current intelligence/counterintelligence doctrine to accommodate a new intelligence discipline namely Force Protection intelligence. Recommendation: The Army Intelligence Directorate should pass orders for the training and setup process for Force Protection units , properly staffed and commanded by thoroughly trained officers and personnel.They can be drawn from MI Staff Officers and lower echelon billets and imparted training.This further extrapolates to the fact that tactics , techniques and procedures of Force Protection intelligence must be established and training imparted in the same vein.

                        Finding 2: A study of past attacks such as URI , Pathankot , Sukna among others highlights the fact that terrorists are adapting to defensive tactics , techniques and procedures and are resorting to and devising different attack courses of action , leveraging asymmetric advantage by changing place and weapon delivery platform as well as selective targeting. The enemy is resorting to HUMINT/CI practices utilizing local inhabitants. Recommendation: The Army HQs should admit the fact that its not only asymmetric warfare but a mix of asymmetric and hybrid domains. It should be clearly emphasized at command echelons that tactical battle decision planning should take into account of all possible delivery means of  assault phase of the enemy , even those not yet thought of but happening in other parts of the Globe. It should be clearly understood that the terrorist will want to use the most current means of attack so as to catch our forces off guard , our forces being tuned to specific types of attack scenarios due to historical inertia , that is attacks from the same spectrum being conducted over the years. Recommendation: We must maintain a written Force Protection Doctrine where will be included all past attacks , lessons learned , frequency of such attacks , tactics used , tactic-damage dynamic , newer tactics and techniques adopted among other things. Such a Doctrine will provoke/prompt newer ideas/concepts about attack regimen during tactical plannings.The Doctrine should take into account all terrorist/insurgent intelligence/CI activity and liaison with the police will be very fruitful in compiling these data. Recommendation: It is highly recommended to make all unit and command officers aware of the risk-displacement/risk-aversion technique during target selection by terrorists as this is what our officers are blind to when they harden a possible target, forcing the terrorists to look elsewhere, such as convoys instead of fortified bases. Once the terrorists decide on the target he automatically starts intelligence collection to fit his battle strategy. The police are in a better position to detect/deny such activities as the terrorist resource pool is the local inhabitant’s base. Hence it is highly recommended that Army Intelligence ( I should say Army Intelligence and Force Protection intelligence officers) closely liaise with local police and intelligence agencies. This is where the CI component of both AI and FP units come into play apart from Humint agents .All these will reduce the vulnerability of forces-in-transit to sporadic but planned attacks by terrorists.

                        Finding 3: It has been observed that attacks on bases/camps have shifted to convoys.The underlying threat translates from challenging the imperviousness of fortified military installations to personnel killings in numbers.If we further extend this line of thinking then it wont be surprising if attacks are conducted on embarking or disembarking troops at railway stations or for that matter troops-in-train-transit.All these may sound a bit far fetched right now given present circumstances of localized terrorist attacks but as I said earlier asymmetric  war is characterized by the primary element of surprise. Recommendation: Apart from in-transit troops protection protocol inter-state-transit troops need also be given adequate preventive protection.The focus should be on detect/deny and prempt such terrorist attacks.For that intelligence , counterintelligence and Force Protection intelligence must be integrated with movement planning and security.It is important that current procedures of Force Protection are reassessed , modified and implemented in keeping with this Commissions findings.

FINDING SUMMARY

1. I found that the Army does not have a dedicated Force Protection Unit which could have extended counterintelligence, intelligence, security and police specific security to in transit troops. I find that there are no template Force Protection security measures such as a force protection cell specifically providing support to outgoing forces in transit as opposed to static forces in bases/camps. I find there is no dedicated separate Regimental Security Office which will have tasking authority over separate Force Protection units/detachments and effect operational synchronization (I find no separate Force Protection cells/units/detachments as said earlier).I found that liaison activities of the Army with the local police did not explore the possibility of being transformed as a Force Multiplier for the Police with respect to security of the army personnel. I find that the various stakeholders in the area of Force Protection did not actively and directly relate or participate with any dedicated Force Protection Unit , rather it was standard operating procedures , military security and intelligence led not intelligence driven involvement , with a broad rigid Force Protection programme and not Force Protection at a resolution at ground level , tactical and much finer than the coarse resolution level at higher echelons of the CRPF.
2. I found that there could have been a total lack of validation and prioritization process in order to monitor Force Protection variables and whether the existing SOPs answered every question arising due to different ground scenarios , keeping earlier attacks in perspectives and historical data of adaptation of terrorists to newer force TTPs and movement security thus resorting to newer terrorist attack delivery platforms.I find that existing SOPs are rigid without any major initiative to incorporate changes in light of emerging trends after the attacks in URI , Sukna , and elsewhere.
3. I found that current Force Protection practices were not adequately addressed so as to be continually updated.Newer policies to this effect were not framed.I find that mission-specific Force Protection needs are only highlighted and hence only those policy guidelines are adhered to that fill in mission requirements.A 360 degrees policy adherence is not the case and hence obsolete or Force Protection practices that do not provide necessary guidance come into play.
4. I find that  a standardized and consistent training program did not exist that addresses the training needs and this absence is primarily due to the fact that we don’t have dedicated Force Protection units/cells/detachments , existence of which would have made possible separate education and training Doctrine.I find that the lack of Force Protection specific training regimen is one of the primary causes behind the disaster. 
5. I find it is not acknowledged that SOPs have a life cycle and that adaptations , modifications and overhaul is very necessary in light of current adaptive trends in enemy tactics , techniques and procedures. 

General Note

Mission essential tasks of any unit Commander should include adequate Force Protection listed as a priority requirement.The organic intelligence capability , if created , can enhance the commanders situational awareness so he can develop security programs accordingly.We find in the Pulwama terrorist attack incident there are reports of advance warning , warning that emanated from Signals.There was a reported , verified incident in Pakistan of the terrorist group airing a video threatening an attack. Images and speech accessed by India Today show Jaish-e-Mohammed commander Moulana Rouf Asghar, younger brother of JeM chief Masood Azhar, addressing a rally in Karachi nine days ahead of the Pulwama terror attack, where he gave indications of suicide attacks being planned by the Pakistan-based terror outfit in India and Kashmir. In his speech, Asghar also mentioned Ghazi Rashid, who is being considered as the brains behind the dastardly suicide bombing in Awantipora, Pulwama which claimed the lives of 44 CRPF jawaans. The intelligence input, sent on behalf of the Inspector General of Police, Kashmir, asked all security agencies to "sanitize areas properly before occupying your place or deployment as there are inputs that IEDs could be used".Headlined "extremely urgent", the letter accessed by IANS, was marked to the Deputy Inspector General of Central Reserve Police Force, South Srinagar; DIG CRPF, North Srinagar; DIG CRPF North Kashmir, Baramulla; DIG CRPF South Kashmir, Awantipora; DIG CRPF South Kashmir, Anantnag; DIG Sashastra Seema Bal, South Headquarters (Special Operations) Kashmir and all Senior Superintendent of Police of Kashmir zone.The information was also shared with Inspector General, CRPF, Kashmir operations sector, IG CRPF, Srinagar sector, IG Border Security Force Headquarter Kashmir, all range Deputy Inspector Generals of Police of Kashmir zone, Brigadier General Staff (operations) at the Srinagar-based 15 Corps, the DIG Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), the Air Force, , the Commandant Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) and SSP, Armed Police, Control Room Srinagar.The letter also mentioned that it should be for "all concerned".

Keeping all the above in perspective it is strongly felt that had our forces had their own organic intelligence units and a separate Force Protection Detachment assigned to the unit then such cases of external intelligence inputs from Govt/Military agencies and Open Source would not have gone ignored and could have been analysed , interpreted and disseminated more effectively , the disaster could have been averted.The point to note here is that organic intelligence units and a Force Protection detachment in Direct Support mode are more tuned to the overall protection of the unit than higher HQs as they are much closer to the ground , and the intelligence requirements is judged from a finer resolution rather than at a coarser level as seen by higher HQ.

(To Be Continued)..

(To be continued , detailed findings , policy and recommendations)

The next and final edit of the draft will dwell on the policy and procedures to enable FP dets and why the requirement of FP specific intelligence,humint CI taskorganized with various Force Protection conditions.Am color coding area sectors in keeping with threat intensity index,orange being high alert.This FP conditions will be time variable and influenced by threat perceptions and live display.A change from a lighter color to say orange will impact security forces action in a more aggressive way.Intelligence collection and human exploitation in the community will increase.There are more but we need this color coded force protection conditions live display system.

P.S.Soldiers are dying.situation chaotic and uncertain in kashmir.too many deployment but targeting based on search ops,cordon and not full int supported.paramil forces in the fray and their command cannot synchronise properly with int,officers not int savvy.admixture of army and paramilitary,concept of ops not defined clearly.this admixture is not task organized.mission specific task organized teams with int support coupled with cordon and search ops is required and aided by human exploitation teams as we are dealing with a hybrid case,terrorists,local sympathizers and those who are actively supporting terrorists.Time for CI elements under cover to conduct ops in community areas.int ops need to be preceded by thorough int/CI planning.

Example-Security application: Terrorist activity prone areas have the local populace as their center of gravity.I'll label areas most sensitive and with history of frequent attacks  orange.cordoning these areas away from the yellow labelled ones where we have large scale demonstrations and overt terrorism support.finally the grey areas where peace prevails and low public activity.setting up checkpoints roadblocks and troops chain in order  to seperate these zones and then conducting search ops will be fruitful as escape routes and entry blocked.ops can be configured as per colour code.orange demands active mil ops,yellow human exploitation,detention and interrogation and intimidation while grey psychological ops.this way the battlespace can be shaped and forces optimally committed with proper usage of resources and tactical combat support such as other int disciplines , MP,Signals.